Category Archives: Moneyball

The Real Game: PWI Athletics Win with Wealth, Not Athletes—And HBCUs Can’t Chase That Model

“The wealthiest boosters and donors to a PWI rarely ever played sports, but they did go build companies and a lot of wealth. Boosters spend hundreds of millions a year to compete with their friends and business competition from rival schools. The money spent is a bigger game than what happens on the field.” – William A. Foster, IV

Courtesy of The Rich Eisen Show

The image circulating across sports media this week says everything without trying to explain anything at all. LSU’s new contract offer to Lane Kiffin — seven years at $13 million annually, stacked with multimillion-dollar bonuses, home buyouts, and housing subsidies looks less like a coaching contract and more like a sovereign wealth transaction. It is the kind of deal only an institution backed by generational wealth, mega-boosters, and a national alumni base at the upper end of the economic ladder could produce. Yet every few months a familiar chorus resurfaces insisting that if “only the top African American athletes chose HBCUs,” the financial gap in college athletics would close. The narrative is compelling, emotional, and rooted in cultural longing, but it remains economically false.

The fantasy is seductive: if only more premier African American athletes chose HBCUs, our athletic programs could compete with Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs). If only we could land that five-star recruit, sign that top quarterback, or attract that elite basketball prospect, everything would change. The dream persists in alumni conversations, on social media, and in aspirational fundraising campaigns. But the dream is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of what actually drives college athletic success and it’s costing HBCUs resources they can’t afford to waste. The numbers tell a story that talent alone cannot rewrite.

Lane Kiffin’s new contract with LSU pays him approximately $13 million annually, making him one of the highest-paid coaches in college football. To put this in perspective, Southern University’s entire athletic department operates on total revenues of $18.2 million for fiscal year 2025-2026. One coach at a PWI earns over 70 percent of what an entire HBCU athletic department generates in revenue. This isn’t an aberration it’s the system working exactly as designed.

The disparity becomes even starker when you examine what funds these massive operations. According to an audit report, Southern University Athletics had total revenue of $17.3 million and expenses of $18.9 million in fiscal year 2023, creating a deficit of $1.5 million. Meanwhile, PWI athletic departments operate with budgets in the hundreds of millions. The athletes on the field, no matter how talented, cannot bridge this chasm.

What truly separates PWI athletic programs from HBCU programs isn’t the talent of 18-22 year-olds playing the games. It’s the economic power of the institutions behind them specifically, the size, wealth, and giving capacity of their alumni bases. According to Georgetown University, PWI graduates earn an average of $62,000 annually, compared to HBCU graduates who earn around $51,000. But the income gap is just the beginning of the story. The real disparity lies in generational wealth accumulation and the sheer number of potential donors.

Major PWIs have alumni bases numbering in the hundreds of thousands, often spanning generations of families who have accumulated significant wealth over decades. These institutions benefit from alumni who are CEOs, hedge fund managers, real estate developers, and executives at Fortune 500 companies. Their boosters can write seven-figure checks without blinking. When they want to retain a coach or upgrade facilities, they simply open their checkbooks.

HBCUs represent around 3% of America’s colleges, yet account for less than 1% of total U.S. endowment wealth. The endowment funding gap stands at approximately $100 to $1—for every $100 a PWI receives in endowment money, HBCUs receive $1. This isn’t just about annual giving; it’s about the compound interest of generational investment that HBCUs have never had the opportunity to build.

Corporate sponsors don’t pay for athletic excellence they pay for eyeballs and access to affluent consumer bases. When companies decide where to invest their marketing dollars, they’re calculating the purchasing power and professional networks they can reach through an institution’s alumni base. A company sponsoring a PWI athletic program gains access to hundreds of thousands of alumni with significant disposable income and decision-making power in corporations. The athletes are just the entertainment that delivers this audience. The actual product being sold is access to the alumni network—for recruiting employees, marketing products, and building business relationships.

This is why even if every top African American athlete chose HBCUs, the sponsorship dollars wouldn’t automatically follow. The economic fundamentals would remain unchanged. Companies invest based on return on investment calculations that are tied to alumni wealth and network size, not solely to on-field performance.

