Category Archives: Moneyball

Philadelphia and Boston, Jaylen and Jayson, Black and Biracial, and America’s Continued and Growing Reshaping of Blackness

Posted on July 12, 2026 by | Leave a comment

“The doll that’s a nice doll… the doll that’s a bad doll.” – Dr. Kenneth Clark, recalling the study’s core questions, 1985

In the old Akan trading towns along the Gold Coast, a young carver could choose one of two paths once his hands proved skilled enough to earn coin. The first path led to the chief’s court, where a steady commission awaited any carver willing to produce masks and stools bearing the court’s preferred likeness, paid promptly, praised publicly, and forgotten the moment a newer hand arrived. The second path led to the carver’s own workshop, built slowly with his own timber, stocked with his own apprentices, selling to whoever would buy but owned by no patron. The court path paid faster. The workshop path paid forward, to sons, to students, to a guild that outlived the carver himself. Both carvers were skilled. Both were paid. Only one built something that did not depend on being chosen again tomorrow.

On July 1, 2026, the Boston Celtics traded Jaylen Brown to the Philadelphia 76ers for Paul George and four draft picks, ending a ten-season partnership that produced an NBA championship and six trips to the Eastern Conference finals. Boston’s stated rationale was structural, and every part of it is true: a roster straining under two supermax contracts, a collapsed pursuit of Giannis Antetokounmpo, and a first-round exit that exposed real fit problems on the floor. None of that is manufactured. But a trade’s stated logic and its full logic are rarely the same document, and this one is worth reading past the press release.

For a decade Boston fielded one pairing of stars, and the city called them, with the affection reserved for a matched set, “the Jays.” Brown and Tatum arrived within a year of each other, won a championship together in 2024, and built back-to-back supermax contracts that made them two of the highest-paid athletes in league history. They shared a locker room, a coaching staff, and a fan base that likes to believe it is more progressive than any other in professional basketball. What they never shared was an economic strategy, and that gap is worth sitting with not because one man was more talented, but because their divergence resembles a pattern in how American capital treats Black masculinity that this piece can only describe, not adjudicate.

What makes the trade’s timing worth reading closely is what did not happen in the weeks before it. As speculation mounted that Boston might move Brown, Tatum said nothing; no public defense of his co-star, no stated wish that the front office keep the partnership intact. The silence was loud enough that Bill Simmons devoted airtime to it, speculating it reflected an understanding, shared inside the organization, that Brown wanted a team of his own and Tatum probably wanted him to have it. Tatum had separately acknowledged in a January interview that the partnership carried real “growing pains.” None of this proves intent, and this piece draws no conclusion about what Tatum was or wasn’t thinking. It does mean the silence around the trade was not neutral, it had already been noticed and discussed by the same media apparatus this piece is describing.

Start with the ledger. In 2023, Brown turned down more than $50 million in conventional endorsement offers — turned them down, not failed to receive them — to fund 741 Performance, his own apparel and footwear company, and to scale 7uice, the media venture he had already built. A year later he launched Boston XChange, an incubator modeled on the idea of Black Wall Street, targeting $5 billion in community wealth across Greater Boston, with a first cohort of grants, workspace, and Harvard Business School (we will forgive him for it not being an HBCU Business School) delivered coaching for local Black founders. Brown’s public language around these moves is institutional rather than personal: he describes the goal as addressing a wealth disparity “no one wants to talk about,” not building his own celebrity profile.

Tatum’s ledger runs the other direction, and it runs long. By industry counts he has endorsed more than two dozen brands; Nike and Jordan Brand, Gatorade, AT&T, Amica, Coach, Subway, 2K Sports, Ruffles, JBL, and others making him one of the most heavily endorsed players in the league by sheer volume of paid-spokesman relationships. This is not a marginal career; it is the standard model for a superstar of his caliber, the same model that has generated wealth for Black athletes going back to Michael Jordan. Tatum is good at it, and there is nothing dishonorable in the choice. But it is a fundamentally different choice than his backcourt partner made, and the difference invites a question rather than answers one since it is not about talent or marketability, since both men have those in comparable measure.

What explains two stars, on the same roster, choosing such different relationships to capital? Part of the answer may be personal preference, which deserves respect without further interrogation. But part may sit inside research worth taking seriously: the market narrates lighter skin and biracial identity differently than it narrates darker skin, even within a league that is overwhelmingly Black. A 2019 American Journal of Sociology study of televised college basketball found broadcasters consistently described lighter-skinned players in terms of intelligence and control, and darker-skinned players in terms of raw physicality, a gap that held even after controlling for on-court performance and the announcer’s own race. A Brookings review reached the same conclusion: skin tone, not race alone, shapes how a player is narrated, and that narration is the raw material brands buy in an endorsement deal. A separate compensation study found weaker evidence that skin tone directly moves pay, a useful caution against overclaiming. None of this proves what happened between one front office and two players. It documents a pattern the Brown-Tatum split resembles closely enough to raise, not settle.

This is not a new pattern, and skin tone alone has never been the whole explanation for it, values and choices may matter just as much. Muhammad Ali’s refusal of the draft cost him three years of his career and most of his commercial appeal, not because promoters doubted his marketability but because his assertion of autonomy over his own body and institutional affiliations read as a threat rather than a story brands wanted to rent. A generation later, Craig Hodges, a two-time NBA champion and elite three-point shooter, tested that same autonomy from inside his own locker room: he asked Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson to boycott Game 1 of the 1991 Finals over the beating of Rodney King, wore a dashiki to the Bulls’ White House visit that year, and handed President Bush’s staff a letter demanding a real plan to address poverty in Black communities. He was out of the league within a year, still one of its most accurate shooters, and no team called. Jordan is instructive precisely because he is not light-skinned or biracial, he is one of the most conventionally marketed dark-skinned athletes in American history, and by Hodges’s own account, Jordan understood that taking a political stance could hamper his economics, and declined to test that trade-off. Hodges and Jordan shared a skin tone and a locker room. Only one was pushed out, a fact that raises a question rather than answers it. Colin Kaepernick’s endorsement portfolio collapsed to essentially one relationship after asserting similar autonomy from NFL ownership, and Kaepernick himself is biracial, a detail that should complicate any account of this pattern as pure colorism rather than erase colorism’s role elsewhere. Two of these three men do not even share a skin tone. What they may share, more than pigment, is a decision to make institutional autonomy non-negotiable; though a pattern across three careers is a pattern, not a proof. Brown’s version is lower-stakes than any of the three, but the same open question recurs: does capital move more easily toward Black athletes who remain legible as spokesmen for institutions they do not control, and more cautiously toward those who assert control of their own, regardless of skin tone? This piece cannot answer that with certainty. It can only note how often the shape recurs.

