Tag Archives: HBCU institutional strategy

The HBCU Card? Why the Community’s Institutional Dollar Constantly Fails to Circulate at the HBCU’s Front Door

Let us put our money together; let us use our money; let us put our money out at usury among ourselves, and reap the benefit ourselves. – Maggie Lena Walker

The HBCU Card routes HBCU community spending through a family-owned Minnesota bank. African American-owned financial institutions are watching from the sideline. HBCUs are institutions with balance sheets, alumni networks, and banking relationships. When those relationships run through a family-owned bank in St. Paul, Minnesota, the question is not whether the partnership is well-intentioned. The question is who is building institutional capacity for whom.

There is an old arrangement, familiar to the sharecropping South, called the company store. The employer owned the land, controlled the wages, and operated the only store within reach. The worker labored, earned, and spent and every dollar completed a circle that ended back in the employer’s pocket. The arrangement was not presented as exploitation. It was presented as convenience. As service. As the reasonable way things worked given the options available. The options, of course, were controlled by the same party that ran the store. HBCUs in 2026 are not sharecroppers. They are institutions with endowments, alumni networks, and balance sheets. Which makes it harder, not easier, to explain why they are running the company store model on their own communities.

A prepaid Mastercard called the HBCU Card is circulating in HBCU communities, issued through Sunrise Banks, N.A., a family-owned bank headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota. It carries the logos of individual HBCUs. It returns a fraction of transaction fees to participating schools. The pitch is that HBCU students and alumni can express institutional pride through their spending and send a little money back to their alma mater in the process. That is the whole proposal. Read it twice if you need to.

It is not alignment. It is a licensing agreement dressed up as solidarity.

Sunrise Banks is a privately held, family-owned institution headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota, wholly owned by University Financial Corp, GBC, led by CEO David Reiling and his father, Bill Reiling. The bank is a certified B Corporation and holds CDFI designation from the U.S. Treasury. Its social impact commitments are real. None of that is the point. Sunrise Banks is not an African American-owned institution. It has no ownership ties to the HBCU community. It is not part of the African American financial ecosystem in any structural sense. It is a vendor that found a distribution channel, and the distribution channel said yes. Banking is not a transaction. It is infrastructure. Deposits flow into balance sheets that fund mortgages, small business loans, and community reinvestment. When that capital is held by institutions with ownership accountability to the depositing community, it compounds within that ecosystem. When it flows to an outside institution, however well-certified, however socially conscious its marketing, it leaves. A branded card does not change the direction of the outflow. Pride does not reroute capital. Ownership does.

HBCUs are, by their founding logic, in the business of building something that lasts. Endowments. Land. Research infrastructure. Alumni networks that compound across generations. That is the institutional premise. Against that premise, the HBCU Card is an embarrassment. It asks HBCU communities to generate transaction fee revenue, a rounding error in any serious capital strategy — and hand the actual value of the arrangement to a Minnesota family bank. The HBCU gets logo placement. Sunrise Banks gets a branded distribution network across dozens of historically Black institutions, customer acquisition at scale, and the reputational association with one of African America’s most symbolically resonant set of institutions. That is not a partnership. That is a concession. This would be forgivable if there were no alternative. There is. There are 221 of them.

As of 2025, there are 205 active African American-owned credit unions holding more than $8.15 billion in assets and serving nearly 727,000 members across 29 states and the District of Columbia. There are 16 African American-owned banks holding $6.7 billion in combined assets. Louisiana alone has 25 African American-owned credit unions. Illinois has 23. Virginia has 13. These institutions are not obscure. They are documented, chartered, federally insured, and in many cases operating within miles of HBCU campuses. Six HBCU-affiliated credit unions, institutions built specifically to serve the campus financial community, are still active after five such institutions closed or were absorbed since 2020. Their combined assets total $76.8 million. They are contracting. The HBCU Card is expanding. This is the choice being made.

The six that remain deserve to be named because the institutions they were built to serve have apparently forgotten them. Southern Teachers & Parents Federal Credit Union, founded to serve the Southern University system across its Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Shreveport campuses, is the largest of the survivors at $30.3 million in assets. Florida A&M University Federal Credit Union serves the flagship public HBCU in Florida. Virginia State University Federal Credit Union serves one of Virginia’s historically Black institutions. Councill Federal Credit Union serves the Alabama A&M University community. Arkansas A&M College Federal Credit Union serves the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff. Xavier University of Louisiana Federal Credit Union serves the only historically Black Catholic university in the Western Hemisphere. These six institutions held a combined $76.8 million in assets as of the most recent reporting, a number that should be ten times larger given the campus communities they sit inside. Prairie View A&M University Federal Credit Union, founded in 1937 by sixteen people who built a financial institution to serve the employees of Texas’s first state-supported college for African Americans, did not survive. It was absorbed by Cy-Fair Federal Credit Union, the credit union of a Houston-area school district with a documented record of racial inequity in its own student discipline. An 85-year-old Black institution, built by and for a Black university community, became a subsidiary of a school district credit union. Prairie View A&M University has nothing publicly to say about it. These institutions are not disappearing because they failed their communities. They are disappearing because their communities’ own flagship institutions will not anchor them.

