Tag Archives: Black business ownership

The 1.8% Problem: What the Wealth Data Says About NIL’s HBCU Gap

“In a race-based capitalist society, it’s not what you know — it’s what you own.” – Dr. Claud Anderson

In 1975, a small manufacturing town watched its largest employer announce a new headquarters two counties over. The mayor called a meeting of the leading families and asked them to match the incentive package the rival town had offered. The families were respected, well-connected, active in every civic club in the region but not one of them owned the mill, the bank, or the rail line that had made the town matter in the first place. They owned homes, pensions, and good names. The headquarters left. Two decades later, when a regional grocery distributor scouted the same corridor for a new warehouse hub, it wasn’t the town’s civic reputation that won the deal, it was the fact that, by then, three local families owned the land, the trucking contracts, and the cold-storage facility the distributor needed to move product. Ownership, not affection, decided where capital went.

That distinction between people who care about an institution and people who own enough to move capital toward it is the one that has been missing from nearly every conversation about Name, Image and Likeness and the widening chasm between Historically Black Colleges and Universities and their Power Four counterparts. The prevailing HBCU theory of the NIL era held that Black America’s demonstrable, generational devotion to its football and basketball programs would translate into competitive collective fundraising once the NCAA’s amateurism rules fell. It has not, and it will not, because the premise was never about devotion. It was about ownership, and on that metric the arithmetic was never close.

Consider what happened in West Texas this summer. Texas Tech’s football stadium, known for decades as Jones AT&T Stadium, was renamed Galaxy Stadium in a naming-rights agreement reported at $75 million, replacing AT&T as the venue’s corporate partner. Galaxy Digital is a cryptocurrency and AI-infrastructure company that operates a large data campus in nearby Dickens County, currently undergoing a multibillion-dollar expansion. Its founder and chief executive, Mike Novogratz, is a Princeton graduate. AT&T, the company that held the naming rights before it, is led by John Stankey, a graduate of Loyola Marymount and UCLA. Neither man has any alumni tie to Texas Tech. The deal was not an act of institutional loyalty. It was a commercial transaction, a company with regional infrastructure interests buying brand proximity to a media asset with roughly 60,000 seats and a television footprint. Around the same time, Ripple became the first cryptocurrency sponsor to appear on a college jersey, at the University of Kansas, the alma mater of Ripple’s chief executive, Brad Garlinghouse, but a decision made unilaterally by a founder who controls his company’s marketing budget, not a fundraising campaign that mobilized thousands of small donors.

Compare that to the version of “alumni giving” available to HBCUs. Mark Cuban, a 1981 graduate of Indiana University and among the wealthiest men to build his fortune from a single company he founded and sold, has been a steady donor to his alma mater: roughly five million dollars for a sports media center in 2015, six million for the rugby program, and an undisclosed “big number” more recently funneled toward Indiana’s transfer portal recruiting. These are genuinely generous gifts from a genuinely engaged alumnus. They are also, by an order of magnitude or more, smaller than what a single infrastructure company paid for a stadium’s name. That gap is the entire story. When the money comes from an alumnus who happens to own a company outright, the number is real but bounded by one person’s balance sheet. When the money comes from a corporation with no alumni relationship at all, the number reflects what an asset, the media rights, the stadium, the media market, is worth on the open market, and it dwarfs even the most generous individual gift.

HBCUs have access to neither lever at scale, and the reason is visible in the numbers rather than in sentiment. HBCU Money’s 2024 Annual Wealth Report, drawing on Federal Reserve data, put total African American household assets at roughly $7.1 trillion. Private businesses — the asset class that actually produces boosters capable of writing nine-figure checks — accounted for just $330 billion of that, or 4.7% of African American household assets, and only 1.8% of all U.S. household private business assets. For a population that is roughly 13 to 14% of the country, a 1.8% share of the nation’s private business wealth is not a gap; it is close to an absence, and it is the single most underrepresented major asset category in the entire report relative to population share. Corporate equities and mutual fund shares told the same story from a different angle: also $330 billion, also 4.7% of Black household assets, but a mere 0.7% of total U.S. household equity holdings meaning African American households are not meaningfully participating in the ownership side of public markets either.