The pattern extends past Boston, and past sports entirely, though here too what follows is an observation, not a verdict. Patrick Mahomes and Dak Prescott, the two most heavily endorsed quarterbacks of their generation, are both biracial, sons of Black fathers and white mothers. Mahomes has built one of the largest endorsement portfolios in American sports, anchored by a record-setting Adidas deal alongside State Farm and Oakley; Prescott’s corporate slate runs comparably broad. None of this proves brands set out to favor biracial athletes. But it sits alongside the pattern documented above closely enough to warrant the question, in a league and sport where the majority of players are Black. A second pattern is worth placing beside the first, one this publication has already reported without moralizing: Black men have recorded the fastest-growing intermarriage rate of any male demographic group in America, from 8 percent of newly married Black men in 1980 to 24 percent by 2015, according to Pew Research Center analysis, concentrated precisely among the educated, high-earning cohort most likely to reach the kind of professional visibility Mahomes and Prescott occupy. No causal line connects that statistic to either man’s marriage, and this piece draws none. What it raises is a broader question this publication is positioned to ask: whether a market’s comfort with biracial Black men and a fast-growing intermarriage rate concentrated in the same professional class are two separate stories, or two readings of one. If they are one story, the connective thread is unlikely to be race in the abstract. It is more plausibly ownership, or the absence of it, across every domain a community needs to hold its own capital. Jaylen Brown’s story, told above, describes what happens when a Black athlete tries to build wealth inside institutions he controls rather than institutions that rent his image. Does the intermarriage data describe a parallel mechanism operating on family formation — capital and talent flowing toward whichever institutions exist to receive them, absent Black-owned alternatives built to receive them instead? This piece cannot answer that with the data available. It can note that no institutional framework currently exists to prepare African American partnerships before formation, comparable to what other communities have long maintained for their own members, and that this absence, not any individual’s marriage, may be the more consequential gap. Whether it constitutes a liability the community carries into every domain where Black institutional ownership remains thin — family, business, media, capital — is the question this piece leaves open. Patterns are not proof. But a community that declines to ask the question because it lacks proof is choosing a different kind of vulnerability.

The trade also relocates Brown to a city whose relationship with Black institutional life is a different proposition than Boston’s. Bill Russell, who won eleven championships in this same uniform, called Boston a flea market of racism in his memoir, describing a city that layered institutional bigotry over civic pride without ever reconciling the two. That reputation has proven durable: in Boston Globe surveys of Black residents conducted in 2010, 2013, and 2017, Boston finished last among seven major cities behind Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Charlotte, San Francisco, and Philadelphia on how welcoming it is to people of color. The same reporting found the median net worth of non-immigrant Black households in Greater Boston to be $8, against $247,500 for white households, and Black representation on Massachusetts corporate boards at roughly one percent. Philadelphia carries its own history of segregation and disinvestment, and no one should romanticize it. But it is also the city where, in 1837, a Quaker philanthropist’s bequest founded what became Cheyney University, the nation’s first institution of higher learning for African Americans, and where Lincoln University, seventeen years later, became the first HBCU to confer degrees. Whether a builder of Black-owned infrastructure landing in the city that produced the nation’s first Black-serving colleges, rather than remaining in the city its own most decorated Black player once called a flea market of racism, is coincidence or pattern is a question this publication’s readers are equipped to sit with.

None of this requires believing any single Celtics executive consciously weighed Jaylen Brown’s politics before making the call, and treating it as a boardroom conspiracy would badly undersell how institutional racism can function when it exists. It can survive in culture rather than decision memos. Boston’s sports-media environment has its own well-documented record independent of any front office. In 2017, Baltimore Orioles outfielder Adam Jones said he had been called a racial slur and had peanuts thrown at him at Fenway Park; Black journalists who covered the aftermath have said the dominant response on Boston sports radio was indignation directed at Jones rather than reckoning with the city’s reputation. In February 2023, a host on Boston’s top sports-talk station was suspended for a racist joke; weeks later, another used an ethnic slur on air against a Black woman sportswriter. Black reporters who cover Boston teams have described vetting spaces before entering them; Black fans have described watching games at home rather than risk a stadium environment they cannot control. None of that required anyone in the Celtics organization to think a conscious thought about Brown specifically. It raises the question of whether the trade simply moved through a press box and a call-in culture that have, for decades, treated assertive Black men with more suspicion than compliant ones, an environment that would not need anyone’s permission to shape which star ends up costing more to keep. This piece does not claim to have proven that. It notes only that the pattern, once named, is difficult to unsee.

None of this is an accusation against Jayson Tatum, who has built a disciplined, values-driven endorsement career, including a foundation for generational wealth-building in his hometown of St. Louis. The point is not that one Jay is virtuous and the other compromised. The point is structural, and it is a pattern this publication keeps observing rather than a verdict on any single institution’s intent: corporate America has a well-developed machinery for renting a Black athlete’s image, and a comparatively undeveloped machinery for financing his ownership stakes in Black-controlled infrastructure. Endorsement money flows easily because it requires nothing of the brand except a media budget and a face. Ownership capital, the kind Brown is building with Boston XChange; requires a brand, a bank, or an institution to accept a Black founder as a peer with equity claims rather than a spokesperson with a contract term. The endorsement machine is fast and comfortable. The ownership machine barely exists, and where it does, it is disproportionately built by athletes willing to walk away from the safer story.

