Tag Archives: Black dollar circulation

The Half of One Percent Problem: What Population Parity Would Actually Look Like for Black Banking

“African Americans love to quote that the dollar does not stay in our community but a few hours, which is true, but it is the belief that if they just buckle down and patronize more Black businesses. Unfortunately, until we understand institution to institution circulation and retention of capital, patronizing is just a redundant talking point. The same as trying to move oil – with no pipelines.” – William A. Foster, IV

A city plans for a population of five hundred thousand. It builds roads sized for five hundred thousand, schools sized for five hundred thousand, a water system sized for five hundred thousand. Then, by policy rather than accident, it allows only thirty thousand of those residents to ever draw water from the municipal system. The other four hundred seventy thousand are permitted to live in the city, work in the city, pay taxes to the city but they must find their water elsewhere, in smaller private wells scattered across town, each one a fraction of the capacity the city itself was built to provide. No one calls this a water crisis. They call it culture, or preference, or the free market sorting itself out. The wells keep drying up. The city keeps growing. Nobody asks why the math never closes.

That is, in miniature, the condition of African American banking in the United States in 2025. It is not a story about seventeen small institutions doing their best against long odds, though that story is true and worth telling. It is a story about scale; about what full institutional participation in the American banking system would actually require, measured in dollars, and about how far short of that requirement the current system sits. The gap is not rhetorical. It is arithmetic, and once it is laid out in full, it becomes difficult to discuss African American banking capacity using the language of individual bank performance at all. The conversation has to move to population, to proportion, and to the institutional habits that keep the proportion from closing.

Start with the top of the American banking system. As of March 31, 2026, the seventeen largest U.S. domestically chartered commercial banks by consolidated assets led by JPMorgan Chase at just over $4.0 trillion, followed by Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, and thirteen others hold a combined $16.36 trillion in assets. Now set beside that figure the complete universe of African American-owned banks in the country: seventeen institutions, spanning fifteen states and territories, holding a combined $6.72 billion. The ratio between the two groups is roughly 2,432 to 1. JPMorgan Chase alone holds approximately 597 times the combined assets of every African American-owned bank in the country put together. Liberty Bank & Trust of New Orleans, the single largest African American-owned bank in America at $1.1 billion, is outweighed by JPMorgan Chase alone at a ratio of roughly 3,634 to 1.

The scale of that gap becomes easier to hold in mind with a single object. In October 2025, JPMorgan Chase opened its new global headquarters at 270 Park Avenue in Manhattan; a 1,388-foot tower designed by architect Norman Foster, built at a reported cost of approximately $4 billion. The building alone cost nearly 60 percent of the combined total assets of every African American-owned bank in the United States. JPMorgan Chase did not draw down its balance sheet to build it, did not strain its capital position, and continued operating as the largest bank in the world throughout construction. The tower is, in other words, a rounding error for JPMorgan Chase and very nearly the entire African American banking sector’s balance sheet at the same time, the same dollar figure describing two entirely different orders of magnitude, depending on which side of the ledger it sits.

These comparisons are dramatic, but they are also, in a sense, unfair not to African American banks, but to the argument. Comparing seventeen community and regional institutions to the seventeen largest banks in the wealthiest economy in human history will always produce a lopsided ratio; the same exercise run against Sweden’s entire banking sector would look similarly stark. The more useful question, and the one that actually measures institutional health, is proportional. What share of America’s banking assets would African American-owned banks hold if African America held banking assets in proportion to its share of the American population — no more, no less, simply parity?