What African American households do hold, in scale, is retirement income tied to employment. Defined benefit pension entitlements totaled $1.73 trillion or 24.4% of all African American household assets, and 9.7% of the nation’s defined benefit pension assets, by far the highest representation of any asset category relative to population share. Add defined contribution plans like 401(k)s, another $880 billion and 12.4% of assets, and pension entitlements alone account for nearly 37% of everything African American households own — more than real estate, more than every other asset class combined except real estate itself. That is not a portfolio built by owners. It is a balance sheet built by workers: people whose wealth exists because an employer, public or private, guaranteed them a retirement benefit in exchange for decades of labor, not because they held equity in the enterprise itself. The wealth is real, and the institutions that produced it, often public-sector employers and unionized industries, deserve credit for building it. But a pension check, however large in aggregate, cannot write a stadium naming-rights deal. Only ownership can, and ownership is precisely the asset class where the data shows African American households are furthest from parity.

This is not a story about HBCU alumni failing to show up. It is a story about a capital-formation deficit that predates NIL by a century, rooted in exclusion from mainstream lending, redlining that kept Black-owned enterprise from accumulating the commercial real estate and equity positions that compound into founder-scale wealth, and a labor-market history that concentrated African American economic participation in employment rather than ownership, a history the wealth data confirms is still very much the present, not just the past. NIL simply exposed, in real time and in dollar figures anyone can look up, a gap that institutional strategists have been describing in more abstract terms for years. The mistake was believing that emotional intensity, the unmatched loyalty HBCU alumni show their bands, their homecomings, their institutions could substitute for what only ownership scale provides. It cannot. A hundred thousand donors giving fifty dollars each produces five million dollars and an enormous amount of goodwill. It does not produce seventy-five million dollars, because the mathematics of collective small-dollar giving and the mathematics of a single balance sheet decision operate on entirely different curves.

The strategic response, then, cannot be a better fundraising pitch. It has to be a redirection of where HBCU athletic and institutional leadership spend their effort. Conference-level collective bargaining, SWAC and MEAC schools pooling media rights and NIL infrastructure rather than competing individually for the same small donor base, captures at least some of the scale economics that individual HBCUs cannot achieve alone. Building actual venture and private equity vehicles modeled on efforts like Ariel Investments’ Project Black, which exists explicitly to grow Black-owned enterprises to the scale where their founders become the next generation of nine-figure donors, addresses the underlying ownership gap rather than the symptom. HBCU athletic departments should pursue infrastructure and commercial partnerships on the same terms Galaxy Digital pursued Texas Tech; as deals tied to real assets (media rights, campus real estate, facility co-location) rather than appeals to conscience from companies with no alumni connection to lose sleep over. And alumni giving programs should shift from one-time gifts toward equity-bearing vehicles — alumni investment funds tied to HBCU-linked enterprises — that convert working-professional generosity into compounding ownership stakes rather than annual write-offs.

None of this closes the gap by next season. The wealth data suggests the honest horizon for building an HBCU-linked ownership class capable of matching this kind of capital is measured in decades, not fundraising cycles, the private business share of African American wealth has moved only marginally year over year even as pensions and real estate continued compounding. But the alternative of continuing to ask a donor base of working professionals to out-fundraise infrastructure companies and telecom giants was never a strategy. It was a hope mistaken for one.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

The DEI Distraction: Why Black Business Leaders Are Defending the Wrong Battlefield

It is simple. Our talent and capital is either empowering and enriching our institutional ecosystem – or it is doing that for someone else. We are begging Others’ to let our talent and capital make them richer and more powerful. – William A. Foster, IV

When Bloomberg Businessweek convened a roundtable of prominent Black business executives in late March 2026 to discuss the Trump administration’s sweeping rollback of diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives, the gathering carried an unmistakable weight. The participants — Ursula Burns of Integrum, Lisa Wardell of the American Express board, Jacob Walthour Jr. of Blueprint Capital Advisors, Nicole Reboe of Rich Talent Group, and Chris Williams of Siebert Williams Shank represent some of the most accomplished figures in American corporate life. Their concerns are real. Their frustrations are earned. And they are, with the greatest respect, focused on exactly the wrong problem.

