Tag Archives: Black-owned banks

Where Black-Owned Lending Doesn’t Reach: Mapping the (Primary) Mortgage Gap

“How do we think about buying the home, but not who is supplying the mortgage? The capital, the very thing we constantly say needs to circulate more we give no thought too. We give no thought to who owns the mortgage company, title company, the real estate brokerage company our agent works for. All we know is – we are buying a house and unfortunately we think that is enough and we could not be more wrong.” – William A. Foster, IV

Draw a map of the United States and mark every county with a Black population share above fifteen percent. The shading will run thick down the Mississippi Delta, wrap around the Chesapeake, spill across the Piedmont Carolinas, thicken again in Houston and Dallas, and pool densely in New York, Philadelphia, and the Bay Area. Now draw a second map, this one marking every mortgage lender in America that is actually owned — not merely led, not merely branded, not merely marketed — by African Americans, and actively originating home loans for the house a borrower actually lives in. The second map is nearly blank. Nine dots, clustered in a dozen states, mostly small cities, mostly credit unions. Overlay the two maps and the mismatch becomes the argument: the geography of Black homeownership demand and the geography of Black-owned mortgage capital do not correspond. For most African American home buyers in the country’s largest Black population centers, the choice to bank Black on the single largest financial transaction of their lives does not exist. It was never offered.

This is not a complaint about willingness. It is a diagnosis of capacity. HBCU Money has argued consistently that Black wealth-building runs through institutions, not sentiment, and nowhere is that clearer than in the mortgage market, where the difference between origination by a Black-owned lender and origination by a mainstream white-owned lender is not cosmetic. It is the difference between interest payments compounding inside the African American institutional ecosystem; funding future loans, future branches, future capital reserves and interest payments leaving it permanently, financing balance sheets with no obligation to reinvest. A mortgage is a thirty-year capital-retention decision disguised as a housing decision, and right now the overwhelming majority of that decision is being made by institutions with no stake in Black community reinvestment.

Start with what actually exists. According to NerdWallet’s most recent accounting of lenders serving Black communities, published in January 2026, ten institutions make the list. One of them, Legacy Home Loans, is Black-led and does meaningful volume and it is licensed to operate in twenty-nine states plus Washington, D.C. but it is not Black-owned; it is a nonbank mortgage company, not a depository institution held by African American shareholders or member-owners. It belongs in a different conversation, one about Black executive leadership inside a financial system still substantially owned by others. It should not be counted alongside the nine that are actually owned by African Americans, because ownership, not leadership, is what determines whether profit and reinvestment obligations stay inside the ecosystem or exit it. And even Legacy’s twenty-nine-state reach should be read against the actual scale of the mortgage industry it operates inside: Rocket Mortgage alone originated roughly 429,000 loans worth $116.2 billion in 2025, and the ten largest lenders in the country together accounted for more than a quarter of all mortgage dollar volume originated nationally that year. A single top lender’s annual dollar volume dwarfs the combined asset base of every African American-owned bank and credit union in the country several times over.

The nine that are actually Black-owned are, without exception, small and regional. Andrews Federal Credit Union serves Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., with a natural base among military members and veterans. Citizens Trust Bank operates out of Atlanta, serving Alabama and Georgia, with a first-time buyer program built on partnership with the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta. First Independence Bank serves Detroit and Minneapolis. Hope Credit Union covers a five-state footprint across the Deep South (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee) with underwriting flexibility built for lower-income borrowers, including ITIN loans for those without Social Security numbers. Liberty Bank has the widest reach of the nine, touching Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee, and runs a Detroit-specific restoration and acquisition program. Municipal Employees Credit Union of Baltimore and SecurityPlus Federal Credit Union both concentrate on Baltimore. St. Louis Community Credit Union concentrates on St. Louis. Self-Help Credit Union serves Florida and North Carolina, with no-down-payment products designed for borrowers with thin or alternative credit files. What unites all nine, and distinguishes them from the banks discussed below, is that a borrower can walk in the door and finance the home they intend to live in directly with the institution; not a commercial building, not a rental property, not a construction loan against a development, but the primary residence itself.

Compress that list into a set of states and the coverage runs to roughly seventeen states plus the District of Columbia: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia. That is the entire national footprint of Black-owned primary-residence mortgage lending capacity in America.

Now compare it against where African Americans actually live in the largest numbers, and against the fuller picture of where Black-owned banks and credit unions operate at all, primary mortgages or not. Texas holds the largest Black population of any state in the country, concentrated in Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, and San Antonio. Houston is home to Unity National Bank, and the state carries fourteen active Black-owned credit unions, the fourth-highest count nationally, yet the distinction here has to be precise. Unity does lend against real estate, and lends actively: by its own account, its loan portfolio runs heaviest in commercial and industrial lending, commercial real estate, and small business loans, and it offers financing for owner-occupied and investor commercial buildings, housing development and construction, and SBA-backed acquisitions. What it does not do is originate primary-residence home mortgages directly. Unity’s own materials describe that product as handled “through a trusted third-party partnership” rather than underwritten and held by the bank itself which means a Black family in Houston can finance a commercial building or a construction project through a Black-owned bank, but not, in any direct sense, the house they intend to live in. That is a meaningfully different thing from Citizens Trust, Hope Credit Union, or Liberty Bank actually closing a primary-residence loan in their own name, and it is the precise reason Unity does not appear among the nine even though it is a real, active, community-rooted Black-owned bank. New York tells a related story: no Black-owned bank operates in the state at all, but fifteen active Black-owned credit unions do, the third-highest concentration in the country, serving a Black population that ranks fourth largest nationally and carries the historic institutional density of Harlem, Brooklyn, Buffalo, and Rochester and still, none of those fifteen institutions reach the national primary-mortgage-lender list. Pennsylvania is home to United Bank of Philadelphia, one of the country’s African American-owned banks, and to two of the HBCUs this publication takes care to highlight rather than ignore in Cheyney University, the nation’s first degree-granting HBCU, and Lincoln University, the first degree-granting HBCU for men, yet whatever its lending mix, it does not appear on the active primary-mortgage list either. South Carolina follows a similar pattern: Optus Bank operates out of Columbia, in a state where African Americans make up one of the highest population shares in the country and where Claflin, Voorhees, Allen, Benedict, Morris College, and South Carolina State together form one of the densest HBCU clusters anywhere, but Optus does not appear on that list. California is the thinnest case in this group by far. OneUnited Bank, headquartered in Boston, operates branches and does considerable business in the state, serving a Black population of well over two million people concentrated in Los Angeles, Oakland, and the Bay Area but OneUnited does not offer mortgages anywhere, and California’s own credit union sector amounts to a single active institution holding $318,105 in assets and 262 members, a presence that has contracted since 2016 rather than grown. In each of these five states, the absence is not institutional absence; it is a narrower and in some ways more troubling gap between capital existing, and in some cases lending actively, and that capital being deployed specifically into the primary-residence mortgage product that would make it meaningful to a home buyer rather than a developer or a business owner.