The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2025 population estimates place the Black-alone population of the United States at approximately 46.2 million people, or roughly 13.5 percent of the national population. HBCU Money’s own 2025 African American Owned Bank Directory places total FDIC-tracked domestic bank assets at approximately $24.9 trillion. If African America held banking assets proportional to its population share of the country, African American-owned banks would need to control approximately $3.36 trillion in assets or 13.5 percent of $24.9 trillion. The actual figure, again, is $6.72 billion. The gap between where population parity would place African American banking capacity and where it actually sits is approximately $3.355 trillion. To close that gap through organic growth at current rates where the sector’s total assets grew from $6.4 billion in 2024 to $6.7 billion in 2025, a $326 million increase would take not years or decades but centuries. Put differently: African American-owned banks would need to be roughly 500 times larger, in aggregate, than they are today simply to reach proportional representation. Not to dominate the banking sector. Not to overtake it. To match it.

It is worth sitting with what $3.36 trillion actually represents, because the number is large enough to lose its meaning through repetition. It is larger than the GDP of every country on earth except roughly the top eight. It is more than five hundred times the combined assets of every African American-owned bank that currently exists. It is, notably, not money that needs to be created from nothing it already exists, circulating through the American banking system, much of it deposited by African American individuals, businesses, churches, fraternities and sororities, professional associations, and institutions, simply routed through banks that are not African American-owned. The gap is not primarily a wealth-creation problem, though wealth creation matters. It is a capital-retention and capital-routing problem. The money exists. It is banking somewhere else.

This is where the conversation has to move from macroeconomics to institutional behavior, because the population-parity gap cannot be explained by African American banks lacking capable leadership, sound underwriting, or FDIC compliance. It has to be explained by where African American capital — individual, corporate, and institutional — chooses to be deposited, and the data on that question is uncomfortable. HBCU Money’s 2023 analysis of HBCU banking relationships found that of the country’s 107 HBCUs (U.S. Department of Education designation) and roughly 68 to 104 Predominantly Black Institutions (a federally designated but demographically fluid category, per the Postsecondary National Policy Institute), together approximately 200 institutions, only two were believed to bank with an African American-owned institution: Florida Memorial University, an HBCU, and Roxbury Community College, a PBI, both of which bank with OneUnited Bank. That means the overwhelming majority of the flagship educational institutions of Black America, the same institutions publicly organized around the mission of Black advancement, do not patronize the Black banking sector at all. This is not a scattered oversight. It is a structural pattern, and it repeats across nearly every category of African American institution: businesses, chambers of commerce, professional associations, churches, fraternal organizations, and nonprofits overwhelmingly bank with mainstream white-owned lenders, not because those lenders are barred by any law from serving them, but because institutional inertia, existing banking relationships, perceived convenience, and — bluntly — habit route the capital elsewhere by default.

Consider the case that HBCU Money’s 2023 piece surfaced: Howard University, the most prominent HBCU in the country, entered a five-year, $3.4 million-per-year partnership with PNC Bank to fund an entrepreneurship center on its own campus. PNC is a fine institution and the grant funded real programming. But PNC’s consolidated assets stand at roughly $568 billion as of early 2026, an amount that dwarfs the combined assets of every remaining African American-owned bank many times over, while Industrial Bank, an African American-owned institution with over $770 million in assets, sits a few miles away in the same city Howard calls home, unbanked by the university it neighbors. This is not a story about villainy. PNC did not do anything wrong by funding a center at Howard. It is a story about institutional default: when the moment came to choose a banking partner, the largest, most convenient, most established option was chosen, and the community institution built to receive exactly this kind of patronage was not seriously considered as an alternative. Multiply that single decision by every HBCU, every Black professional association, every African American-owned business banking outside the sector, every fraternity and sorority housing its national treasury with a conventional lender, and the population-parity gap stops looking mysterious. It looks like the predictable output of thousands of individually reasonable decisions that, in aggregate, produce collective institutional abandonment.