This is where this publication’s readers should focus, because the lesson is about capital formation, not sports pages. If African American-owned financial institutions, HBCU business schools, and Black venture networks are serious about closing the wealth gap Brown keeps naming publicly, they cannot treat athletes as donor targets for one-time gifts or career-day speakers. Boston XChange is, functionally, an unincorporated development fund with a five-year, $304 million balance sheet behind it. Institutions like Fisk, Tougaloo, and Grambling’s business programs, not only the flagships that already receive this attention, have more to gain by building pipeline relationships with athlete-founded ventures like Brown’s than by waiting for a landmark gift that may never come. Equity partnerships, curriculum ties to incubators like BXC’s creator accelerator, and coordinated deal flow between HBCU alumni networks and athlete-backed funds would do more for capital retention than another round of applause for a sneaker deal.

The two Jays no longer share a locker room, and nothing here requires believing anyone in Boston’s front office consciously moved against Jaylen Brown for what he represents. Institutional racism, when it operates at all, rarely announces itself as intent. It can accumulate instead as a weather pattern in press boxes, call-in shows, and roster rooms, quietly making the assertive, self-determined Black star cost more to keep than the compliant one, until a trade that reads as pure salary-cap logic also leaves the more marketable Jay standing alone as the face of the franchise. Whether that is what happened here is a question this piece raises rather than settles. What is not in question is where Brown lands: a city with a deeper institutional relationship to Black self-determination than the one that just let him go. What HBCU business schools, alumni networks, and Black venture funds can control is what they do with his arrival in a city already home to Cheyney and Lincoln and whether they treat it as a genuine opening or let it pass as sports-page trivia.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by Claude AI.

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The Color Line Was Never Broken: MLB’s Jackie Robinson Day and the Permanent Absence of Black Ownership

Posted on April 16, 2026 by | Leave a comment

Blacks are the only group of people in America who have been taught to invest their time, talents, and resources into other people’s businesses and institutions rather than their own.– Dr. Claude Anderson

Every April 15th, Major League Baseball dresses itself in the iconography of racial progress. Every player, coach, manager, and umpire in the league wears number 42, the retired number of Jackie Robinson, in a league-wide act of commemorative solidarity. Stadiums host ceremonies. The commissioner issues statements. The Negro Leagues Baseball Museum is quoted in the wire copy. This year marked the 79th anniversary of Robinson’s debut with the Brooklyn Dodgers, and the ritual was performed with its usual solemnity and precision. Bob Kendrick, president of the Negro Leagues Baseball Museum, offered the occasion’s defining sentiment: every player of color who now enjoys the sport owes it to this man. It was the kind of statement that lands well precisely because it is true and precisely because it forecloses the question that actually matters: what do the owners of the sport owe?

The answer, measurable across 79 years, is nothing. Because in the entire recorded history of Major League Baseball, there has never been a single African American principal owner of a franchise. Not one. The league that wraps itself annually in the image of the man who broke its color barrier has never permitted Black Americans to sit at the table where the real decisions are made and the real wealth is accumulated. Jackie Robinson Day, in this light, is not a celebration. It is a ritual performance of symbolism in the absence of substance, a ceremony that honors a labor breakthrough while quietly burying the ownership catastrophe that labor breakthrough produced.

Dr. Claude Anderson diagnosed this dynamic with clinical precision in Black Labor, White Wealth: The Search for Power and Economic Justice. Anderson’s central thesis is that African Americans have historically been incorporated into American economic structures as labor inputs essential to the production of wealth but systematically excluded from its ownership and accumulation. The pattern Anderson traces across centuries of American economic life finds one of its most vivid contemporary illustrations in professional baseball. In 1947, there were zero African American owners in Major League Baseball. In 2026, there are zero African American owners in Major League Baseball. The number has not moved in nearly eight decades of ceremonies, commemorations, and retired jerseys. Whatever integration accomplished for those who could play, it accomplished nothing for those who might own.

The financial stakes of that absence are not abstract. The average MLB franchise value entering the 2026 season is $3.17 billion, a 12 percent increase from the prior year. The New York Yankees are valued at $9 billion; the Los Angeles Dodgers at $8 billion. Thirty franchises, each a multigenerational wealth vehicle, each appreciating at rates that make even the highest player salaries look modest by comparison. The mathematics of ownership versus labor in professional sports is not complicated: franchises compound wealth over generations, while athletic careers end, often before age 35, and rarely produce the kind of capital base required to enter the ownership market. George Steinbrenner paid $10 million for the New York Yankees in 1973; the team is now valued at nearly $9 billion — a 900-fold increase. No player’s salary trajectory has ever approximated that kind of return. The wealth gap between Black athletes and the owners who profit from their labor is not a gap it is a chasm, and it has been widening for eight decades while baseball holds its annual ceremony.

What made this chasm possible was the structural transformation that Robinson’s entry into MLB initiated. Rube Foster, considered the father of Negro League Baseball, was insistent as early as 1910 that Black teams should be owned by Black men. The Negro Leagues were not merely a segregated alternative to the major leagues they were an ownership infrastructure, an economic ecosystem, a complex of jobs, investment, and community capital that functioned precisely because it was self-contained. Virtually all of the initial Negro League ownership was Black, according to Garrick Kebede, a Houston-based financial adviser and Negro League Baseball historian. When Robinson crossed the color line under Branch Rickey’s terms, he did not negotiate a merger. He negotiated a labor transfer. African American talent, the asset that had built and sustained the Negro Leagues, departed for a structure in which African Americans held no ownership stake, no board seats, no equity, and no decision-making authority. The Negro Leagues, stripped of their best labor, collapsed. The ownership infrastructure they represented was dismantled. What remained was the arrangement that has persisted ever since: Black labor generating wealth for white ownership, with the annual ceremony serving as the cultural lubricant that makes the arrangement palatable.

This publication has argued before that what African Americans celebrate when they celebrate Robinson’s debut is better understood as a miscelebration, an uncritical embrace of a “first” that, examined structurally, represented institutional dispossession rather than institutional advancement. The framework is not complicated. A community’s economic power derives not from its ability to supply labor to others’ institutions, but from its capacity to build, own, and control institutions of its own. The Negro Leagues were such an institution. Their destruction produced precisely the outcome that Dr. Anderson’s framework would predict: a permanently subordinate position within an economic structure controlled by others, with symbolic inclusion substituting for actual power.