Delaware, Ohio, and Wisconsin sit in a starker category, and two of the three arrived there only this year. Delaware, which by population share ranks among the most heavily African American states in the union and is home to Delaware State University, has no Black-owned bank on record. Ohio, home to Central State University and Wilberforce University, lost its last African American-owned bank, Adelphi Bank, when the institution’s ownership diluted below majority African American control in 2025; a particularly bitter loss because Adelphi had been the first new African American-owned bank chartered anywhere in the country in twenty-three years, and its growing asset base made the loss of ownership control, rather than a closure, the actual wound. Wisconsin’s loss came from the opposite direction: Columbia Savings and Loan Association of Milwaukee, chartered in 1924 and one of the oldest African American-owned financial institutions in the country, survived the Depression, the savings-and-loan crisis, and the 2008 collapse, only to close in 2025 after its capital base finally gave out. Milwaukee’s Black population runs to roughly thirty-nine percent of the city, and it now has no African American-owned bank of any kind, a fact HBCU Money’s own reporting names directly. Together, Ohio and Wisconsin’s losses erased nearly $130 million in Black-owned banking assets in a single year, offset only partly by the addition of Redemption Bank in Salt Lake City, Utah; a welcome new entrant, but one whose presence in a state with a comparatively small Black population does nothing for the students at Central State and Wilberforce or the residents of Milwaukee’s north side. Missouri, notably, does not belong in this category at all while it has no Black-owned bank, but it is one of only four states, alongside Maryland, Mississippi, and Virginia, that together hold roughly eighty percent of all African American-owned credit union assets nationally, with St. Louis Community Credit Union anchoring real capacity in the state even without a bank of its own.

This is the pattern the institutional lens is built to catch and the individual-success lens is built to miss. It is not that Black home buyers in Houston, Harlem, Philadelphia, Columbia, or Los Angeles lack the income, the credit profiles, or the desire to build wealth through homeownership. It is that the institutional infrastructure to let them do it through an ownership structure aligned with their own community’s capital retention simply does not exist where they live, or exists and does real business there, sometimes real estate business, without that business ever reaching the specific product that would make the ownership meaningful to a family buying a home to live in, or existed until this year and has now been lost outright. The absence is structural, and structural absences do not close through individual effort; they close through institutional construction, merger, and expansion or they do not close at all.

The scale problem compounds the geography problem. HBCU Money’s own 2025 directories count African American-owned banks holding $6.7 billion in assets, and 205 active African American-owned credit unions holding $8.15 billion in assets and serving 726,929 members, a combined $14.85 billion in Black-owned depository capital against nearly $25 trillion in total American bank assets alone. The credit union count has fallen from 318 institutions in 2016 to 205 today, a 35 percent decline in the number of institutions even as combined assets more than doubled over the same period, a sector consolidating around its strongest players while losing breadth, not one expanding into new geography. The bank sector tells the same story in sharper relief: two of its oldest and newest institutions, a century-old Milwaukee thrift and a two-year-old Columbus startup, both vanished from the ranks in the same year. Of this already-thin universe, only a handful of institutions actively originate primary-residence consumer mortgages at any real volume; many of the rest, like Unity National, are real and active lenders in commercial and investment real estate without extending that activity into owner-occupied home loans, while others are simply not underwriting real estate credit as a core product line at all, whether from capital constraints, risk appetite, or the absence of the correspondent relationships and secondary-market infrastructure that make mortgage lending viable at scale for a small institution. HBCU Money’s own Annual Wealth Report puts African American household net worth at roughly $5.6 trillion, a figure that makes plain how thin the institutional base is relative to the capital it would need to absorb if African American mortgage demand were redirected toward it in any serious volume. Nine primary-mortgage lenders drawing on $14.85 billion in combined sector assets cannot underwrite home purchases for a population of over forty million people concentrated in dozens of metropolitan areas outside their combined footprint, particularly against an industry where a single national lender moves more than $100 billion in loans in one year. The mismatch is not a marketing problem to be solved with a “bank Black” campaign. It is a balance-sheet, charter, product-line, and geographic-coverage problem that campaigns cannot fix.

What follows from this is not resignation but a specific set of institutional priorities. First, expansion of primary-mortgage capacity into states where Black-owned depository institutions already operate including in adjacent real estate lending, as Unity National does in Texas but do not lend on owner-occupied homes, should be treated as a nearer-term strategic objective than chartering new institutions from scratch, since the regulatory relationship, the deposit base, the real estate underwriting expertise, and in New York’s and Texas’s cases a double-digit count of existing credit unions already exist; what is missing is a specific product line, which is a narrower and more solvable gap than institutional absence. Second, the roughly two hundred active Black-owned credit unions nationally represent underused latent capacity concentrated too heavily in four states; a coordinated push through NCUA guidance, CDFI Fund support, or philanthropic capital specifically earmarked for mortgage-program buildout to bring a meaningful share of the New York and Texas credit union bases into primary-mortgage origination would multiply national coverage without requiring a single new charter. Third, secondary-market aggregation matters more for this sector than for almost any other segment of American banking: a consortium structure that allows small Black-owned institutions to originate loans locally while pooling them for sale or securitization through a shared, mission-aligned intermediary would let a nine-lender map become a fifty-state map without requiring each institution to carry mortgage risk alone on an undersized balance sheet. Fourth, HBCUs themselves properly understood as one node in the broader African American institutional ecosystem rather than its center sit inside several of the exact metropolitan areas where lending capacity is absent, dormant, commercial-only, or newly lost, and alumni associations, endowment offices, and institutional banking relationships at schools in Texas, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, California, and Ohio could function as anchor depositors and referral partners, giving a Unity National, an Optus Bank, or a New York credit union the local relationship base and deposit volume needed to justify building out a primary-mortgage division that does not currently exist.

