We are forced to trust the very institutions who stole the land in the first place because we have not developed and maintained our own. – William A. Foster, IV
A grandfather in Wilcox County plants loblolly pine on forty acres in 1961, the year the trees will outlive him being the whole point. He tells his children the timber is not for cutting; it is for holding. When he dies without a will, the forty acres become the property of nine heirs, then, a generation later, of thirty-one. No bank will lend against a title held by thirty-one people who cannot agree to sign the same document. The family calls the county forester listed on the state’s directory, the only one covering their district, because there is no other option in the phone book and no other name anyone in the family has ever heard mentioned with trust. The advice that comes back is vague, the timeline uncertain, and there is no second opinion to check it against, no other firm to call, no one who looks like the family sitting across the table. The pines keep growing, undermanaged not for lack of care but for lack of anywhere safe to take that care. Forty years after planting, a timber company buys out the confused heirs for a fraction of the standing timber’s value, and the grandfather’s patient capital becomes someone else’s harvest.
That scene is not a story about one bad forester or one unlucky family. It is a story about what happens when an entire asset class has exactly zero Black-owned institutions capable of serving it; no brokerage, no financing arm, no forestry consultancy, no appraisal firm built by and accountable to the community whose land is on the table. For nearly every other category of wealth-building infrastructure, HBCU Standard has documented at least a partial institutional base: Black-owned banks and credit unions, Black-owned commercial real estate firms, Black-owned construction companies. In rural land and timberland specifically, a category increasingly discussed as an inflation hedge, a carbon-credit asset, and a durable multigenerational holding — that base does not exist. Not a small one. Not a regional one. None. And the absence does not simply mean missed opportunity. It means that every African American family holding rural land, and every one considering buying it, is doing so without the single thing that would let them tell the difference between good advice and bad: a trusted counterparty inside the industry with something to lose if it gets that advice wrong.
This is the predicament worth naming plainly. A family that already holds land has, in most of the rural South, exactly one state district forester assigned to their county, no competing Black-owned firm to call for a second opinion, and no institutional recourse if that forester’s guidance turns out to serve someone else’s interests rather than theirs. A family looking to buy timberland as an asset has no Black-owned equivalent of a firm like Hall and Hall, which does not simply broker land but finances it directly, offering loan programs ranging from low variable rates to full thirty-year fixed terms so a client can originate, appraise, and fund an acquisition inside a single relationship. That vertical integration is precisely what makes an institution durable across a timber rotation: the same firm that helps a client find and value a parcel can also lend against it, rather than sending the client back out to a separate lender with no connection to the land or the deal.
To understand why that absence matters, it helps to see what a firm like Hall and Hall actually does, because it bears almost no resemblance to the real estate transaction most readers know from buying a house. A residential agent lists a property, compares it against recent sales of similar homes nearby, and hands the buyer off to a conventional mortgage lender who underwrites based on the buyer’s income and an appraiser’s estimate of the house’s value alone. None of those tools transfer to timberland. Valuing a working forest requires an actual cruise of the standing timber; a forester physically walking the property to inventory species, age, volume per acre, and growth rate because the trees themselves are a separate, living asset with their own market price, layered on top of the bare land value, changing every year whether anyone touches it or not. Financing the purchase means underwriting against decades of projected harvest income, and often against secondary income like grazing or hunting leases, rather than a buyer’s fixed monthly paycheck, which is why Hall and Hall runs its own loan programs instead of referring clients to a bank teller. And the transaction itself carries considerations a residential closing never touches: mineral rights that may or may not convey with the surface, water rights in Western states, conservation easements that permanently restrict future use in exchange for tax benefits, access easements across neighboring land, and a formal management plan for what happens to the timber over the next thirty years, not just what happens at the closing table. A firm built to handle all of that under one roof, continuously, is a fundamentally different kind of institution than a residential brokerage that occasionally lists rural acreage on the side and it is exactly why calling a local real estate agent, however well-intentioned, is not a substitute for the thing that’s missing.
No Black-owned firm offers any piece of that stack, let alone all of it. A family that finds its way past appraisal and negotiation on its own still has to secure financing from an institution outside the community entirely often the very kind of lender whose historical record with Black landowners is the reason for caution in the first place.
That wariness is not paranoia. It has a documented record behind it. Pigford v. Glickman, settled in 1999 as one of the largest civil rights settlements in American history, established in federal court that the USDA had systematically discriminated against Black farmers in the allocation of farm loans and disaster assistance between 1981 and 1996 delaying and denying credit that white farmers received routinely, and for over a decade failing to functionally operate the very civil rights office meant to investigate complaints about it. Congress appropriated another $1.2 billion in 2010 for a second settlement, Pigford II, because so many farmers with legitimate claims had been unable to file the first time. This is not ancient history from the era of outright land theft after emancipation. It is a pattern of institutional behavior toward Black landowners that persisted into living memory, inside the very federal agency structure that state and district foresters, county extension offices, and agricultural lenders all sit within. A family that has watched that pattern play out in the district office, in the bank, sometimes in their own family’s dealings with a local forester has every reason to want a trusted, accountable alternative before signing anything. The absence of that alternative is the actual risk, not an inconvenience layered on top of one.