The belief that athletic success drives institutional prosperity is perhaps the most dangerous delusion facing HBCU leadership. Even among PWIs, only a tiny fraction of athletic programs actually turn a profit. Most operate at a loss that’s subsidized by the broader university budget, student fees, and institutional transfers. Southern University’s budget shows $2.2 million in “Non-Mandatory Transfer” and $1.4 million in “Athletic Subsidy”—meaning the institution itself must subsidize athletics with nearly $3.6 million in institutional funds. This is money diverted from academic programs, faculty salaries, research, and student services to keep athletic programs afloat.

The PWI athletic model works for PWIs not because athletics are inherently profitable, but because they can afford the losses. They have massive endowments, substantial state funding, and alumni donor bases that can absorb deficits while still funding academic excellence. HBCUs don’t have this luxury. When an HBCU runs a $1.5 million athletic deficit while struggling to pay competitive faculty salaries, upgrade outdated classroom technology, or fund research initiatives, the opportunity cost is devastating. That deficit represents scholarships not awarded, professors not hired, and academic programs not developed.

Some HBCU advocates point to conference television deals and NCAA tournament appearances as potential revenue sources. But here again, the math is unforgiving. Major PWI conferences negotiate billion-dollar television contracts because they deliver large, affluent viewing audiences that advertisers covet. The Big Ten and SEC don’t command massive TV deals because their athletes are more talented they command them because their alumni bases represent valuable consumer demographics. The SWAC and MEAC can’t replicate these deals because they don’t deliver the same audience size and purchasing power, regardless of the talent on the field. Even if HBCUs somehow assembled teams that won national championships, the structural economic advantages would remain with PWIs.

Here’s what proponents of athletic investment don’t want to acknowledge: the marginal difference in talent between a five-star recruit and a three-star recruit is minimal compared to the massive difference in institutional resources. A slightly more talented roster cannot overcome a 10-to-1 or 100-to-1 resource disadvantage.

Consider the logistics: While an HBCU football program might struggle to afford charter flights for the team, PWI programs have dedicated planes, state-of-the-art training facilities, nutritionists, sports psychologists, and medical staffs that rival professional franchises. They have recruiting budgets that allow them to identify and court prospects nationally. They have video coordinators, analysts, and support staff that outnumber many HBCU athletic departments entirely. The game is won with infrastructure, coaching depth, medical support, nutrition, facilities, and recovery technology not just with the athletes on scholarship. And these resources require the kind of sustained, massive funding that only comes from large, wealthy alumni bases and major corporate partnerships.

There is an alternative model that makes sense for HBCUs: the Ivy League approach. Ivy League schools have chosen not to compete in the athletic arms race. They don’t offer athletic scholarships for football. They emphasize academic excellence while maintaining competitive but not dominant athletic programs. Their alumni networks and institutional prestige are built on academic achievement, research output, and professional success not athletic championships.

For HBCUs, this model offers a realistic path forward. Focus resources on academic excellence, research capabilities, and entrepreneurship. Build prestige through intellectual output, not athletic performance. Create value through what HBCUs have always done best: developing future leaders, producing groundbreaking research, and serving their communities.

The Ivy League proves that institutional prestige and alumni loyalty can thrive without major athletic success. No one questions Harvard’s or Yale’s institutional value because their football teams don’t win national championships. Every dollar spent trying to compete in the PWI athletic model is a dollar not invested in what could actually transform HBCU economic outcomes: research infrastructure, entrepreneurship programs, endowment building, and academic excellence.

Research shows that more than half of all students at HBCUs experience some measure of upward mobility, and upward mobility is about 50 percent higher at HBCUs than PWIs. This is the actual competitive advantage HBCUs possess their ability to transform the economic trajectories of students from under-resourced communities. This mission deserves full investment, not the scraps left over after athletic departments consume resources. If HBCUs invested the millions currently subsidizing athletic deficits into research grants, business incubators, technology transfer offices, and endowed professorships, they could create sustainable revenue streams while fulfilling their core mission. They could become engines of wealth creation for African American communities rather than junior varsity versions of PWI athletic programs.

Admitting you can’t win an unwinnable game isn’t defeat it’s strategic wisdom. HBCUs should stop trying to beat PWIs at a game rigged by structural economic advantages they will never possess. Instead, they should redefine success on their own terms.

This means:

Rightsizing athletic budgets to reflect institutional resources and priorities, accepting that competing for national championships in revenue sports isn’t financially viable or strategically wise.

Investing in niche sports and athletic experiences that can be competitive without massive resource requirements and that build campus community without drowning budgets.