Fifth, and perhaps most directly actionable, the sector needs its own version of what Legacy Home Loans already proves is possible: a dedicated, Black-owned nonbank mortgage company, built by an entrepreneur with outside investment capital, licensed to originate across multiple states, and structured from the outset to correspond with rather than compete against the depository institutions already discussed. Legacy demonstrates the model works at scale: twenty-nine states plus Washington, D.C., built without ever taking a deposit or carrying a bank charter. What Legacy does not solve is ownership; profit and control sit with a Black-led company, not a Black-owned one, and the model’s success has not yet been replicated in Black-owned form. A founder pursuing this path would not need to invent underwriting or licensing from scratch — nonbank mortgage companies operate on well-established regulatory rails — but would need enough capital to meet state net-worth and bonding requirements across a meaningful footprint, and enough underwriting and secondary-market discipline to sell originated loans forward rather than hold them on a balance sheet the company does not have. The natural distribution partners for such a company are exactly the institutions already identified in this piece as active in real estate or deposits but not in primary mortgages: Unity National Bank in Houston, whose existing commercial real estate lending relationships and third-party mortgage referral arrangement could be absorbed directly into a Black-owned originator rather than an outside partner; United Bank of Philadelphia; Optus Bank in Columbia; OneUnited’s branch network in California; and the credit union bases in New York and Texas. None of them would need to build a primary-mortgage division of their own if a Black-owned originator existed to take the referral, close the loan under a shared or co-branded relationship, and let the deposit-taking institution keep the account and the trust while the mortgage company carries the origination expertise and risk. That structure — bank or credit union as the front door, a dedicated Black-owned originator as the engine behind it — would close more of the map faster than waiting for seventeen banks and two hundred credit unions to each build mortgage capacity independently, and it is the one recommendation on this list that does not depend on an existing institution changing its strategy first; it only requires someone to build it.

None of this requires new instruments that do not yet exist. It requires existing Black-owned banks and credit unions to treat mortgage buildout and geographic expansion as core strategy rather than incidental growth, it requires an entrepreneur and investment capital willing to build the origination company that connects them, and it requires the broader institutional ecosystem such as HBCUs, Black chambers of commerce, Black professional networks to function as coordinated infrastructure for that expansion rather than as separate, isolated actors each solving a piece of the same problem independently. The map of nine dots is not a permanent feature of the landscape. It is the current state of an institutional sector that lost two of its members in a single year, has not gained a stable new charter in over two decades, has shed a third of its credit unions since 2016, and has not yet been asked, systematically, to turn the capital and the real estate expertise it already has into mortgages for the families it was built to serve. Reversing it is a matter of capital, coordination, and institutional will not of finding more good customers, who have never been the scarce resource in this equation.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

Building Dynasties: What It Will Take for African American Families to Rise to Power

“control, control of resources, control of self, control of nation, requires preparation — Garveyism was about total preparation.” – Dr. John Henrik Clarke, writing on Marcus Garvey’s philosophy of Black institutional power

In 1952, a mason in Americus, Georgia bought eleven acres with cash he’d saved from three decades of laying brick. He built a house on it, a smokehouse behind it, and a wraparound porch where he told his grandchildren that the land was the family’s now, forever. He died in 1979. By 1994, the eleven acres had been split six ways, sold in fragments to cover a funeral, a divorce, and two bad business loans. Today a subdivision sits where the smokehouse stood. The mason did everything right by the logic he was given: work, save, buy, own. What he lacked was not virtue. It was infrastructure. Nobody had ever taught him that land without governance is just land waiting to be divided.

That story is not an outlier. It is the median outcome. And it is the central argument of this piece: African America’s problem was never a shortage of individual achievement. It is a near-total absence of the legal, financial, and cultural machinery that converts one generation’s success into the next generation’s platform. Until that machinery is built, deliberately and aggressively, every dollar earned by this community will keep dying with the person who earned it.

Start with the scoreboard, because the scoreboard is brutal. The Federal Reserve’s 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances put median Black household net worth at $44,900, against $285,000 for the median White household — a gap of more than six to one, and one that widened in absolute dollar terms even as Black wealth grew faster in percentage terms during the pandemic recovery. Growth rate is a vanity metric when the base is this small. A 60 percent increase on $28,000 is still poverty with better arithmetic. The gap is not closing. It is compounding, in the same way interest compounds, except in the wrong direction.

Now layer on top of that the single largest wealth movement in American history, already underway. Cerulli Associates projects that $84 trillion will pass from the Baby Boomer and Silent Generations to heirs and charities through 2045, the bulk of it concentrated among households that were already high-net-worth. This is not a rising tide. It is an inheritance economy, and inheritance economies reward whoever already has family structures in place to receive, consolidate, and reinvest capital across generations. Families without that structure will watch the transfer happen around them, not to them. The transfer is not going to wait for African America to get its paperwork in order.

This is where the sentimental version of “generational wealth” needs to be retired. Passing down money is not the same as passing down power, and Black America has been sold the former as if it were the latter. Power, as any serious student of the Waltons, the Rockefellers, or the Kochs understands, does not come from an inheritance check. It comes from the entity that controls the check. The Walton family does not merely benefit from Walmart’s success; through Walton Enterprises LLC and the Walton Family Holdings Trust, they collectively control roughly 45 percent of the company’s outstanding shares, a concentrated bloc large enough to determine board composition, executive succession, and long-term strategy three generations after Sam Walton’s death. That is not inheritance. That is institutionalized command, engineered through trust structures, family governance, and a refusal to let ownership fragment. Jay-Z’s net worth impresses a magazine cover. It does nothing for the fortieth Black family down the street, because it is not organized as an institution — it is one man’s balance sheet, subject to one man’s mortality.