The percentage of Black players on Opening Day rosters increased from 6.0 percent in 2024 to 6.2 percent in 2025 to 6.8 percent in 2026 — the first back-to-back annual increases in at least two decades. MLB has invested in developmental programs aimed at reversing the long decline of Black players in the sport, and the league has used this uptick as evidence of progress on Jackie Robinson Day. The framing is instructive in its evasions. At the apex of Black participation in MLB, the figure reached 18.7 percent in 1981. Today’s 6.8 percent, celebrated as a milestone, remains less than half that peak and remains, critically, a measure only of labor participation. The ownership figure has not changed. It is zero. It has always been zero. The developmental programs that produce more Black players produce more labor for an ownership class that has never included a single African American. Whatever the developmental intention, the structural outcome is the same as it has always been: more Black men supplying the asset that generates wealth for others.

This is not, it must be stressed, an argument against Black Americans playing baseball. It is an argument about what the celebration of their playing, in the absence of ownership, actually signifies. It signifies that the arrangement Branch Rickey designed in 1947 one in which Black labor would integrate the league while Black ownership was never contemplated has proven durable across nearly eight decades and shows no sign of structural challenge. The 30 franchise owners whose combined wealth now runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars conduct their business in owners’ meetings that have never included an African American voice with the authority that ownership confers. The decisions made in those meetings about labor rules, revenue sharing, market expansion, franchise relocation, broadcast deals are made entirely without African American ownership participation. This is not an oversight. It is the design of the arrangement that Robinson’s entry formalized.

The institutional lessons of this history extend well beyond baseball. The Negro Leagues offer a template not for nostalgia but for analysis: what does it take to build an economic ecosystem that retains capital within a community rather than exporting it to others? The answer, in the Negro Leagues as in other domains, was ownership. When the Kansas City Monarchs played, the revenue stayed within a structure where Black owners, Black managers, Black vendors, and Black communities captured the economic return on Black athletic talent. That structure was dismantled not by force, but by the gravitational pull of integration on terms that never included ownership as a condition.

The HBCU athletic ecosystem faces an analogous set of choices in the present. The temptation to pursue visibility and validation within structures owned and controlled by others (the Power Five conferences, the NCAA tournament apparatus) reproduces the 1947 logic at the college level. As this publication has examined in detail, the HBCU Power Five has a combined all-time record of 4-55 in the NCAA tournament, and the SWAC and MEAC combined typically earn no more than approximately $680,000 in tournament payouts, roughly $34,000 per school when distributed across conference members. The alternative: owning the tournament, controlling the broadcast rights, building an HBCU Athletic Association would produce less spectacle and more capital. It would reproduce, in athletic governance, the logic that Rube Foster understood a century ago: the economic return on Black talent should accrue to Black institutions.

The broader African American institutional ecosystem — Black owned public and private companies, Black financial institutions, professional associations, fraternal organizations, and HBCUs themselves — contains the capacity for the kind of coordinated ownership strategy that MLB has never permitted and that the Negro League era briefly demonstrated was possible. The question is not whether that capacity exists. It is whether the community’s leadership is willing to pursue ownership as a strategic objective rather than labor participation as a cultural achievement. Dr. Anderson’s framework demands that distinction. So does the arithmetic of 30 MLB franchises averaging $3.17 billion in value, every one of them owned by someone who is not African American, generating their returns on a sport whose very mythology of racial progress was built on the back of a Black man who received no ownership stake in exchange for making the mythology possible.

Every April 15th, the number 42 appears on every jersey in Major League Baseball. It is, in its way, an honest accounting. Forty-two is the number of a man whose labor the league appropriated, whose institutional infrastructure it dismantled, and whose memory it now rents annually for its own legitimacy. What would constitute actual progress is the number of African American principal owners in MLB. That number is zero. It has always been zero. Until it changes, Jackie Robinson Day is not a celebration. It is an invoice of unpaid, and accumulating interest.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

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More Than Sports: HBCU Conferences Need To Create Their Own Endowment Foundations

Posted on April 7, 2026 by | Leave a comment

“If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.” – African Proverb

In the world of HBCUs, sports are often the glittering front porch. The stadiums, the bands, the rivalries—they draw the crowds, the attention, the media. But behind that porch is a house often held together by financial duct tape. For decades, HBCU athletic conferences like the SWAC, MEAC, SIAC, and CIAA have focused on managing competition and culture. But the economic foundation underneath them is alarmingly thin.

The financial disparity between HBCU athletic institutions and their predominantly white peers is not simply about who has better training facilities or more ESPN airtime. It’s about the difference between operating with an endowment mindset versus a sponsorship mindset. PWIs leverage their conference structures to coordinate billions in collective endowments, research funding, and intellectual capital. Meanwhile, HBCU conferences still operate paycheck to paycheck, dependent on event-driven income, annual sponsors, and episodic corporate philanthropy.

It is time for that to change. The next great leap in HBCU economic sovereignty must come through the creation of endowment foundations at the conference level—independent yet cooperative financial vehicles that can invest in the long-term needs of HBCU institutions, students, and faculty.

The Forgotten Leverage of Collective Wealth

Historically, African American communities have mastered the art of doing more with less. From the Black Wall Streets of the early 20th century to mutual aid societies, pooling resources has long been a survival strategy. But in the modern higher education economy, survival is not enough. Institutions must thrive. And thriving requires capital—specifically, patient capital.

A conference-wide endowment foundation could be just that. It would allow HBCU conferences to strategically deploy financial resources where they are most needed—not only for athletics, but for academic innovation, student scholarships, research collaborations, alumni entrepreneurship, and faculty retention.

Each of the four major HBCU athletic conferences represents a combined student population of tens of thousands and a deep well of alumni, many of whom have entered the upper echelons of law, medicine, tech, government, and business. If each conference coordinated an endowment foundation targeting just 5% of its alumni giving annually and directed those funds into a permanent asset fund managed by Black-owned asset managers and banks, we would begin to see a fundamental shift in institutional leverage.