Redirecting resources toward academic distinction, particularly in high-demand fields like STEM, healthcare, and technology where HBCU graduates can command premium salaries and build generational wealth.

Building research infrastructure that attracts grants, creates intellectual property, and establishes HBCUs as innovation centers rather than athletic also-rans.

Developing entrepreneurship ecosystems that turn students into business owners and job creators, building the kind of economic power that generates sustained institutional support.

Creating HBCU-specific tournaments and competitions where these institutions can showcase their talents to their communities without subsidizing PWI athletic departments through guarantee games.

The African American community’s love for HBCU athletics is real and deep. The pageantry of HBCU homecomings, the tradition of the bands, the pride of seeing young Black excellence on display these matter. But love sometimes means making hard choices about where to invest limited resources for maximum impact. The question isn’t whether HBCUs should have athletic programs. The question is whether they should bankrupt their academic missions chasing a competitive model they can never win, designed by and for institutions with 100 times their resources.

One coach earning $13 million. One entire athletic department operating on $18 million. The math isn’t subtle. The choice shouldn’t be either.

Until HBCUs build alumni bases with the size, wealth, and giving capacity to compete in the modern college athletic arms race, pursuing the PWI model isn’t ambition it’s financial suicide. The path to HBCU prosperity runs through classrooms and laboratories, not football stadiums and basketball arenas. It’s time to stop chasing someone else’s game and start winning our own.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

Owning The Diamond: Why HBCU Women Entrepreneurs Should Buy a Women’s Pro Baseball Team

“Let us put our moneys together; let us use our moneys; let us put our moneys out at usury among ourselves, and reap the benefits ourselves.” – Maggie L. Walker, pioneering African American banker and businesswoman:

It is not enough to cheer from the stands.
IIt is not enough to cheer from the stands. If HBCU women entrepreneurs and the institutions that produced them are serious about building generational wealth, influence, and visibility in the global sports economy, then ownership, not participation, must be the goal. The emergence of the Women’s Pro Baseball League (WPBL) offers just such a moment. Four inaugural franchises in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Boston mark the first professional women’s baseball league in the United States since 1954. And yet, amid this historic announcement, one question should echo across the HBCU landscape: Who will own a piece of it?

Ownership in sports is about more than trophies it’s about capital, culture, and control. While athletes inspire, it is owners who shape the economic ecosystem: negotiating television contracts, setting standards for pay equity, deciding where teams are located, and determining which communities benefit from their presence. In American sports, Black ownership remains vanishingly rare. Fewer than a handful of African Americans have ever held majority stakes in professional teams across all major leagues. Among women, ownership representation is even smaller. Yet the HBCU ecosystem comprising over a hundred institutions, $4 billion in endowment capital (though still dwarfed by their PWI counterparts), and a growing class of wealthy and capable alumni possesses both the human and institutional capital to change that reality. Buying a WPBL franchise would be a powerful signal: that African American women are no longer content to merely play or support the game, but to own the infrastructure of it.

The WPBL represents a once-in-a-century opportunity. The last women’s professional baseball league folded in 1954 when postwar America reverted to its gendered labor norms and refused to institutionalize women’s success on the field. Today, that same sport returns in a vastly different economy one defined by media fragmentation, digital storytelling, and institutional investing that rewards niche audiences and strong narratives. Women’s sports are on the rise. The WNBA just received a $75 million investment round from Nike, Condoleezza Rice, Laurene Powell Jobs, and others. Women’s college basketball ratings have exploded, drawing more viewers than some men’s sports. The National Women’s Soccer League has seen team valuations grow fivefold in the past five years. Investors are realizing what the data already shows: undervalued leagues often yield outsized returns once visibility and infrastructure catch up.

The WPBL sits at this exact inflection point. Early investors will not just shape the league they will define its culture, inclusivity, and profitability. This is why HBCU women entrepreneurs, backed by HBCU endowments and alumni capital, should move swiftly. Ownership here is not a vanity project it is a long-term equity position in the fastest-growing frontier of professional sports.

Start-up sports franchises are not the billion-dollar investments of the NFL or NBA. The WPBL’s initial teams are expected to sell for figures in the mid-seven to low-eight figures: expensive, yes, but feasible through a syndicate model combining entrepreneurial capital and institutional backing. A $15 million franchise, for instance, could be financed with $5 million in equity from HBCU women entrepreneurs, $3 million in matching commitments from HBCU endowments through a joint-venture investment arm, $5 million in debt financing via an African American–owned bank or credit union consortium, and $2 million in naming rights, sponsorship pre-sales, and city incentives.