The uncomfortable truth is that most families, of any race, fail at this. Research tracked by the Family Business Institute finds that roughly 30 percent of family-owned businesses survive into a second generation, about 12 percent make it to a third, and only 3 percent endure into a fourth. Succession is hard even with capital, even with lawyers, even with three generations of practice at running something. What that data point exposes is not that Black families are uniquely undisciplined — it’s that family continuity is a discipline nobody is taught, and African America has had roughly one-fifth of the time (counting from Emancipation, and accounting for the systematic destruction of Black wealth through redlining, urban renewal, and outright terrorism such as the 1921 razing of Tulsa’s Greenwood district) to build the muscle memory that older American dynasties built over five and six generations. The response to that deficit cannot be more individual grit. It has to be structure, copied deliberately from where it already works, and adapted ruthlessly to this community’s actual starting conditions.

So build the structure. A family constitution — a written document specifying mission, capital rules, and succession mechanics — costs nothing but discipline and an afternoon with a competent estate attorney, yet almost no Black family has one, while every dynasty mentioned above treats theirs as more binding than a corporate bylaw. A family office does not require billionaire assets to justify its existence; pooled family capital in the low six figures is sufficient to retain a fee-only advisor, establish an LLC or trust structure, and begin making coordinated decisions across a real portfolio — brokerage accounts, retirement vehicles, business equity, insurance-funded trusts, even royalty and intellectual-property streams — instead of six relatives each managing a fragment of the same family’s capital in isolation. Land is one asset class among several and should be governed the same way the rest are: never liquidated to cover an emergency when it could instead be collateralized, folded into a trust, or held alongside an equity stake in a family business and a diversified investment account, each professionally managed rather than administered by whichever relative answered the phone first.

None of these families stayed inside their founding asset. Koch Industries began as a part-interest in a single Minnesota oil refinery bought out in the 1940s and 1960s; under Charles Koch it diversified deliberately into pipelines, fertilizer, pulp and paper, ranching, glass, electronics, and commodities trading, so that no single market downturn — a refining glut, a paper-price collapse, a bad cattle season — could touch the whole estate at once. The Rothschilds began as court bankers to European nobility in the 1760s and, over two centuries, moved family capital into railways, mining, real estate, energy, and, notably, wine estates like Château Lafite and Château Mouton — acquired not as hobbies but as productive, appreciating assets that diversified the family’s holdings away from the banking sector that made them. Even the Waltons, whose fortune is most associated with a single company, don’t hold it as a single asset: Walton Enterprises runs its own internal investment arm allocating family capital into private equity, real estate, and outside ventures entirely apart from Walmart stock, precisely so the family’s fate isn’t fused to one retailer’s stock price. In every case, the founding asset became the seed capital for a portfolio, not the permanent shape of the estate. That is the model the eleven acres in Americus should be measured against. The land was never meant to be the ceiling of that family’s wealth — it was meant to be collateral for the next asset, security for a loan into a business, a hedge alongside a brokerage account, one holding in a portfolio instead of the whole of it. Held that way, structured that way, it doesn’t matter whether the estate a family passes down began as land, a barbershop, a nursing license, or a pension. What matters is whether it was ever allowed to grow past its origin.

None of this is exotic. It is standard operating procedure for every dynasty this essay has named. It has simply never been marketed to African America as something within reach, because the wealth management industry profits more from selling individual products than from building family institutions that don’t need it.

Institutions of the wider Black ecosystem have a direct, self-interested role here, and this is where the case must be made in dollars, not sentiment. A Black-owned bank or credit union that captures family trust deposits and estate accounts gains stable, patient capital instead of transactional balances. A historically Black college or university that structures a real endowed-chair or scholarship-naming relationship with a family — rather than accepting a one-time gift — gains a recurring donor relationship spanning generations rather than a single tax-season transaction. Fisk, Tougaloo, Dillard, and Xavier of Louisiana have decades of experience cultivating exactly this kind of multigenerational donor family; Alcorn State, Coppin State, Savannah State, Bethune-Cookman, Norfolk State, Delaware State, Fort Valley State, and Morgan State could each become the anchor institution for a rising family dynasty if they pursued the relationship as deliberately as the Rockefellers pursued the University of Chicago or the Dukes pursued the university that bears their name. The institution that captures a family early, before its capital scales, is the institution that owns the relationship when that capital multiplies. This is not charity. It is customer acquisition, and any HBCU treating it otherwise is leaving its own endowment on the table.

The same logic extends past the water’s edge. Diaspora capital coordination — joint investment vehicles linking African American family offices with counterparts in the Caribbean and across Africa Core — is not a symbolic gesture toward Pan-Africanism. It is a hedge against the concentration risk of building wealth inside a single, historically hostile domestic market. A family real estate or infrastructure fund co-managed across African American, Jamaican, and Ghanaian family offices diversifies political risk, currency exposure, and asset class in one structure, while building exactly the kind of institutional density and strategic coordination that isolated, single-country family wealth can never achieve alone.

None of this happens through moral appeal, and this publication has no interest in making one. Appeals to racial solidarity have moved conferences and Twitter timelines; they have not moved balance sheets. The case for family institutionalization has to be made the way the Waltons, the Kochs, and the Wallenbergs made it to their own descendants: this structure protects what you have from your own children’s mistakes, from probate courts, from market volatility, and from the actuarial certainty that someone in every family eventually dies without a plan. Estate planning is not morbid. It is the single highest-leverage act of institution-building available to a family with under a million dollars in assets, and it costs less than a used car.

There is also a governance failure hiding inside the sentimental version of Black wealth-building that deserves direct confrontation. Families that treat wealth distribution as an equality exercise — splitting everything evenly among heirs regardless of role, competence, or commitment — are optimizing for fairness at the expense of survival. The Family Business Institute’s own data on why family enterprises collapse points overwhelmingly to succession disputes and undefined governance, not lack of capital. A family that assigns real roles — someone accountable for investment decisions, someone accountable for philanthropic strategy, someone accountable for legal and tax exposure — and backs those roles with actual authority, not just a title at Thanksgiving, will outlast a family that insists every cousin gets an equal, undifferentiated vote on every decision. Institutions require hierarchy. Families building institutions will have to get comfortable with that, however uncomfortable it sits against a cultural instinct toward flattened, communal decision-making.

The alternative to all of this is not neutral. It is continued erosion. Every family that fails to formalize governance sends its capital back into the undifferentiated churn of individual consumption — the paycheck model this publication has criticized elsewhere, in which wealth is treated as something to be spent rather than something to be commanded. Every dollar that leaves the Black institutional ecosystem through an unplanned estate, an uninsured death, or a liquidated piece of land is a dollar the next generation has to earn from zero, while families with institutional infrastructure simply compound what they already hold. The compounding gap in the Federal Reserve’s data is not an accident of history. It is the visible output of one set of families running institutional software and another set running none at all.