The deeper issue is what might be called the B2B lapse in African America’s institutional framework, the absence of a functioning business-to-business and institution-to-institution circulation system comparable to what other ethnic economic communities maintain as a matter of course. Economic development research has long noted that a dollar circulating within a tightly networked community; Asian immigrant enclaves, Jewish community networks, historically insular white ethnic communities tends to pass through many hands and institutions before leaving that community’s economic orbit, sometimes for weeks. The African American dollar, by contrast, is frequently cited as leaving the community’s economic orbit within hours, not because African American consumers spend irresponsibly, but because the institutional infrastructure that would capture and recirculate that dollar: Black-owned suppliers banking with Black-owned banks, insured by Black-owned insurers, audited by Black-owned accounting firms, financed by Black-owned lenders was never built to the density that other communities achieved, and where pieces of it do exist, they are not systematically used by the institutions closest to them. This is Institutional Density and Capital Retention, HBCU Money’s foundational concepts, expressed as a single measurable failure: African American institutions do not bank African American, insure African American, or contract African American at anywhere near the rate that would let the ecosystem compound on itself.

The consequence of that lapse is not merely symbolic. Capital retention compounds. A dollar deposited in an African American-owned bank does not simply sit there; under fractional reserve banking, it becomes the basis for loans to African American-owned businesses, African American homebuyers, and African American institutions that a mainstream lender evaluating the same borrowers through unfamiliar underwriting assumptions, without community-specific knowledge, and often with documented disparities in approval rates is statistically less likely to extend. Every HBCU endowment, every Black professional association’s operating account, every Black-owned business’s payroll account that banks outside the African American-owned system is not merely a missed opportunity for solidarity. It is a forgone multiplier on the community’s own capital, and it is the single most tractable lever available for narrowing the $3.36 trillion gap, because it does not require new wealth creation, it requires redirection of wealth that already exists.

“Do we want power? Or do we want the illusion of inclusion and equality? Because they are not the same.”

An institutional ecosystem that controls 0.027 percent of its own country’s banking assets does not set terms — it accepts them, from lenders who evaluate its businesses, its homebuyers, and its institutions on assumptions built for someone else’s community. Every dollar redirected into an African American-owned bank is a dollar that compounds inside the ecosystem instead of outside it becoming loan capital for the next Black-owned business, the next Black homebuyer, the next Black institution, and every dollar that stays outside it is a dollar the ecosystem permanently forfeits control over. Closing the population-parity gap is not a matter of asking African American institutions to sacrifice convenience for symbolism. It is a matter of an ecosystem deciding whether it intends to hold power over its own capital or continue lending that power to institutions that already hold $16 trillion of it.

The apex of African American banking’s share of national assets was 1926, when the sector held roughly 0.2 percent of America’s banking assets; ten times its current 0.027 percent share, achieved with a fraction of today’s Black professional class, Black business revenue, and Black institutional wealth. The population-parity gap is not a ceiling African America has never approached. It is a floor the community once stood far closer to, and has since drifted away from not through catastrophe, but through a hundred years of unexamined institutional habit. Closing even a fraction of that distance would not require African America to build something unprecedented. It would require African America’s own institutions to stop routing their capital away from the very system built to hold it.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

The HBCU Card? Why the Community’s Institutional Dollar Constantly Fails to Circulate at the HBCU’s Front Door

Let us put our money together; let us use our money; let us put our money out at usury among ourselves, and reap the benefit ourselves. – Maggie Lena Walker

The HBCU Card routes HBCU community spending through a family-owned Minnesota bank. African American-owned financial institutions are watching from the sideline. HBCUs are institutions with balance sheets, alumni networks, and banking relationships. When those relationships run through a family-owned bank in St. Paul, Minnesota, the question is not whether the partnership is well-intentioned. The question is who is building institutional capacity for whom.

There is an old arrangement, familiar to the sharecropping South, called the company store. The employer owned the land, controlled the wages, and operated the only store within reach. The worker labored, earned, and spent and every dollar completed a circle that ended back in the employer’s pocket. The arrangement was not presented as exploitation. It was presented as convenience. As service. As the reasonable way things worked given the options available. The options, of course, were controlled by the same party that ran the store. HBCUs in 2026 are not sharecroppers. They are institutions with endowments, alumni networks, and balance sheets. Which makes it harder, not easier, to explain why they are running the company store model on their own communities.