When The Game Ends, What Remains?

The problem is not talent. It’s time horizon.

HBCU conferences have too often focused on short-term visibility over long-term viability. A celebrity coach may raise a program’s profile for a season, but a well-capitalized endowment will sustain it for generations. PWIs understand this deeply. The Big Ten and SEC do not just operate athletic schedules. Their conference-level infrastructure includes powerful media rights contracts, legal teams, joint academic initiatives, and most importantly—shared wealth.

Take the Ivy League. Its member schools may not be athletic powerhouses, but collectively they manage over $200 billion in endowment assets. While HBCUs often compete against each other for grants, donors, and students, Ivy League and Big Ten schools collaborate to amplify their influence. Why can’t HBCUs do the same?

A SWAC Endowment Foundation, for example, could support:

  • Annual capital grants for member HBCUs to build dormitories, research centers, or innovation labs.
  • A Black student investment fund, empowering students to manage a real portfolio.
  • A faculty sabbatical and fellowship program to retain top talent within the HBCU ecosystem.
  • Grants to fund summer bridge and college prep programs across rural Black communities.
  • Ownership stakes in infrastructure projects in HBCU towns—student housing, broadband, and more.

A 21st Century Wealth Blueprint for HBCUs

The structure is not complicated, but the will must be. Each HBCU conference should establish an independent 501(c)(3) endowment foundation. The foundation would be governed by a board composed of conference commissioners, university presidents, HBCU alumni investment professionals, and student liaisons.

The foundation would start with a 10-year capital campaign. Initial targets? Raising $100 million per conference by year ten. This is modest. If 10,000 alumni gave $1,000 over a decade—just $100 a year—it would amount to $10 million. Pair that with philanthropic and corporate matching, estate giving, and mission-driven Black investors, and these endowments become engines of independence.

Critically, these endowment foundations should also commit to investing 100% of their assets with Black asset managers, banks, and venture capital firms. According to a 2021 Knight Foundation report, less than 1.4% of the over $80 trillion in asset management is controlled by diverse firms. HBCU conferences can help change that while keeping their dollars circulating within their own ecosystem.

Why It Matters: Ownership, Control, and The Power to Say No

The absence of financial infrastructure has often forced HBCUs to compromise. Take whatever TV deal is offered. Accept unfavorable game contracts. Cancel athletic seasons due to budget shortfalls. Move championship games to cities with no cultural or economic benefit to Black communities.

An endowment changes the game. With financial strength comes the power to say no—no to deals that don’t serve the community, no to external forces dictating priorities, and no to underestimating the value of HBCU brands.

It also allows for coordinated lobbying efforts. A conference endowment could fund policy centers and advocacy work in Washington to push for equitable funding, infrastructure investments, and higher education reform that centers Black institutions. Endowments are not just about dollars. They are about direction.

Cultural Buy-In & Structural Challenges

Skeptics will ask: who will manage it? Will universities compete instead of collaborate? Will presidents agree to hand over some control?

These are valid questions—but solvable ones. What’s required is a paradigm shift. The same way the United Negro College Fund (UNCF) once proved that HBCUs could raise money collectively, athletic conferences can prove that they can build wealth collectively. Trust can be built through transparency. Foundations must publish quarterly reports, undergo annual audits, and invite stakeholders to participate in governance.

The cultural buy-in must be intergenerational. Students should see themselves as builders of legacy, not just borrowers of opportunity. Alumni must view giving not as charity, but as strategic investment in their own institutional ecosystem.

And universities must remember: autonomy and alignment are not enemies. One HBCU’s success is every HBCU’s opportunity.

From Halftime Shows to Financial Shows of Strength

The world is watching HBCUs now more than ever. Celebrities are giving. TV deals are emerging. Black students are reconsidering PWI alternatives. But without institutional infrastructure—especially financial infrastructure—this moment may pass like many others before it.

We cannot build generational legacy off emotional moments alone. It requires structure, discipline, vision, and capital. Conference endowments offer the structure. Our community provides the capital. And our students are the vision.

Let this be the era where HBCU athletic conferences moved from entertainment to enterprise. From event coordination to economic coordination. From standing on the field to standing on financial foundations.

Because after the buzzer sounds, after the lights dim, and after the trophies are stored—what remains is what was built.

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The Real Game: PWI Athletics Win with Wealth, Not Athletes—And HBCUs Can’t Chase That Model

Posted on December 4, 2025 by | Leave a comment

“The wealthiest boosters and donors to a PWI rarely ever played sports, but they did go build companies and a lot of wealth. Boosters spend hundreds of millions a year to compete with their friends and business competition from rival schools. The money spent is a bigger game than what happens on the field.” – William A. Foster, IV

Courtesy of The Rich Eisen Show

The image circulating across sports media this week says everything without trying to explain anything at all. LSU’s new contract offer to Lane Kiffin — seven years at $13 million annually, stacked with multimillion-dollar bonuses, home buyouts, and housing subsidies looks less like a coaching contract and more like a sovereign wealth transaction. It is the kind of deal only an institution backed by generational wealth, mega-boosters, and a national alumni base at the upper end of the economic ladder could produce. Yet every few months a familiar chorus resurfaces insisting that if “only the top African American athletes chose HBCUs,” the financial gap in college athletics would close. The narrative is compelling, emotional, and rooted in cultural longing, but it remains economically false.

The fantasy is seductive: if only more premier African American athletes chose HBCUs, our athletic programs could compete with Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs). If only we could land that five-star recruit, sign that top quarterback, or attract that elite basketball prospect, everything would change. The dream persists in alumni conversations, on social media, and in aspirational fundraising campaigns. But the dream is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of what actually drives college athletic success and it’s costing HBCUs resources they can’t afford to waste. The numbers tell a story that talent alone cannot rewrite.