The mason in Americus did not fail his family. He succeeded at everything available to him in 1952, in a state where a Black man building wealth at all was itself an act of defiance. What failed him was the absence of a structure that could have held what he built past his own lifetime, and the absence of a plan to let that first asset become seed capital for a second and third — a trust, a governance document, a designated successor with both the authority and the training to keep the estate whole and growing, whatever form that estate took or became. That absence is fixable, at a scale of millions of families, in this generation, and it applies as much to a brokerage account or a stake in a family business as it does to eleven acres of Georgia clay. The Kochs turned one refinery into a dozen industries. The Rothschilds turned a banking desk into vineyards and mines. Neither family mistook where they started for where they had to stay. It requires no act of Congress and no act of philanthropy from outside the community. It requires families to stop organizing themselves as clusters of individuals bound by affection, and start organizing as institutions bound by structure, because affection does not survive probate court and structure does. The eleven acres are gone. Whatever the next generation holds — land, equity, a business, a portfolio, or something none of them have thought to build yet — does not have to stop there, and does not have to follow them into the ground.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

Invite Allies to the Potluck but Protect the Cookout

Do not show me the person dancing to our music, enjoying our food, fetishizing the Black man, or some other cultural consumption. Show me the one who is demanding Harvard deposit $100 million of their own funds to OneUnited Bank so that OneUnited, Liberty Bank, and other African American owned banks can make loans to our community for business and homeownership. Show me the ones who uses their privilege to stick up for what society has done and does to Black women and Black family. That is who can come to the potluck, but the cookout is ours. We have a tendency to shrink ourselves to Others’ fragility of real conversations that we need to have for ourselves when Others are present. – William A. Foster, IV

There is an old story, told in various forms across African American communities, about a family that learned to cook in secret. For generations, they had grown their own food, developed their own techniques, and built a kitchen that could feed a neighborhood. One day, a neighbor knocked on the door, drawn by the smell. They were welcomed in, fed generously, and they returned often. They brought friends. They praised the food. They called themselves part of the family. Eventually they began to suggest improvements to the kitchen — a different arrangement, a new appliance, a recipe adjusted for broader tastes. The family, grateful for the company, accommodated each request. By the time they looked up, the kitchen still stood. The neighbor’s name was on the deed. The family was still cooking. They just no longer owned the stove.

But generosity extended without institutional clarity is not community building. It is exposure. And the history of African American institutional life is, in no small part, a history of spaces built with collective sacrifice that were subsequently absorbed, diluted, defunded, or dismantled once their value became legible to the outside world.

The cookout, in other words, is not a metaphor. It is an asset. And assets require more than governance, they require protection. Not the passive protection of a community that hopes its institutions will be respected, but the active, disciplined defense of people who understand that what they have built has value precisely because others will seek to capture it. Protection, at the institutional level, is not always a defensive posture. Sometimes it means going on offense by organizing buying power before the crisis arrives, building legal capacity before the lawsuit is filed, funding Black media before the narrative is set by someone else. Communities that wait to protect what they have until after it is threatened are communities that spend their energy on recovery rather than accumulation. The history of Black Wall Street, of the Freedman’s Bank, of the systematic dismantling of Black-owned cooperatives during the mid-twentieth century is not a history of insufficient gratitude from the outside world. It is a history of insufficient institutional defense from within. The lesson is not to be less generous. It is to be better armed.

The analytical literature on Black wealth formation is consistent on a foundational point: communities that retain capital, talent, and institutional loyalty generate compounding returns across generations. Communities that allow those resources to migrate outward whether through spending patterns, marriage partners, talent pipelines, or cultural appropriation subsidize the wealth accumulation of others while undermining their own. The cookout dynamic maps directly onto this framework. When African American cultural production, social spaces, and institutional knowledge are shared without reciprocal investment, the result is a net transfer of value from Black institutions to non-Black ones. This is not a theoretical concern. It is the operating condition of the present economy.

Consider the structure of the music industry, where Black artists have generated the dominant commercial genres of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries — blues, jazz, rock and roll, hip-hop, R&B — while the majority of accumulated wealth from those genres has resided in non-Black-owned labels, distributors, publishing houses, and streaming platforms. Consider the food economy, where Black culinary traditions have been commodified into billion-dollar restaurant chains and packaged goods while the originators of those traditions remain systematically underbanked and undercapitalized. Consider the fashion and beauty industries, where aesthetics developed within African American communities command global markets while the infrastructure of those markets sits largely outside Black institutional ownership. In each case, the cultural product was welcomed. The economic architecture was not extended.

Allies who celebrate Black culture without supporting Black institutions are not allies in any operationally meaningful sense. They are consumers. The distinction is not semantic. An ally, by institutional definition, extends their power, capital, and access in support of an aligned party’s strategic objectives. A consumer extracts value from a community’s production without contributing to the institutional conditions that make that production possible. The presence of a non-Black person at the potluck enjoying the food, the music, the wit, the aesthetic while opposing or simply ignoring the policy conditions, banking relationships, and institutional investments that African American communities require to sustain themselves, is the profile of a consumer, not a coalition partner. They have not earned the potluck. They have certainly not been invited to the cookout.

This distinction becomes especially critical in the current political economy. Federal and state policy over the past several decades has systematically defunded or defanged the institutional infrastructure of Black America: HBCUs chronically underfunded relative to their peer institutions; Black-owned banks capitalized at a fraction of the levels needed to serve their communities; Black neighborhoods subject to environmental, housing, and educational policies that extract tax revenue while withholding proportional investment. In this context, cultural adjacency or rather the willingness to celebrate Juneteenth, consume Black media, or engage Black social vernacular is insufficient as an expression of solidarity. It may, in fact, function as cover for the absence of the structural commitments that matter.

The HBCU sector offers a particularly instructive case study. Historically Black Colleges and Universities were built precisely because African Americans were excluded from the educational institutions of their own country. They were not a gesture of separatism; they were an institutional response to exclusion. Over the course of the twentieth century, HBCUs produced a disproportionate share of the Black professional class, trained the majority of Black doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers of their generation, and served as incubators for the civil rights movement’s leadership and organizational capacity. They are, by any rigorous measure, among the most productive institutions in American higher education history relative to the resources they have been given.