A prepaid Mastercard called the HBCU Card is circulating in HBCU communities, issued through Sunrise Banks, N.A., a family-owned bank headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota. It carries the logos of individual HBCUs. It returns a fraction of transaction fees to participating schools. The pitch is that HBCU students and alumni can express institutional pride through their spending and send a little money back to their alma mater in the process. That is the whole proposal. Read it twice if you need to.

It is not alignment. It is a licensing agreement dressed up as solidarity.

Sunrise Banks is a privately held, family-owned institution headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota, wholly owned by University Financial Corp, GBC, led by CEO David Reiling and his father, Bill Reiling. The bank is a certified B Corporation and holds CDFI designation from the U.S. Treasury. Its social impact commitments are real. None of that is the point. Sunrise Banks is not an African American-owned institution. It has no ownership ties to the HBCU community. It is not part of the African American financial ecosystem in any structural sense. It is a vendor that found a distribution channel, and the distribution channel said yes. Banking is not a transaction. It is infrastructure. Deposits flow into balance sheets that fund mortgages, small business loans, and community reinvestment. When that capital is held by institutions with ownership accountability to the depositing community, it compounds within that ecosystem. When it flows to an outside institution, however well-certified, however socially conscious its marketing, it leaves. A branded card does not change the direction of the outflow. Pride does not reroute capital. Ownership does.

HBCUs are, by their founding logic, in the business of building something that lasts. Endowments. Land. Research infrastructure. Alumni networks that compound across generations. That is the institutional premise. Against that premise, the HBCU Card is an embarrassment. It asks HBCU communities to generate transaction fee revenue, a rounding error in any serious capital strategy — and hand the actual value of the arrangement to a Minnesota family bank. The HBCU gets logo placement. Sunrise Banks gets a branded distribution network across dozens of historically Black institutions, customer acquisition at scale, and the reputational association with one of African America’s most symbolically resonant set of institutions. That is not a partnership. That is a concession. This would be forgivable if there were no alternative. There is. There are 221 of them.

As of 2025, there are 205 active African American-owned credit unions holding more than $8.15 billion in assets and serving nearly 727,000 members across 29 states and the District of Columbia. There are 16 African American-owned banks holding $6.7 billion in combined assets. Louisiana alone has 25 African American-owned credit unions. Illinois has 23. Virginia has 13. These institutions are not obscure. They are documented, chartered, federally insured, and in many cases operating within miles of HBCU campuses. Six HBCU-affiliated credit unions, institutions built specifically to serve the campus financial community, are still active after five such institutions closed or were absorbed since 2020. Their combined assets total $76.8 million. They are contracting. The HBCU Card is expanding. This is the choice being made.

The six that remain deserve to be named because the institutions they were built to serve have apparently forgotten them. Southern Teachers & Parents Federal Credit Union, founded to serve the Southern University system across its Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Shreveport campuses, is the largest of the survivors at $30.3 million in assets. Florida A&M University Federal Credit Union serves the flagship public HBCU in Florida. Virginia State University Federal Credit Union serves one of Virginia’s historically Black institutions. Councill Federal Credit Union serves the Alabama A&M University community. Arkansas A&M College Federal Credit Union serves the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff. Xavier University of Louisiana Federal Credit Union serves the only historically Black Catholic university in the Western Hemisphere. These six institutions held a combined $76.8 million in assets as of the most recent reporting, a number that should be ten times larger given the campus communities they sit inside. Prairie View A&M University Federal Credit Union, founded in 1937 by sixteen people who built a financial institution to serve the employees of Texas’s first state-supported college for African Americans, did not survive. It was absorbed by Cy-Fair Federal Credit Union, the credit union of a Houston-area school district with a documented record of racial inequity in its own student discipline. An 85-year-old Black institution, built by and for a Black university community, became a subsidiary of a school district credit union. Prairie View A&M University has nothing publicly to say about it. These institutions are not disappearing because they failed their communities. They are disappearing because their communities’ own flagship institutions will not anchor them.