The scale of what coordinated HBCU engagement could mean to this sector is not theoretical. The median African American-owned credit union holds approximately $2.47 million in assets and serves roughly 618 members, operating at the margin of viability in an asset tier where the national system is contracting fastest. Only 40 percent have a functional public website. Thirty percent are congregation-affiliated, with succession risks that threaten their continuity across a single pastoral transition. These institutions are not failing for lack of purpose. They are failing for lack of the institutional anchor relationships that would capitalize and stabilize them. HBCUs are precisely that anchor. A single mid-sized HBCU redirecting its payroll processing and student financial services to an African American-owned financial institution is a capitalization event for that institution. Six HBCUs doing it in a coordinated way reshape a sector. Instead, the sector contracts and HBCUs sign prepaid card deals.

The HBCU Card requires nothing from the institution except a logo. There is no governance, no balance sheet commitment, no strategic partnership to build or manage. An administrator with a full calendar can execute it in an afternoon. That is the real explanation, and it is worth saying plainly: this is what institutional avoidance looks like when it has been dressed up with branding. Banking with an African American-owned institution requires relationships to be built, terms to be negotiated, and sometimes real advocacy inside a bureaucracy that defaults to the path of least resistance. It is harder. It is supposed to be harder. Institutions that will not do the harder work in service of their own community’s financial ecosystem are not being strategic. They are being comfortable.

The Jewish American institutional ecosystem did not build generational financial infrastructure by licensing its brand to well-intentioned outside vendors. It built banks. It built credit unions. It built investment vehicles and directed capital toward them, institution by institution, decade by decade. Cuban American financial infrastructure in South Florida did not emerge from branded prepaid cards issued by Anglo-owned banks. It emerged from institutional discipline from the deliberate decision to route deposits, payroll, and investment relationships toward institutions owned by the community they were meant to serve. African American institutions are capable of the same discipline. The question that must be asked plainly, at this point, is whether they intend to practice it.

Sunrise Banks will receive a branded distribution network across the HBCU ecosystem, customer acquisition at scale, and the reputational weight of an association with institutions that African America has defended, funded, and attended for over 150 years. HBCUs will receive a transaction fee drip. That is the deal, and anyone who has read a term sheet in their life can see which side of it they want to be on. The deeper insult is that the card’s central premise that cultural identity can be expressed through a branded payment instrument is not wrong. OneUnited Bank, one of the largest African American-owned bank in the country with $756 million in assets, already offers a full range of culturally branded debit card designs as part of its standard deposit product. The infrastructure to do this through a Black-owned bank already exists. HBCUs have simply chosen not to direct their communities toward it.

The alternative does not require building anything new. It requires redirecting what already moves. Payroll. Student fee processing. Operating accounts. Auxiliary enterprise banking. These are cash flows that exist at every HBCU right now, today, flowing through institutions with no ownership accountability to the African American community. Fort Valley State University in Georgia operates with Citizens Trust Bank and Carver State Bank in the same state. Edward Waters University in Jacksonville, Florida sits in a market with documented African American-owned financial institution presence. Bethune-Cookman University and Florida Memorial University operate in a Florida context where redirecting institutional banking relationships would register immediately and materially in the balance sheets of the African American-owned credit unions that are currently fighting to survive. None of this requires a capital campaign. It requires a decision.

Delaware State University sits in proximity to one of the most financially sophisticated African American communities on the East Coast and banks with institutions that have no structural accountability to that community. Cheyney University, the oldest HBCU in the country, founded in 1837, older than the Civil War, operates in Pennsylvania, a state with documented African American-owned financial institutions, without a formal banking relationship with a single one of them. These are not resource constraints. These are not governance complications. These are choices. Call them what they are.

This is not an indictment of Sunrise Banks. The Reiling family built a legitimate community development institution and its credentials are real. But good intentions held by people outside a community are not a substitute for ownership infrastructure inside it and this distinction should not have to be explained to the leadership of institutions that exist precisely because the African American community refused to accept the benevolence of outside institutions as a substitute for their own. The HBCU was the answer to that substitution. The HBCU Card reverses the logic entirely.