Lane Kiffin’s new contract with LSU pays him approximately $13 million annually, making him one of the highest-paid coaches in college football. To put this in perspective, Southern University’s entire athletic department operates on total revenues of $18.2 million for fiscal year 2025-2026. One coach at a PWI earns over 70 percent of what an entire HBCU athletic department generates in revenue. This isn’t an aberration it’s the system working exactly as designed.

The disparity becomes even starker when you examine what funds these massive operations. According to an audit report, Southern University Athletics had total revenue of $17.3 million and expenses of $18.9 million in fiscal year 2023, creating a deficit of $1.5 million. Meanwhile, PWI athletic departments operate with budgets in the hundreds of millions. The athletes on the field, no matter how talented, cannot bridge this chasm.

What truly separates PWI athletic programs from HBCU programs isn’t the talent of 18-22 year-olds playing the games. It’s the economic power of the institutions behind them specifically, the size, wealth, and giving capacity of their alumni bases. According to Georgetown University, PWI graduates earn an average of $62,000 annually, compared to HBCU graduates who earn around $51,000. But the income gap is just the beginning of the story. The real disparity lies in generational wealth accumulation and the sheer number of potential donors.

Major PWIs have alumni bases numbering in the hundreds of thousands, often spanning generations of families who have accumulated significant wealth over decades. These institutions benefit from alumni who are CEOs, hedge fund managers, real estate developers, and executives at Fortune 500 companies. Their boosters can write seven-figure checks without blinking. When they want to retain a coach or upgrade facilities, they simply open their checkbooks.

HBCUs represent around 3% of America’s colleges, yet account for less than 1% of total U.S. endowment wealth. The endowment funding gap stands at approximately $100 to $1—for every $100 a PWI receives in endowment money, HBCUs receive $1. This isn’t just about annual giving; it’s about the compound interest of generational investment that HBCUs have never had the opportunity to build.

Corporate sponsors don’t pay for athletic excellence they pay for eyeballs and access to affluent consumer bases. When companies decide where to invest their marketing dollars, they’re calculating the purchasing power and professional networks they can reach through an institution’s alumni base. A company sponsoring a PWI athletic program gains access to hundreds of thousands of alumni with significant disposable income and decision-making power in corporations. The athletes are just the entertainment that delivers this audience. The actual product being sold is access to the alumni network—for recruiting employees, marketing products, and building business relationships.

This is why even if every top African American athlete chose HBCUs, the sponsorship dollars wouldn’t automatically follow. The economic fundamentals would remain unchanged. Companies invest based on return on investment calculations that are tied to alumni wealth and network size, not solely to on-field performance.

The belief that athletic success drives institutional prosperity is perhaps the most dangerous delusion facing HBCU leadership. Even among PWIs, only a tiny fraction of athletic programs actually turn a profit. Most operate at a loss that’s subsidized by the broader university budget, student fees, and institutional transfers. Southern University’s budget shows $2.2 million in “Non-Mandatory Transfer” and $1.4 million in “Athletic Subsidy”—meaning the institution itself must subsidize athletics with nearly $3.6 million in institutional funds. This is money diverted from academic programs, faculty salaries, research, and student services to keep athletic programs afloat.

The PWI athletic model works for PWIs not because athletics are inherently profitable, but because they can afford the losses. They have massive endowments, substantial state funding, and alumni donor bases that can absorb deficits while still funding academic excellence. HBCUs don’t have this luxury. When an HBCU runs a $1.5 million athletic deficit while struggling to pay competitive faculty salaries, upgrade outdated classroom technology, or fund research initiatives, the opportunity cost is devastating. That deficit represents scholarships not awarded, professors not hired, and academic programs not developed.

Some HBCU advocates point to conference television deals and NCAA tournament appearances as potential revenue sources. But here again, the math is unforgiving. Major PWI conferences negotiate billion-dollar television contracts because they deliver large, affluent viewing audiences that advertisers covet. The Big Ten and SEC don’t command massive TV deals because their athletes are more talented they command them because their alumni bases represent valuable consumer demographics. The SWAC and MEAC can’t replicate these deals because they don’t deliver the same audience size and purchasing power, regardless of the talent on the field. Even if HBCUs somehow assembled teams that won national championships, the structural economic advantages would remain with PWIs.

Here’s what proponents of athletic investment don’t want to acknowledge: the marginal difference in talent between a five-star recruit and a three-star recruit is minimal compared to the massive difference in institutional resources. A slightly more talented roster cannot overcome a 10-to-1 or 100-to-1 resource disadvantage.

Consider the logistics: While an HBCU football program might struggle to afford charter flights for the team, PWI programs have dedicated planes, state-of-the-art training facilities, nutritionists, sports psychologists, and medical staffs that rival professional franchises. They have recruiting budgets that allow them to identify and court prospects nationally. They have video coordinators, analysts, and support staff that outnumber many HBCU athletic departments entirely. The game is won with infrastructure, coaching depth, medical support, nutrition, facilities, and recovery technology not just with the athletes on scholarship. And these resources require the kind of sustained, massive funding that only comes from large, wealthy alumni bases and major corporate partnerships.

There is an alternative model that makes sense for HBCUs: the Ivy League approach. Ivy League schools have chosen not to compete in the athletic arms race. They don’t offer athletic scholarships for football. They emphasize academic excellence while maintaining competitive but not dominant athletic programs. Their alumni networks and institutional prestige are built on academic achievement, research output, and professional success not athletic championships.

For HBCUs, this model offers a realistic path forward. Focus resources on academic excellence, research capabilities, and entrepreneurship. Build prestige through intellectual output, not athletic performance. Create value through what HBCUs have always done best: developing future leaders, producing groundbreaking research, and serving their communities.

The Ivy League proves that institutional prestige and alumni loyalty can thrive without major athletic success. No one questions Harvard’s or Yale’s institutional value because their football teams don’t win national championships. Every dollar spent trying to compete in the PWI athletic model is a dollar not invested in what could actually transform HBCU economic outcomes: research infrastructure, entrepreneurship programs, endowment building, and academic excellence.