Yet HBCUs now operate in a competitive landscape that rewards endowment size, federal research designation, and alumni giving rates; all measures that reflect historical access to capital rather than institutional quality or community impact. Predominantly white institutions that previously excluded Black students now recruit them aggressively, drawing talent and tuition revenue that would otherwise compound within the HBCU ecosystem. The language used to justify this recruitment is almost always the language of inclusion and opportunity. But inclusion in another institution’s ecosystem is not equivalent to investment in your own. A Black student who attends a well-resourced predominantly white institution may gain individual credentials. The HBCU they did not attend loses the tuition, the alumni relationship, endowment compounding, and the network density that transforms good universities into great ones.

This is not an argument against shared space. There are potlucks to which allies are genuinely welcome that inlcude moments of coalition, cross-cultural solidarity, and mutual investment where the presence of non-Black partners strengthens rather than dilutes collective purpose. But a potluck is not a cookout, and the distinction is not decorative. At a potluck, everyone brings something to the table. The host provides the space; the guests contribute to the meal. It is a transaction of mutual provision, and it works precisely because no one arrives empty-handed expecting to be fed. A cookout is different. A cookout is the community’s own table that is prepared by Black hands, funded by Black resources, held in Black space, for Black people. Its purpose is not coalition. Its purpose is sustenance, honesty, and the particular freedom that only comes when a people can speak plainly among themselves without managing anyone else’s comfort. Both gatherings have their place. They are not interchangeable, and confusing one for the other is how communities lose the only space that was ever entirely their own.

What African American institutional life requires is a clear distinction between spaces of engagement and spaces of sovereignty. Spaces of engagement are where coalitions are built, where allies demonstrate reciprocity, where the community interfaces with the broader economy and polity on its own terms. Spaces of sovereignty are where Black families and communities convene among themselves to assess the wealth gap without softening the diagnosis, to discuss the particular pressures facing Black women and Black men without moderating the conversation for outside sensibilities, to make strategic decisions about institutional investment and political alignment without the distortion that comes from managing the reactions of those who do not share the same structural position. Both kinds of space are necessary. Only one of them is currently treated as optional.

What does that governance structure look like in practice? It looks like HBCU alumni choosing, as a default rather than an afterthought, to bank with Black-owned financial institutions the Liberty Banks, the OneUnited Banks, the First Independence Banks rather than routing deposits to institutions that do not reinvest proportionally in Black communities. It looks like Black professionals who have achieved positions of institutional authority actively directing contracts, investment mandates, and philanthropic dollars toward Black-owned firms and HBCU vendors rather than defaulting to the institutional relationships they inherited. It looks like African American civic organizations insisting on quantifiable reciprocity as a condition of coalition not cultural appreciation, not rhetorical solidarity, but measurable investment.

There is a separate and equally important argument that must be made here, because it is the one most frequently obscured by well-intentioned framing: inclusion is not ownership. Even in the most favorable version of the ally relationship where non-Black partners, institutions, and individuals are genuinely committed to diversity, sincerely supportive of Black participation, and actively working to open doors none of that changes the structural necessity of Black-owned institutions. Inclusion operates within someone else’s architecture. Ownership builds your own.

This distinction is not abstract. It has a balance sheet. When a Black professional is included in a non-Black-owned firm, their labor generates returns that compound within that firm’s ownership structure and those are returns that flow to shareholders, partners, and stakeholders who are, in the aggregate, not Black. The professional may advance. They may be compensated well. They may even occupy positions of genuine authority. But the wealth generated by their inclusion does not build Black institutional capital; it builds the institution that included them. Inclusion, at scale, is a mechanism by which Black talent subsidizes non-Black institutional growth. It is not a substitute for ownership. It is, in many cases, its alternative.

The same logic applies to HBCUs operating in a landscape of ostensibly inclusive predominantly white institutions. The argument made against HBCU investment that the best Black students should simply attend the best-resourced universities, wherever those happen to be is structurally an argument against Black institutional ownership in higher education. It accepts inclusion as a terminal condition rather than a transitional one. A Black student included at Harvard is not the same institutional fact as Harvard-level resources flowing into an HBCU. One is a credential extended to an individual. The other is capacity built within a community-owned institution that will outlast any single student and compound across generations.

Ownership is also the only form of institutional participation that is durable against shifts in political will. Inclusion depends on the continued goodwill of those doing the including. When political climates shift, when diversity commitments are deprioritized, when administration changes, when economic contractions force budget realignments the “included” are the first to absorb the cost. Ownership is not subject to another party’s goodwill. A Black-owned bank does not require a non-Black institution to remain committed to serving Black depositors. A Black-owned media organization does not require a conglomerate’s editorial patience. An HBCU does not require a predominantly white institution to remain interested in Black academic excellence. Ownership is the only form of institutional security that does not expire when someone else’s priorities change.

This is why the recent assault on diversity, equity, and inclusion programs in American corporations and universities however dismaying as a political signal is not the fundamental crisis for African American institutional life that it is sometimes framed as being. The fundamental crisis predates the DEI rollback and will outlast its reversal. It is the historical condition of a community that has been systematically excluded from ownership while being selectively included in participation. DEI programs, at their most effective, opened doors into institutions that someone else owned. Their elimination forecloses that access. But their presence never resolved the ownership question. The community that owns nothing is equally vulnerable in both eras, it simply has a longer walk to the door in one of them.

The same analytical framework applies to an institution that is rarely named as such in discussions of Black economic strategy: the Black family. The family unit is not a private matter sealed off from institutional analysis. It is the primary site of intergenerational wealth transfer, the first school of civic and financial literacy, and the foundational node in any network of community institutional density. How the Black family is formed, sustained, and oriented toward community investment is therefore a question of institutional consequence, not merely personal preference.

This makes the question of interracial partnership and specifically, the assumptions that sometimes travel with it a legitimate subject of institutional inquiry. The concern here is not interracial partnership as such. It is the set of ideological commitments that non-Black partners sometimes bring into Black family formation, and what those commitments mean for the community institutions that depend on family-level investment and loyalty to survive.