The pattern is not new and it is not subtle. African American institutions accept the role of distribution channel, brand partner, and program host for arrangements that deliver the primary economic value to someone else. The community benefit is always in the framing. It is often partially real. What it never builds is the ownership infrastructure that makes a community institutionally durable across generations. HBCU Money has documented this in research pipelines that route HBCU-generated intellectual capital into PWI commercialization structures. In philanthropic arrangements that deliver program dollars without governance rights. In workforce development partnerships that build human capital for employers with no reciprocal obligation to the communities supplying the talent. The HBCU Card is the same transaction in a different category. The African American community keeps accepting these terms. Its institutions keep modeling the acceptance. And then everyone wonders why the ecosystem does not compound.

HBCUs are not passive observers of the African American financial ecosystem. They are, or should be, its institutional anchors. A single HBCU redirecting its payroll, student financial services, and auxiliary enterprise banking to African American-owned institutions is a capitalization event for those institutions. Six doing it in coordination reshape the sector’s asset base. Twenty doing it is a structural transformation of African American financial infrastructure that no amount of philanthropic giving or federal grant-making has ever achieved. That is what is being traded away for transaction fee revenue from a prepaid card. Let that land.

The 205 African American-owned credit unions and 16 African American-owned banks — Liberty Bank and Trust, Citizens Trust Bank, Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Optus Bank, Industrial Bank, First Independence Bank, and the rest — are not waiting to be discovered. They are chartered, capitalized, and operational. They have been there. What they have not had is the institutional anchor relationships that HBCUs are positioned to provide and have repeatedly declined to provide. That is the record. It is not ambiguous.

The HBCU Card will keep finding takers. The path of least institutional resistance always does. What it will not build, what it cannot build, is the African American financial ecosystem that 150 years of HBCU existence should by now have helped to anchor. That ecosystem is being built, slowly and against the current, by institutions that have received none of the loyalty that their community’s flagship universities should be directing toward them. HBCUs were founded as an act of defiance against a system that refused to invest in Black institutional capacity. The HBCU Card is an act of surrender to the same logic, branded in school colors.

African America knows the statistic. It has been recited at every convocation, posted on every community Facebook page, cited in every financial literacy workshop for the last thirty years: a dollar circulates in the Jewish American community for an estimated 20 days, in Asian American communities for roughly 28 days, and exits the African American community in less than 6 hours. The room nods. The speaker moves on. And then the HBCU signs a deal with Sunrise Banks. This is the part that should produce institutional shame and does not. The circulation of the Black dollar has become African America’s most repeated and least practiced idea. It functions as a ritual, spoken to affirm shared values, set aside before the next institutional decision is made. And the institutional decisions are where the actual economy is built or surrendered. HBCUs are supposed to be different. They are the institutions African America built when it was not allowed to build them. They carry that founding act in their names. They commemorate it at every homecoming. And then Alabama State University hands a $125 million investment management contract to a European American-owned firm without a public accounting of whether a single African American-owned asset manager was seriously considered. And Howard University puts PNC’s name on a center for entrepreneurship. And HBCU after HBCU runs its student financial services through Wells Fargo or Bank of America while Liberty Bank, Citizens Trust, and Mechanics and Farmers Bank operate in the same states, serve the same communities, and wait for a relationship that does not come. “Buy Black” is the slogan. The institutional behavior is: accept the proposal from whoever shows up with the most polished deck. This cannot be fixed at the household level. Individual people buying Black cannot compensate for institutions that do not. When HBCUs alongside fraternities, sororities, churches, and every other pillar of African American institutional life model the extraction rather than the retention, the community internalizes the lesson being taught, not the slogan being chanted. The HBCU Card is not an isolated mistake. It is a current example of a durable institutional posture: perform solidarity, outsource the economics.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

The Real Game: PWI Athletics Win with Wealth, Not Athletes—And HBCUs Can’t Chase That Model

“The wealthiest boosters and donors to a PWI rarely ever played sports, but they did go build companies and a lot of wealth. Boosters spend hundreds of millions a year to compete with their friends and business competition from rival schools. The money spent is a bigger game than what happens on the field.” – William A. Foster, IV

Courtesy of The Rich Eisen Show

The image circulating across sports media this week says everything without trying to explain anything at all. LSU’s new contract offer to Lane Kiffin — seven years at $13 million annually, stacked with multimillion-dollar bonuses, home buyouts, and housing subsidies looks less like a coaching contract and more like a sovereign wealth transaction. It is the kind of deal only an institution backed by generational wealth, mega-boosters, and a national alumni base at the upper end of the economic ladder could produce. Yet every few months a familiar chorus resurfaces insisting that if “only the top African American athletes chose HBCUs,” the financial gap in college athletics would close. The narrative is compelling, emotional, and rooted in cultural longing, but it remains economically false.