Research shows that more than half of all students at HBCUs experience some measure of upward mobility, and upward mobility is about 50 percent higher at HBCUs than PWIs. This is the actual competitive advantage HBCUs possess their ability to transform the economic trajectories of students from under-resourced communities. This mission deserves full investment, not the scraps left over after athletic departments consume resources. If HBCUs invested the millions currently subsidizing athletic deficits into research grants, business incubators, technology transfer offices, and endowed professorships, they could create sustainable revenue streams while fulfilling their core mission. They could become engines of wealth creation for African American communities rather than junior varsity versions of PWI athletic programs.

Admitting you can’t win an unwinnable game isn’t defeat it’s strategic wisdom. HBCUs should stop trying to beat PWIs at a game rigged by structural economic advantages they will never possess. Instead, they should redefine success on their own terms.

This means:

Rightsizing athletic budgets to reflect institutional resources and priorities, accepting that competing for national championships in revenue sports isn’t financially viable or strategically wise.

Investing in niche sports and athletic experiences that can be competitive without massive resource requirements and that build campus community without drowning budgets.

Redirecting resources toward academic distinction, particularly in high-demand fields like STEM, healthcare, and technology where HBCU graduates can command premium salaries and build generational wealth.

Building research infrastructure that attracts grants, creates intellectual property, and establishes HBCUs as innovation centers rather than athletic also-rans.

Developing entrepreneurship ecosystems that turn students into business owners and job creators, building the kind of economic power that generates sustained institutional support.

Creating HBCU-specific tournaments and competitions where these institutions can showcase their talents to their communities without subsidizing PWI athletic departments through guarantee games.

The African American community’s love for HBCU athletics is real and deep. The pageantry of HBCU homecomings, the tradition of the bands, the pride of seeing young Black excellence on display these matter. But love sometimes means making hard choices about where to invest limited resources for maximum impact. The question isn’t whether HBCUs should have athletic programs. The question is whether they should bankrupt their academic missions chasing a competitive model they can never win, designed by and for institutions with 100 times their resources.

One coach earning $13 million. One entire athletic department operating on $18 million. The math isn’t subtle. The choice shouldn’t be either.

Until HBCUs build alumni bases with the size, wealth, and giving capacity to compete in the modern college athletic arms race, pursuing the PWI model isn’t ambition it’s financial suicide. The path to HBCU prosperity runs through classrooms and laboratories, not football stadiums and basketball arenas. It’s time to stop chasing someone else’s game and start winning our own.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

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Owning The Diamond: Why HBCU Women Entrepreneurs Should Buy a Women’s Pro Baseball Team

Posted on November 21, 2025 by | Leave a comment

“Let us put our moneys together; let us use our moneys; let us put our moneys out at usury among ourselves, and reap the benefits ourselves.” – Maggie L. Walker, pioneering African American banker and businesswoman:

It is not enough to cheer from the stands.
IIt is not enough to cheer from the stands. If HBCU women entrepreneurs and the institutions that produced them are serious about building generational wealth, influence, and visibility in the global sports economy, then ownership, not participation, must be the goal. The emergence of the Women’s Pro Baseball League (WPBL) offers just such a moment. Four inaugural franchises in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Boston mark the first professional women’s baseball league in the United States since 1954. And yet, amid this historic announcement, one question should echo across the HBCU landscape: Who will own a piece of it?

Ownership in sports is about more than trophies it’s about capital, culture, and control. While athletes inspire, it is owners who shape the economic ecosystem: negotiating television contracts, setting standards for pay equity, deciding where teams are located, and determining which communities benefit from their presence. In American sports, Black ownership remains vanishingly rare. Fewer than a handful of African Americans have ever held majority stakes in professional teams across all major leagues. Among women, ownership representation is even smaller. Yet the HBCU ecosystem comprising over a hundred institutions, $4 billion in endowment capital (though still dwarfed by their PWI counterparts), and a growing class of wealthy and capable alumni possesses both the human and institutional capital to change that reality. Buying a WPBL franchise would be a powerful signal: that African American women are no longer content to merely play or support the game, but to own the infrastructure of it.

The WPBL represents a once-in-a-century opportunity. The last women’s professional baseball league folded in 1954 when postwar America reverted to its gendered labor norms and refused to institutionalize women’s success on the field. Today, that same sport returns in a vastly different economy one defined by media fragmentation, digital storytelling, and institutional investing that rewards niche audiences and strong narratives. Women’s sports are on the rise. The WNBA just received a $75 million investment round from Nike, Condoleezza Rice, Laurene Powell Jobs, and others. Women’s college basketball ratings have exploded, drawing more viewers than some men’s sports. The National Women’s Soccer League has seen team valuations grow fivefold in the past five years. Investors are realizing what the data already shows: undervalued leagues often yield outsized returns once visibility and infrastructure catch up.

The WPBL sits at this exact inflection point. Early investors will not just shape the league they will define its culture, inclusivity, and profitability. This is why HBCU women entrepreneurs, backed by HBCU endowments and alumni capital, should move swiftly. Ownership here is not a vanity project it is a long-term equity position in the fastest-growing frontier of professional sports.

Start-up sports franchises are not the billion-dollar investments of the NFL or NBA. The WPBL’s initial teams are expected to sell for figures in the mid-seven to low-eight figures: expensive, yes, but feasible through a syndicate model combining entrepreneurial capital and institutional backing. A $15 million franchise, for instance, could be financed with $5 million in equity from HBCU women entrepreneurs, $3 million in matching commitments from HBCU endowments through a joint-venture investment arm, $5 million in debt financing via an African American–owned bank or credit union consortium, and $2 million in naming rights, sponsorship pre-sales, and city incentives.

Such a structure distributes risk while maximizing institutional leverage. It also allows for a reinvestment loop: returns from franchise appreciation, media deals, or merchandising could feed back into the endowments that helped fund the acquisition, growing HBCU wealth through private equity in sports. At a modest ten percent annualized return over fifteen years, a $3 million endowment investment could grow to more than $12.5 million, even before accounting for franchise appreciation. The social return of visibility, leadership, and influence would be immeasurable.