A non-Black person who partners with a Black man or woman has not, by virtue of that partnership, demonstrated any commitment to African American institutional empowerment. The relationship is personal. The institutional question is separate, and it must be asked separately. Does this person bank at Black-owned financial institutions? Do they support HBCU attendance, alumni giving, and network loyalty as a family value? Do they understand that the wealth gap their Black partner navigates is not an abstraction but a structural condition reproduced through specific policy and capital allocation decisions and that their own family’s economic choices either mitigate or compound that condition? Personal love does not answer institutional questions. Only institutional behavior does.

The specific case of non-Black women partnered with Black men warrants direct analysis, because it intersects with a set of structural realities that the colorblind framework is particularly ill-equipped to see. Black women in America face a documented and compounding disadvantage in the partner market, a disadvantage produced not by individual preference alone but by the structural devaluation of Black femininity in American cultural and economic life, by the incarceration and early mortality rates that reduce the available pool of Black men, and by media and social ecosystems that actively hierarchize desirability along racial lines. These are not grievances. They are measurable structural conditions with identifiable institutional causes.

Non-Black women who partner with Black men enter this landscape with structural advantages they did not earn and, in the colorblind framework, are not required to acknowledge. The colorblind framework of “we are the world,” love is love, race doesn’t matter to me functions in this context not as enlightenment but as insulation from accountability. It allows a person to benefit from the aesthetics and community of Blackness, to be welcomed into Black family life and Black social space, while remaining ideologically committed to a universalism that forecloses any obligation to the specific institutional needs of the community whose door they have entered. The distinction between a potluck and a cookout becomes precise here: they have been given a seat at the table of coalition, but they have wandered into the cookout consuming its warmth, its honesty, its intimacy without ever acknowledging who built the table or accepting any obligation to help it stand.

This matters institutionally because family formation is where ideology meets capital allocation. A household in which one partner is oriented toward Black institutional investment and one is oriented toward a colorblind universalism that treats all institutions as equivalent is a household with a structural conflict embedded in its financial decisions. Where will their children attend college? Which financial institutions will hold their savings? Which civic organizations will receive their philanthropic commitments? Which political candidates and policy frameworks will they support? These are not questions that love resolves. They are questions that ideology answers and the colorblind ideology consistently answers them in ways that route resources away from the Black institutional ecosystem and toward the universal one, which in practice means the mainstream one, which in practice means the predominantly non-Black one.

The institution of the Black family, therefore, must be understood as requiring the same institutional clarity as any other node in the African American ecosystem. Welcoming a non-Black partner into Black family life is not categorically different from inviting a non-Black guest to the potluck. In both cases, the question is not the warmth of the welcome. The question is whether the guest understands what was built, what it cost, and what it requires to survive and whether they comprehend that the cookout, the sovereign space, the honest table, was never theirs to enter simply because they were loved by someone who belonged there. Structural advantages do not disappear because they are unacknowledged. They accumulate. And a household ideology that refuses to see those advantages and to accept the institutional obligations they create is not a neutral position. It is a position that benefits from Black institutional labor while declining to contribute to it.

It also looks like intellectual clarity about co-optation, which is the more subtle and in many ways more consequential threat to Black institutional space. Co-optation does not require hostility. It requires only that a framework, a concept, a methodology, or a space developed with Black intellectual labor and institutional capital be adopted and repackaged by actors who do not acknowledge its origin, do not direct resources back to its source, and do not bear the institutional costs that made its development possible. This happens in academia, where Black Studies frameworks migrate into mainstream curricula without corresponding investment in Black Studies departments. It happens in corporate diversity programs, where the conceptual vocabulary of African American equity movements is deployed in the service of institutional reputation management rather than structural change. It happens in media, where Black cultural aesthetics are packaged for mass consumption while Black-owned media organizations operate on fractional budgets.

The question facing African American institutional leadership is not whether to engage with the broader economy and polity of course it must. The question is on what terms. Engagement without institutional conditions is simply absorption. The HBCU sector, the network of Black-owned banks and CDFIs, the ecosystem of Black professional associations and civic organizations, the tradition of Black media, these are not relics of a segregated past. They are the institutional architecture of a future in which African Americans participate in American (and global) economic and political life from a position of institutional strength rather than perpetual dependency.

That institutional architecture does not sustain itself through cultural warmth. It sustains itself through capital, coordination, and the disciplined exercise of institutional loyalty. The potluck can be generous and it should be, because coalition requires genuine exchange. But the cookout is not the potluck. The cookout is where the community gathers to be honest with itself, to protect what it has built, and to plan for what it still must build. Allies are welcome at the potluck when they bring something real. The cookout is not their invitation to extend.

The fire is on. The food is ready. But the table was built by people who had no other table to go to. That history is not decoration. It is the deed.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by Claude AI.

“You’re Not Even Looking at the Problem”: Why African America Is Losing the Game of Wealth & Power

“Talent without institutions is a pipeline to someone else’s profit.” – William A. Foster, IV

In a pivotal scene from the film Moneyball, Billy Beane stares across the table at a room of seasoned scouts and executives, asking again and again, “What’s the problem?” The men fumble for surface-level answers—lost players, declining performance, tight budgets—but Beane cuts through the noise with surgical precision: “You’re not even looking at the problem.” His frustration isn’t simply about baseball; it’s about the failure to reframe strategy in the face of structural disadvantages. It’s about institutions mistaking symptoms for causes.

That same failure of vision and the urgent need for a paradigm shift applies not just to baseball, but to African America’s quest for economic power, institutional wealth, and self-determined sovereignty.

African America’s greatest minds, labor, and capital are often deployed outside of African American institutions. In essence, the community is fielding players, but not for its own teams. Valedictorians enroll at predominantly white institutions. Brilliant entrepreneurs pitch to Silicon Valley venture capitalists. Top athletes build billion-dollar empires for Nike, not Actively Black. The irony is that African America is not talent-poor. It is institution-poor. And that distinction is everything.

The most misunderstood problem in African American wealth-building discourse is not the racial wealth gap, it is the institutional wealth gap. African America commands over $1.6 trillion in consumer spending power annually, yet circulates less than 2% of that inside its own institutions before it exits the community entirely. Compare this to Jewish Americans, who circulate an estimated 8 to 12 times within their institutional networks, or East Asian Americans at 6 to 12 times, or even Latino Americans at 4 to 6. The velocity of African American economic energy leaves almost immediately. Another financial literacy seminar cannot fix this. What is required are financial institutions that keep wealth anchored in the community and institution-to-institution cooperation that builds collective power rather than isolated individual net worth.