The fantasy is seductive: if only more premier African American athletes chose HBCUs, our athletic programs could compete with Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs). If only we could land that five-star recruit, sign that top quarterback, or attract that elite basketball prospect, everything would change. The dream persists in alumni conversations, on social media, and in aspirational fundraising campaigns. But the dream is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of what actually drives college athletic success and it’s costing HBCUs resources they can’t afford to waste. The numbers tell a story that talent alone cannot rewrite.

Lane Kiffin’s new contract with LSU pays him approximately $13 million annually, making him one of the highest-paid coaches in college football. To put this in perspective, Southern University’s entire athletic department operates on total revenues of $18.2 million for fiscal year 2025-2026. One coach at a PWI earns over 70 percent of what an entire HBCU athletic department generates in revenue. This isn’t an aberration it’s the system working exactly as designed.

The disparity becomes even starker when you examine what funds these massive operations. According to an audit report, Southern University Athletics had total revenue of $17.3 million and expenses of $18.9 million in fiscal year 2023, creating a deficit of $1.5 million. Meanwhile, PWI athletic departments operate with budgets in the hundreds of millions. The athletes on the field, no matter how talented, cannot bridge this chasm.

What truly separates PWI athletic programs from HBCU programs isn’t the talent of 18-22 year-olds playing the games. It’s the economic power of the institutions behind them specifically, the size, wealth, and giving capacity of their alumni bases. According to Georgetown University, PWI graduates earn an average of $62,000 annually, compared to HBCU graduates who earn around $51,000. But the income gap is just the beginning of the story. The real disparity lies in generational wealth accumulation and the sheer number of potential donors.

Major PWIs have alumni bases numbering in the hundreds of thousands, often spanning generations of families who have accumulated significant wealth over decades. These institutions benefit from alumni who are CEOs, hedge fund managers, real estate developers, and executives at Fortune 500 companies. Their boosters can write seven-figure checks without blinking. When they want to retain a coach or upgrade facilities, they simply open their checkbooks.

HBCUs represent around 3% of America’s colleges, yet account for less than 1% of total U.S. endowment wealth. The endowment funding gap stands at approximately $100 to $1—for every $100 a PWI receives in endowment money, HBCUs receive $1. This isn’t just about annual giving; it’s about the compound interest of generational investment that HBCUs have never had the opportunity to build.

Corporate sponsors don’t pay for athletic excellence they pay for eyeballs and access to affluent consumer bases. When companies decide where to invest their marketing dollars, they’re calculating the purchasing power and professional networks they can reach through an institution’s alumni base. A company sponsoring a PWI athletic program gains access to hundreds of thousands of alumni with significant disposable income and decision-making power in corporations. The athletes are just the entertainment that delivers this audience. The actual product being sold is access to the alumni network—for recruiting employees, marketing products, and building business relationships.

This is why even if every top African American athlete chose HBCUs, the sponsorship dollars wouldn’t automatically follow. The economic fundamentals would remain unchanged. Companies invest based on return on investment calculations that are tied to alumni wealth and network size, not solely to on-field performance.

The belief that athletic success drives institutional prosperity is perhaps the most dangerous delusion facing HBCU leadership. Even among PWIs, only a tiny fraction of athletic programs actually turn a profit. Most operate at a loss that’s subsidized by the broader university budget, student fees, and institutional transfers. Southern University’s budget shows $2.2 million in “Non-Mandatory Transfer” and $1.4 million in “Athletic Subsidy”—meaning the institution itself must subsidize athletics with nearly $3.6 million in institutional funds. This is money diverted from academic programs, faculty salaries, research, and student services to keep athletic programs afloat.

The PWI athletic model works for PWIs not because athletics are inherently profitable, but because they can afford the losses. They have massive endowments, substantial state funding, and alumni donor bases that can absorb deficits while still funding academic excellence. HBCUs don’t have this luxury. When an HBCU runs a $1.5 million athletic deficit while struggling to pay competitive faculty salaries, upgrade outdated classroom technology, or fund research initiatives, the opportunity cost is devastating. That deficit represents scholarships not awarded, professors not hired, and academic programs not developed.