The scale of what coordinated HBCU engagement could mean to this sector is not theoretical. The median African American-owned credit union holds approximately $2.47 million in assets and serves roughly 618 members, operating at the margin of viability in an asset tier where the national system is contracting fastest. Only 40 percent have a functional public website. Thirty percent are congregation-affiliated, with succession risks that threaten their continuity across a single pastoral transition. These institutions are not failing for lack of purpose. They are failing for lack of the institutional anchor relationships that would capitalize and stabilize them. HBCUs are precisely that anchor. A single mid-sized HBCU redirecting its payroll processing and student financial services to an African American-owned financial institution is a capitalization event for that institution. Six HBCUs doing it in a coordinated way reshape a sector. Instead, the sector contracts and HBCUs sign prepaid card deals.

The HBCU Card requires nothing from the institution except a logo. There is no governance, no balance sheet commitment, no strategic partnership to build or manage. An administrator with a full calendar can execute it in an afternoon. That is the real explanation, and it is worth saying plainly: this is what institutional avoidance looks like when it has been dressed up with branding. Banking with an African American-owned institution requires relationships to be built, terms to be negotiated, and sometimes real advocacy inside a bureaucracy that defaults to the path of least resistance. It is harder. It is supposed to be harder. Institutions that will not do the harder work in service of their own community’s financial ecosystem are not being strategic. They are being comfortable.

The Jewish American institutional ecosystem did not build generational financial infrastructure by licensing its brand to well-intentioned outside vendors. It built banks. It built credit unions. It built investment vehicles and directed capital toward them, institution by institution, decade by decade. Cuban American financial infrastructure in South Florida did not emerge from branded prepaid cards issued by Anglo-owned banks. It emerged from institutional discipline from the deliberate decision to route deposits, payroll, and investment relationships toward institutions owned by the community they were meant to serve. African American institutions are capable of the same discipline. The question that must be asked plainly, at this point, is whether they intend to practice it.

Sunrise Banks will receive a branded distribution network across the HBCU ecosystem, customer acquisition at scale, and the reputational weight of an association with institutions that African America has defended, funded, and attended for over 150 years. HBCUs will receive a transaction fee drip. That is the deal, and anyone who has read a term sheet in their life can see which side of it they want to be on. The deeper insult is that the card’s central premise that cultural identity can be expressed through a branded payment instrument is not wrong. OneUnited Bank, one of the largest African American-owned bank in the country with $756 million in assets, already offers a full range of culturally branded debit card designs as part of its standard deposit product. The infrastructure to do this through a Black-owned bank already exists. HBCUs have simply chosen not to direct their communities toward it.

The alternative does not require building anything new. It requires redirecting what already moves. Payroll. Student fee processing. Operating accounts. Auxiliary enterprise banking. These are cash flows that exist at every HBCU right now, today, flowing through institutions with no ownership accountability to the African American community. Fort Valley State University in Georgia operates with Citizens Trust Bank and Carver State Bank in the same state. Edward Waters University in Jacksonville, Florida sits in a market with documented African American-owned financial institution presence. Bethune-Cookman University and Florida Memorial University operate in a Florida context where redirecting institutional banking relationships would register immediately and materially in the balance sheets of the African American-owned credit unions that are currently fighting to survive. None of this requires a capital campaign. It requires a decision.

Delaware State University sits in proximity to one of the most financially sophisticated African American communities on the East Coast and banks with institutions that have no structural accountability to that community. Cheyney University, the oldest HBCU in the country, founded in 1837, older than the Civil War, operates in Pennsylvania, a state with documented African American-owned financial institutions, without a formal banking relationship with a single one of them. These are not resource constraints. These are not governance complications. These are choices. Call them what they are.

This is not an indictment of Sunrise Banks. The Reiling family built a legitimate community development institution and its credentials are real. But good intentions held by people outside a community are not a substitute for ownership infrastructure inside it and this distinction should not have to be explained to the leadership of institutions that exist precisely because the African American community refused to accept the benevolence of outside institutions as a substitute for their own. The HBCU was the answer to that substitution. The HBCU Card reverses the logic entirely.