Much like Billy Beane confronting baseball’s scouting orthodoxy, African America must confront its deep obsession with prestige, particularly the pursuit of inclusion in institutions that were never designed for its empowerment. The community still celebrates when African Americans “break barriers” into historically exclusive spaces: the first Black partner at a global law firm, the first Black president of an Ivy League university, the first Black billionaire appointed to a PWI board. These are symbolic gestures, not systemic gains. They are the equivalent of drafting a slugger with a high batting average while ignoring his low on-base percentage. It may photograph well, but it does not win championships.

Meanwhile, African American institutions like HBCUs, Black-owned banks, credit unions, media companies, foundations remain undercapitalized and under-circulated. According to FDIC data, African American banks account for less than 0.03% of the U.S. banking system’s total assets, despite serving millions of customers. Most carry assets under $500 million, while PNC, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America each hold hundreds of billions in Black consumer deposits alone. The community is putting elite players on the field just not on its own team.

One of the most damaging consequences of the post-civil rights integration era has been the illusion of proximity to power. Inclusion into dominant systems has led many African Americans to feel they are participating in the architecture of power, when in reality they are consumers of it, not owners. The institutions that determine economic direction in this country like investment firms, insurance conglomerates, think tanks, and lobbying organizations remain largely absent African American leadership at the structural level. While the public fixates on celebrity billionaires, it rarely accounts for institutional billionaires: universities with $40 billion endowments, banks with $3 trillion balance sheets, pension funds managing hundreds of billions in assets. Harvard University’s endowment, at roughly $50 billion, generates more annual passive income than the top 20 HBCUs combined in operating budgets. The Ivy League is not competing with African America. It operates on an entirely different playing field.

The data makes the scale of the gap unmistakable. As of 2022, the median net worth of a white household exceeded $188,000. For African American households, the figure was $24,100. But the institutional gap is even more stark. The top 10 predominantly white universities hold over $200 billion in combined endowments. The top 10 HBCUs hold less than $3 billion combined. In the philanthropic sector, the contrast is equally severe: the Gates Foundation manages nearly $8 billion in annual revenue and over $80 billion in assets. Meanwhile, even foundations attached to African American billionaires often operate at a fraction of that capacity. When African Americans are high earners individually, they frequently exist within ecosystems of institutional fragility—fragile schools, fragile banks, fragile civic organizations. This fragility makes individual wealth vulnerable, disperses influence, and mutes policy impact. The community continues to negotiate from positions of dependence.

The strongest ethnic and national economies do not simply focus on internal wealth generation, they construct infrastructure for internal circulation and cooperation. That means Black-owned banks financing Black developers. HBCUs recruiting faculty trained at other HBCUs rather than defaulting to PWI pipelines. Black foundations endowing Black hospitals, think tanks, and research centers. Black technology firms building hiring relationships with HBCU STEM programs. Black media outlets directing advertising budgets toward Black-owned businesses rather than relying on revenue from Google and Pepsi. Currently, this kind of circulation is sporadic and disorganized. Too often, African American institutions function as isolated islands, each struggling independently in a competitive environment that rewards scale and coordination. What is needed is a federation mindset of institutions operating in genuine symbiosis, where growth is strategic rather than accidental. Consider the compounding effect if every HBCU committed 20% of its endowment to Black-owned financial institutions, or if every African American megachurch directed 10% of its annual budget toward a Black-owned insurance provider. These institution-to-institution agreements would create forms of institutional wealth that accumulate quietly but with enormous strategic consequence.

Billy Beane’s genius in Moneyball was not merely contrarianism. It was data literacy. He saw what others refused to acknowledge: that reaching base was more valuable than batting average, and that the traditional metrics of scouting obscured the actual drivers of winning. African America must apply the same discipline to its institutional life. That requires building institutional balance sheets that honestly account for asset and liability structures; capital flow maps that trace where African American money goes after it is earned; circulation velocity metrics that measure how many times a dollar moves among Black institutions before exiting; and influence indexes that evaluate which African American institutions actually shape policy, capital markets, and media narratives. Without that data infrastructure, the community will continue to feel prosperous in moments while remaining fragile in structure and celebrating the anecdote while missing the trend.

Talent allocation is the other dimension of the problem that demands a strategic reframe. Just as the scouts in Moneyball chased big names and home run statistics, African American institutions often pursue talent without connecting it to long-term institutional strategy. Celebrity partnerships, honorary degrees, and gala appearances generate visibility but rarely feed institutional growth. A Tuskegee graduate built the foundations of American agricultural science. But talent, without institutions to give it depth, direction, and deployment, is ultimately portable. It gets recruited away, diluted, or co-opted. The community does not simply need more talented individuals. It needs to scout differently, train differently, and deploy those individuals in ways that compound institutional strength rather than individual achievement.

The question of narrative control is inseparable from the question of institutional power. Of the top twenty media companies in the United States, none are Black-owned. Most African American narratives in news, entertainment, and advertising are filtered through non-Black ownership and editorial priorities. This means political discourse is easily hijacked, cultural capital is regularly commodified without equity stakes, and social movements are routinely defanged by outside interests with different agendas. Reclaiming narrative sovereignty requires sustained investment in Black-owned media, particularly digital platforms and local investigative journalism. More critically, it requires routing advertising dollars toward Black media institutions rather than treating them as secondary channels. Even the most incisive voices will remain echoes if they are amplified through someone else’s infrastructure.

The genius of Billy Beane was not discovering undervalued players, it was reframing the entire game. African America has been operating under a set of assumptions that no longer serve its institutional interests, if they ever did. It has been trying to win with outdated tactics, sentimental strategies, and a persistent belief that the core problem is individual rather than structural. Fighting racism is necessary but insufficient. Engineering sovereignty is the work. That begins with an honest diagnosis: African America is building talent for other people’s institutions. It is celebrating inclusion while surrendering control. It is mistaking prestige for ownership. And it continues to treat the gap as primarily personal when the evidence points overwhelmingly to institutional causes.

“You’re not even looking at the problem,” Beane said.

It is past time to look.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.