HBCU women entrepreneurs already lead some of the most innovative ventures in the country from fintech to fashion to wellness. They have built companies with leaner budgets, higher risk tolerance, and community-driven missions. That same acumen could translate seamlessly into sports ownership. A women-led ownership group rooted in HBCU culture would bring authenticity to a league whose audience is already primed for inclusive storytelling. They would not merely own a team they would shape its identity around empowerment, intellect, and cultural sophistication. Imagine a team whose executive suite reflects Spelman’s academic rigor, Howard’s creative dynamism, and FAMU’s entrepreneurial grit.

Moreover, the investment aligns with HBCU women’s long history of institution building. From Mary McLeod Bethune’s founding of Bethune-Cookman University to Maggie Lena Walker’s creation of the first Black woman–owned bank, African American women have always been at the forefront of merging mission with market. Buying a professional sports franchise is simply a modern continuation of that legacy.

Most HBCU endowments remain undercapitalized. Collectively, they total roughly $4 billion, compared to Harvard’s $50 billion alone. That gap underscores why traditional endowment investing centered on conservative asset classes may not close the wealth chasm. Sports equity, particularly in emerging women’s leagues, represents a hybrid investment: cultural capital meets growth asset. Endowments could carve out a modest allocation for strategic co-investment vehicles aimed at ownership in minority- or women-led sports ventures. Such a move would not only produce potential returns but reposition HBCU endowments as active agents in wealth creation, mirroring how elite universities use their endowments as venture capital arms. The same institutions that once nurtured the first generations of African American scholars could now nurture the first generation of African American women sports owners.

The path to ownership would unfold in phases: coalition building, institutional partnerships, financial structuring, branding, and media engagement. The first step would be forming an HBCU Women Sports Ownership Council an alliance of HBCU alumnae entrepreneurs, investors, attorneys, and sports professionals. Its mission would be to identify a WPBL franchise opportunity, conduct due diligence, and negotiate terms. Next, endowments, foundations, and alumni associations could serve as anchor investors via a pooled HBCU Sports Ownership Fund. African American–owned financial institutions would provide credit facilities, ensuring that capital circulation strengthens Black banking. The team’s branding could reflect HBCU values of intellect, resilience, and excellence. Annual “HBCU Heritage Games,” scholarships for women in sports management, and partnerships with K–12 baseball programs would ensure the franchise deepens institutional impact.

By the time Opening Day 2027 arrives, the vision becomes real. A stadium in Atlanta or Houston cities with deep HBCU roots roars with excitement. The team, perhaps named The Monarchs in tribute to the Negro Leagues, takes the field in uniforms stitched by a Black-owned apparel company. The owner’s suite is filled not with venture capitalists, but HBCU women—founders, engineers, bankers, educators—raising glasses to history. Every ticket sold funds scholarships. Every broadcast includes HBCU branding. Every victory multiplies across the ecosystem, from the university’s endowment statement to the little girl in the stands whispering, “She looks like me.” That is the multiplier effect of ownership.

A defining mark of this ownership group’s legacy should not only be who owns the team but who benefits from it. When an HBCU-led syndicate buys a women’s professional baseball team, it must ensure that every dollar of the fan experience circulates through Black and HBCU-centered businesses. Ownership without ecosystem-building simply recreates dependency; real power multiplies through participation.

An HBCU women’s ownership group has the chance to build an authentically circular sports economy, where concession stands, catering services, and retail vendors reflect the same entrepreneurial DNA as the team itself. The model for this begins with women like Pinky Cole, founder of Slutty Vegan, who transformed plant-based dining into a cultural and economic phenomenon through purpose-driven branding and community investment. Her ability to merge food, culture, and empowerment offers a blueprint for how HBCU women entrepreneurs could anchor the ballpark experience in ownership and identity.

Complementing this vision is the role of HBCU-owned service enterprises like Perkins Management Services Company, founded by Nicholas Perkins, a Fayetteville State University alumnus and owner of Fuddruckers. Perkins Management operates food services across HBCUs and federal institutions, combining operational scale with cultural competence. Partnering with Perkins Management to run stadium concessions or hospitality would ensure that the team’s operations mirror the ownership group’s values efficiency, reinvestment, and excellence.

Such an approach would transform the stadium into an economic hub for HBCU enterprise. Food vendors would come from HBCU alumni-owned companies. Uniform suppliers could source from HBCU textile programs. Merchandise stands could feature HBCU student designs. Hospitality contracts would prioritize HBCU-affiliated culinary programs. The music during games could feature HBCU marching bands or alumni artists. Even the stadium’s artwork could highlight HBCU painters and photographers, ensuring every sensory detail honors the ecosystem that made the ownership possible. A fan buying food or merchandise would not just be a consumer they’d be participating in a shared mission to strengthen African American institutions.

This reimagined sports environment would also offer internships, apprenticeships, and consulting opportunities for HBCU students and faculty. Business students could study operations. Communication majors could intern with the PR team. Engineering departments could advise on stadium energy efficiency. Each partnership would turn the franchise into a living classroom of applied HBCU excellence.

At a time when major leagues outsource globally, a women’s baseball franchise owned by HBCU women could reimagine localization and reinvestment as competitive advantage. Every game day would circulate dollars through a self-sustaining ecosystem that feeds back into HBCU entrepreneurship. Because when the ballpark itself is powered by HBCU women’s enterprise from boardroom to concession stand it ceases to be a venue. It becomes a living institution.

If the Women’s Pro Baseball League truly takes off, early ownership will be the golden ticket. African American investors have often entered markets too late once valuations skyrocket and access narrows. Now, before the WPBL matures, is the time for HBCU institutions and their entrepreneurial alumnae to act collectively. The call is not for charity but for strategy. Pooling even a fraction of the capital that circulates annually among HBCU alumni could change the power dynamic in sports forever. Endowments could stake equity. Alumni could invest through private funds. Students could study the economics of their own institution’s franchise. The result would be a feedback loop of wealth, wisdom, and visibility.

The first women’s professional baseball league in seventy years deserves first-of-its-kind ownership and no community is more qualified to deliver it than HBCU women. Because when HBCU women own the field, the entire game changes.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.

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