The DEI debate has consumed enormous intellectual and political energy among Black business leadership. Executives like Burns have emphasized that DEI efforts historically helped address systemic barriers rather than provide unfair advantages. This is correct as far as it goes. But defending the legitimacy of DEI however righteous the argument is fundamentally an argument about access to other people’s institutions. It is a debate about whether African American talent will be permitted to generate wealth for corporate structures that it does not own, govern, or ultimately benefit from in proportion to its contribution. Winning that argument secures a seat at a table built by someone else, financed by someone else, and passed on to someone else’s heirs.

The more consequential question, one that the DEI debate reliably obscures is this: what is the strategic value of Black business ownership as the foundation of an autonomous African American institutional ecosystem, and why has that ecosystem remained so structurally underdeveloped compared to the scale of Black talent and labor flowing through the broader American economy?

The case against centering the DEI debate as the primary lens for Black economic advancement is, at its core, an argument about capital flows. Every dollar of Black labor and talent that enters a corporation it does not own produces returns that are retained, reinvested, and compounded within that corporation’s ownership structure. The wages extracted represent a fraction of the value created. This is not a critique unique to the experience of African Americans, it is the fundamental logic of capitalism. The distinction, however, is that other ethnic and national communities have historically used their productive capacity to capitalize their own institutional ecosystems: banks, insurance companies, real estate holding entities, research universities, and media operations that recirculate wealth within the community rather than exporting it.

Between 2017 and 2022, Black-owned employer businesses grew by nearly 57 percent, adding more than 70,000 new firms, injecting $212 billion into the economy and paying over $61 billion in salaries. That is not a trivial contribution. But its structural limitations are equally stark. Black Americans make up 14 percent of the U.S. population but own only 3.3 percent of businesses. More revealing still: if Black business ownership continues to grow at its current rate of 4.72 percent annually, it will take 256 years to reach parity with the share of Black people in America, a timeline that leaves racial wealth gaps entrenched across generations. No DEI program, however well-designed or vigorously defended, addresses that structural gap. DEI operates within the existing distribution of institutional ownership. It does not alter it. A Black executive ascending to the C-suite of a Fortune 500 company is a personal achievement of consequence, but it does not transfer a dollar of equity to the African American institutional ecosystem. The corporation retains its ownership structure, its compounding endowment, and its ability to extend opportunity to subsequent generations on its own terms.

This is not an argument that employment in major corporations is without value. It is an argument about strategic priority and institutional logic. The Bloomberg roundtable reflects the perspective of individuals who have navigated the highest levels of American corporate life with exceptional skill. But the very fact that their primary public posture is a defense of DEI — a program designed to manage the terms of Black participation in institutions owned by others — illustrates how thoroughly that framework has captured the strategic imagination of Black business leadership. White workers overall still hold 71 percent of executive jobs, 61 percent of manager positions, and 54 percent of professional roles. DEI, at its most effective, redistributed a fraction of corporate leadership positions without altering the underlying structure of institutional ownership. The wealth generated by those institutions through equity appreciation, retained earnings, and compounding investment portfolios continued to flow overwhelmingly to the same ownership class it always has.

The parallel structure that could generate equivalent wealth retention within the African American community requires not better access to existing institutions but the construction and capitalization of independent ones. HBCUs represent the most significant existing node in that potential ecosystem. They are anchor institutions with land assets, research capacity, and the ability to concentrate and retain Black talent. But they remain chronically undercapitalized relative to their peer institutions, in large part because the most financially productive graduates of HBCUs and of Black communities broadly are systematically routed into corporations and financial institutions that extract rather than recirculate their productive capacity.