Layer the heirs’ property problem on top of that trust deficit and the predicament compounds rather than adds. Research out of the University of Georgia’s Warnell School of Forestry has documented how clouded title land passed down without a will, held as an undivided interest among a growing number of descendants locks families out of financing, cost-share programs, and professional forest management, because no lender or agency wants to deal with an ownership structure that any single heir could blow up with a partition sale. Resolving that title requires legal expertise most families cannot afford and most local firms are not built to provide with any particular care. Mavis Gragg’s organization HeirShares exists specifically to clear these legal pathways, and the Federation of Southern Cooperatives has run a Land Assistance Fund toward the same end for decades. But neither is a brokerage, a lender, or a forestry management firm. They can help a family reach clean title. They cannot then walk that family through financing a thinning operation, negotiating a fair timber sale, or acquiring a second parcel to expand the holding, the actual services a firm like Hall and Hall provides continuously to the families who already trust it. Clearing title without a trusted destination to route the resulting clean parcel toward simply relocates the risk rather than resolving it.
The scale of what’s been lost while this institutional vacuum sat unfilled is worth stating plainly, in the register this publication uses for these numbers rather than the multi-trillion projections other outlets reach for. In 1910, according to the National Forest Foundation, Black Americans owned 195 timber companies and comprised roughly a quarter of all employees in the forest products industry. By 1920, per the Land Trust Alliance, African American farmers controlled approximately 14 percent of the nation’s farmland; today that figure is under 1 percent, and total African American land ownership across every category; timberland, farmland, residential, everything has fallen from an estimated 15 to 16 million acres to under 2 million. Set that number against a single entry on the Land Report’s 2025 ranking of America’s largest private landowners: the Emmerson family, through Sierra Pacific Industries, holds 2.44 million acres of timberland in California, Oregon, and Washington alone more than the entirety of Black land ownership nationwide, across every category, combined. John Malone holds roughly 2.2 million acres across four states. The Reed family’s Green Diamond Resource Company, built from a Pacific Northwest logging operation started in 1897, holds about 2.1 million acres. Each of those holdings is the product of a century or more of uninterrupted institutional continuity: clean title passed down without interruption, financing relationships maintained across generations, professional forestry management retained continuously rather than improvised family by family. That continuity is precisely what heirs’ property and the absence of a trusted institutional counterparty have made structurally difficult for Black landowners to replicate, no matter how much care any individual family brings to the effort.
None of this argues that timberland is a bad asset for African American families to hold or acquire. It argues the opposite: that the fundamentals of the asset class; steady periodic cash flow from harvests, low correlation with equity markets, a growing carbon-credit revenue stream for standing forest, and a purchase price still within reach of pooled institutional capital make it exactly the kind of holding worth building durable infrastructure around. And the talent to staff that infrastructure is not the missing piece. Alabama A&M University, one of the nineteen 1890 land-grant HBCUs rather than one of the handful of flagship HBCUs (Howard, Morehouse, Spelman) usually invoked in this conversation, runs the only professionally accredited forestry degree at an HBCU and operates as a USDA Forest Service Center of Excellence. Southern University and A&M College in Baton Rouge, part of the only historically Black land-grant university system in the country, offers a bachelor’s, master’s, and Ph.D. in Urban Forestry through a program it describes as the most comprehensive of its kind in the nation. Tuskegee University runs combined forestry programs with Auburn, Iowa State, the University of Michigan, and Idaho State, sending its students on to finish accredited degrees at partner institutions. And a partnership dating to 1993 between the U.S. Forest Service and four HBCUs; Alabama A&M, Southern, Tuskegee, and Florida A&M has, according to the Forest Service’s own national diversity student programs manager, trained two-thirds of the Black foresters currently working inside the agency. That is not a thin pipeline. It is a substantial, decades-old talent base, producing credentialed foresters at meaningful scale, virtually none of whom currently have the option of being hired into a private Black-owned brokerage, appraisal, or land-management firm because no such firm exists to hire them. The gap in this asset class was never expertise. It is the institution that expertise would staff.
What the Wilcox County family needed in 1961, and what a family looking to buy its first parcel of timberland needs today, is the same thing: an institution built specifically to hold this asset class the way Sierra Pacific and Green Diamond hold theirs, financed the way Hall and Hall finances its own clients’ acquisitions, staffed by graduates of Alabama A&M, Southern, and Tuskegee who are accountable to the community whose trust the industry has not yet earned, and structured to move a family from clouded title through financing through active management without ever requiring them to extend blind faith to a district office or an outside lender with no history of earning it. Every piece of that institution’s eventual capability already exists somewhere, disconnected from the others; title-clearing organizations, a credentialed forestry pipeline, cooperative land trusts, community capital sitting in Black-owned banks and HBCU endowments. Coordinating those pieces into one accountable, professionally staffed, vertically financed institution is not a distant aspiration. It is the specific, buildable answer to a specific, well-documented predicament.
The grandfather who planted loblolly pine in 1961 was making an institutional bet without an institution to back it, trusting that the trees, the family, and eventually someone trustworthy to manage them, would all still be standing when the rotation came due. The trees held up their end. What failed was everything around them: the title no bank would recognize, the forester no one had reason to trust, the financing that had to be sought from strangers, the firm that never got built to stand between the family and the forced sale. Until African America has its own version of the institution that holds land the way Sierra Pacific and Green Diamond hold theirs and finances it the way Hall and Hall finances its own, every acre already owned and every acre still to be bought carries a risk no amount of individual caution can fully offset.
Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.
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