Some HBCU advocates point to conference television deals and NCAA tournament appearances as potential revenue sources. But here again, the math is unforgiving. Major PWI conferences negotiate billion-dollar television contracts because they deliver large, affluent viewing audiences that advertisers covet. The Big Ten and SEC don’t command massive TV deals because their athletes are more talented they command them because their alumni bases represent valuable consumer demographics. The SWAC and MEAC can’t replicate these deals because they don’t deliver the same audience size and purchasing power, regardless of the talent on the field. Even if HBCUs somehow assembled teams that won national championships, the structural economic advantages would remain with PWIs.

Here’s what proponents of athletic investment don’t want to acknowledge: the marginal difference in talent between a five-star recruit and a three-star recruit is minimal compared to the massive difference in institutional resources. A slightly more talented roster cannot overcome a 10-to-1 or 100-to-1 resource disadvantage.

Consider the logistics: While an HBCU football program might struggle to afford charter flights for the team, PWI programs have dedicated planes, state-of-the-art training facilities, nutritionists, sports psychologists, and medical staffs that rival professional franchises. They have recruiting budgets that allow them to identify and court prospects nationally. They have video coordinators, analysts, and support staff that outnumber many HBCU athletic departments entirely. The game is won with infrastructure, coaching depth, medical support, nutrition, facilities, and recovery technology not just with the athletes on scholarship. And these resources require the kind of sustained, massive funding that only comes from large, wealthy alumni bases and major corporate partnerships.

There is an alternative model that makes sense for HBCUs: the Ivy League approach. Ivy League schools have chosen not to compete in the athletic arms race. They don’t offer athletic scholarships for football. They emphasize academic excellence while maintaining competitive but not dominant athletic programs. Their alumni networks and institutional prestige are built on academic achievement, research output, and professional success not athletic championships.

For HBCUs, this model offers a realistic path forward. Focus resources on academic excellence, research capabilities, and entrepreneurship. Build prestige through intellectual output, not athletic performance. Create value through what HBCUs have always done best: developing future leaders, producing groundbreaking research, and serving their communities.

The Ivy League proves that institutional prestige and alumni loyalty can thrive without major athletic success. No one questions Harvard’s or Yale’s institutional value because their football teams don’t win national championships. Every dollar spent trying to compete in the PWI athletic model is a dollar not invested in what could actually transform HBCU economic outcomes: research infrastructure, entrepreneurship programs, endowment building, and academic excellence.

Research shows that more than half of all students at HBCUs experience some measure of upward mobility, and upward mobility is about 50 percent higher at HBCUs than PWIs. This is the actual competitive advantage HBCUs possess their ability to transform the economic trajectories of students from under-resourced communities. This mission deserves full investment, not the scraps left over after athletic departments consume resources. If HBCUs invested the millions currently subsidizing athletic deficits into research grants, business incubators, technology transfer offices, and endowed professorships, they could create sustainable revenue streams while fulfilling their core mission. They could become engines of wealth creation for African American communities rather than junior varsity versions of PWI athletic programs.

Admitting you can’t win an unwinnable game isn’t defeat it’s strategic wisdom. HBCUs should stop trying to beat PWIs at a game rigged by structural economic advantages they will never possess. Instead, they should redefine success on their own terms.

This means:

Rightsizing athletic budgets to reflect institutional resources and priorities, accepting that competing for national championships in revenue sports isn’t financially viable or strategically wise.

Investing in niche sports and athletic experiences that can be competitive without massive resource requirements and that build campus community without drowning budgets.

Redirecting resources toward academic distinction, particularly in high-demand fields like STEM, healthcare, and technology where HBCU graduates can command premium salaries and build generational wealth.

Building research infrastructure that attracts grants, creates intellectual property, and establishes HBCUs as innovation centers rather than athletic also-rans.

Developing entrepreneurship ecosystems that turn students into business owners and job creators, building the kind of economic power that generates sustained institutional support.

Creating HBCU-specific tournaments and competitions where these institutions can showcase their talents to their communities without subsidizing PWI athletic departments through guarantee games.

The African American community’s love for HBCU athletics is real and deep. The pageantry of HBCU homecomings, the tradition of the bands, the pride of seeing young Black excellence on display these matter. But love sometimes means making hard choices about where to invest limited resources for maximum impact. The question isn’t whether HBCUs should have athletic programs. The question is whether they should bankrupt their academic missions chasing a competitive model they can never win, designed by and for institutions with 100 times their resources.

One coach earning $13 million. One entire athletic department operating on $18 million. The math isn’t subtle. The choice shouldn’t be either.

Until HBCUs build alumni bases with the size, wealth, and giving capacity to compete in the modern college athletic arms race, pursuing the PWI model isn’t ambition it’s financial suicide. The path to HBCU prosperity runs through classrooms and laboratories, not football stadiums and basketball arenas. It’s time to stop chasing someone else’s game and start winning our own.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.