Black households have, on average, 77 percent less wealth than white households — roughly $958,000 less per household, representing approximately 24 cents for every dollar of white family wealth. That gap is not primarily explained by differences in income or educational attainment. It is explained by differences in asset ownership, intergenerational wealth transfer, and institutional investment. The DEI framework, even at its most ambitious, addresses income. It does not address assets. If the share of Black employer businesses reached parity with the share of the Black population, cities across the country could see as many as 757,000 new businesses, 6.3 million more jobs, and an additional $824 billion in revenue circulating in local economies. That figure represents the economic magnitude of the ownership gap and none of it is captured by diversity metrics in corporate hiring. The structural barriers to closing that gap are not primarily political. They are financial. On average, 35 percent of white business owners received all the financing they applied for, compared to 16 percent of Black business owners. Black entrepreneurs are nearly three times more likely than white entrepreneurs to have business growth and profitability negatively impacted by a lack of financial capital, and 70.6 percent rely on personal and family savings for financing which means that lower household wealth creates a compounding disadvantage that no corporate diversity initiative is designed to resolve. This is the architecture of the problem: insufficient institutional wealth produces insufficient capital formation, which constrains business ownership, which perpetuates insufficient institutional wealth. DEI does not break that cycle because it operates entirely outside of it.

The African American institutional ecosystem: HBCUs and their endowments, African American owned banks and credit unions, Black-owned insurance and real estate entities, and community development financial institutions represents the structural alternative to the DEI framework. It is not a consolation prize for those excluded from mainstream corporate life. It is the only mechanism capable of generating the compounding institutional wealth that produces genuine economic sovereignty. HBCUs enroll approximately 10 percent of Black college students while producing a disproportionate share of Black professionals in STEM, law, medicine, and business. They hold land assets in some of the most economically dynamic metros in the South. They maintain alumni networks that, if systematically directed toward institutional investment rather than individual career advancement, could generate endowment growth and enterprise development at a scale currently untapped. The strategic argument is straightforward: every Black student who graduates from an HBCU and subsequently directs their career, capital, and philanthropic energy toward institutions within the aforementioned African American ecosystem compounds the institutional wealth available to the next generation. Every Black student who takes that same talent into a corporation it does not own, however successfully, contributes to the wealth of an institution that will not reciprocate at the ecosystem level.

This is not an argument for economic separatism. It is an argument for institutional density, the same logic that has guided the development of Jewish philanthropic networks, Korean rotating credit associations, and the university endowment strategies of the Ivy League. Strong communities maintain reinforcing networks of institutions that recirculate capital and concentrate talent. The DEI framework asks Black Americans to enrich other communities’ institutional networks on the condition of fairer treatment. The ownership framework asks Black Americans to build their own.

None of this is to diminish the real harm caused by the current administration’s DEI rollbacks. Black-owned businesses that relied on federal contracting set-asides have seen immediate, concrete losses with some small business owners reporting the loss of $15,000 to $20,000 per month due to reduced contract flows. The SBA admitted only 65 companies to its 8(a) business development program in 2025, compared with more than 2,000 admissions over the previous four years. These are real economic injuries that warrant legal and political challenge. But the defensive posture of protecting DEI within institutions that Black America does not control is insufficient as a long-term economic strategy. The Bloomberg roundtable produced eloquent testimony about the frustrations of Black executives navigating a hostile political environment. It produced very little discussion of what autonomous Black institutional infrastructure should look like, or how the talent assembled in that room of capital allocators, board directors, investment bankers, and talent executives might direct its resources toward building it.

The transition from a DEI-centered to an ownership-centered strategic framework requires institutional coordination that does not yet exist at scale. It requires HBCU endowments to function as patient capital for Black enterprise ecosystems rather than passive investment portfolios. It requires Black-owned financial institutions to be capitalized and connected to the deal flow generated by Black corporate executives. It requires alumni networks to function as economic infrastructure rather than social affinity groups. And it requires Black business leadership to measure its success not by representation metrics within institutions it does not own, but by the growth of institutional assets within the ecosystem it does. The DEI debate is real and the rollback is damaging. But the strategic imagination of Black business leadership will remain constrained so long as its primary horizon is defined by the terms of inclusion offered by others. The more consequential work — slower, less visible, and politically unrewarded — is the construction of institutions powerful enough that the terms of inclusion become irrelevant. That is the work HBCUs and the broader African American institutional ecosystem exist to support. It is the work that this moment demands.