The pattern is not new and it is not subtle. African American institutions accept the role of distribution channel, brand partner, and program host for arrangements that deliver the primary economic value to someone else. The community benefit is always in the framing. It is often partially real. What it never builds is the ownership infrastructure that makes a community institutionally durable across generations. HBCU Money has documented this in research pipelines that route HBCU-generated intellectual capital into PWI commercialization structures. In philanthropic arrangements that deliver program dollars without governance rights. In workforce development partnerships that build human capital for employers with no reciprocal obligation to the communities supplying the talent. The HBCU Card is the same transaction in a different category. The African American community keeps accepting these terms. Its institutions keep modeling the acceptance. And then everyone wonders why the ecosystem does not compound.

HBCUs are not passive observers of the African American financial ecosystem. They are, or should be, its institutional anchors. A single HBCU redirecting its payroll, student financial services, and auxiliary enterprise banking to African American-owned institutions is a capitalization event for those institutions. Six doing it in coordination reshape the sector’s asset base. Twenty doing it is a structural transformation of African American financial infrastructure that no amount of philanthropic giving or federal grant-making has ever achieved. That is what is being traded away for transaction fee revenue from a prepaid card. Let that land.

The 205 African American-owned credit unions and 16 African American-owned banks — Liberty Bank and Trust, Citizens Trust Bank, Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Optus Bank, Industrial Bank, First Independence Bank, and the rest — are not waiting to be discovered. They are chartered, capitalized, and operational. They have been there. What they have not had is the institutional anchor relationships that HBCUs are positioned to provide and have repeatedly declined to provide. That is the record. It is not ambiguous.

The HBCU Card will keep finding takers. The path of least institutional resistance always does. What it will not build, what it cannot build, is the African American financial ecosystem that 150 years of HBCU existence should by now have helped to anchor. That ecosystem is being built, slowly and against the current, by institutions that have received none of the loyalty that their community’s flagship universities should be directing toward them. HBCUs were founded as an act of defiance against a system that refused to invest in Black institutional capacity. The HBCU Card is an act of surrender to the same logic, branded in school colors.

African America knows the statistic. It has been recited at every convocation, posted on every community Facebook page, cited in every financial literacy workshop for the last thirty years: a dollar circulates in the Jewish American community for an estimated 20 days, in Asian American communities for roughly 28 days, and exits the African American community in less than 6 hours. The room nods. The speaker moves on. And then the HBCU signs a deal with Sunrise Banks. This is the part that should produce institutional shame and does not. The circulation of the Black dollar has become African America’s most repeated and least practiced idea. It functions as a ritual, spoken to affirm shared values, set aside before the next institutional decision is made. And the institutional decisions are where the actual economy is built or surrendered. HBCUs are supposed to be different. They are the institutions African America built when it was not allowed to build them. They carry that founding act in their names. They commemorate it at every homecoming. And then Alabama State University hands a $125 million investment management contract to a European American-owned firm without a public accounting of whether a single African American-owned asset manager was seriously considered. And Howard University puts PNC’s name on a center for entrepreneurship. And HBCU after HBCU runs its student financial services through Wells Fargo or Bank of America while Liberty Bank, Citizens Trust, and Mechanics and Farmers Bank operate in the same states, serve the same communities, and wait for a relationship that does not come. “Buy Black” is the slogan. The institutional behavior is: accept the proposal from whoever shows up with the most polished deck. This cannot be fixed at the household level. Individual people buying Black cannot compensate for institutions that do not. When HBCUs alongside fraternities, sororities, churches, and every other pillar of African American institutional life model the extraction rather than the retention, the community internalizes the lesson being taught, not the slogan being chanted. The HBCU Card is not an isolated mistake. It is a current example of a durable institutional posture: perform solidarity, outsource the economics.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.