Such a structure distributes risk while maximizing institutional leverage. It also allows for a reinvestment loop: returns from franchise appreciation, media deals, or merchandising could feed back into the endowments that helped fund the acquisition, growing HBCU wealth through private equity in sports. At a modest ten percent annualized return over fifteen years, a $3 million endowment investment could grow to more than $12.5 million, even before accounting for franchise appreciation. The social return of visibility, leadership, and influence would be immeasurable.

HBCU women entrepreneurs already lead some of the most innovative ventures in the country from fintech to fashion to wellness. They have built companies with leaner budgets, higher risk tolerance, and community-driven missions. That same acumen could translate seamlessly into sports ownership. A women-led ownership group rooted in HBCU culture would bring authenticity to a league whose audience is already primed for inclusive storytelling. They would not merely own a team they would shape its identity around empowerment, intellect, and cultural sophistication. Imagine a team whose executive suite reflects Spelman’s academic rigor, Howard’s creative dynamism, and FAMU’s entrepreneurial grit.

Moreover, the investment aligns with HBCU women’s long history of institution building. From Mary McLeod Bethune’s founding of Bethune-Cookman University to Maggie Lena Walker’s creation of the first Black woman–owned bank, African American women have always been at the forefront of merging mission with market. Buying a professional sports franchise is simply a modern continuation of that legacy.

Most HBCU endowments remain undercapitalized. Collectively, they total roughly $4 billion, compared to Harvard’s $50 billion alone. That gap underscores why traditional endowment investing centered on conservative asset classes may not close the wealth chasm. Sports equity, particularly in emerging women’s leagues, represents a hybrid investment: cultural capital meets growth asset. Endowments could carve out a modest allocation for strategic co-investment vehicles aimed at ownership in minority- or women-led sports ventures. Such a move would not only produce potential returns but reposition HBCU endowments as active agents in wealth creation, mirroring how elite universities use their endowments as venture capital arms. The same institutions that once nurtured the first generations of African American scholars could now nurture the first generation of African American women sports owners.

The path to ownership would unfold in phases: coalition building, institutional partnerships, financial structuring, branding, and media engagement. The first step would be forming an HBCU Women Sports Ownership Council an alliance of HBCU alumnae entrepreneurs, investors, attorneys, and sports professionals. Its mission would be to identify a WPBL franchise opportunity, conduct due diligence, and negotiate terms. Next, endowments, foundations, and alumni associations could serve as anchor investors via a pooled HBCU Sports Ownership Fund. African American–owned financial institutions would provide credit facilities, ensuring that capital circulation strengthens Black banking. The team’s branding could reflect HBCU values of intellect, resilience, and excellence. Annual “HBCU Heritage Games,” scholarships for women in sports management, and partnerships with K–12 baseball programs would ensure the franchise deepens institutional impact.

By the time Opening Day 2027 arrives, the vision becomes real. A stadium in Atlanta or Houston cities with deep HBCU roots roars with excitement. The team, perhaps named The Monarchs in tribute to the Negro Leagues, takes the field in uniforms stitched by a Black-owned apparel company. The owner’s suite is filled not with venture capitalists, but HBCU women—founders, engineers, bankers, educators—raising glasses to history. Every ticket sold funds scholarships. Every broadcast includes HBCU branding. Every victory multiplies across the ecosystem, from the university’s endowment statement to the little girl in the stands whispering, “She looks like me.” That is the multiplier effect of ownership.

A defining mark of this ownership group’s legacy should not only be who owns the team but who benefits from it. When an HBCU-led syndicate buys a women’s professional baseball team, it must ensure that every dollar of the fan experience circulates through Black and HBCU-centered businesses. Ownership without ecosystem-building simply recreates dependency; real power multiplies through participation.

An HBCU women’s ownership group has the chance to build an authentically circular sports economy, where concession stands, catering services, and retail vendors reflect the same entrepreneurial DNA as the team itself. The model for this begins with women like Pinky Cole, founder of Slutty Vegan, who transformed plant-based dining into a cultural and economic phenomenon through purpose-driven branding and community investment. Her ability to merge food, culture, and empowerment offers a blueprint for how HBCU women entrepreneurs could anchor the ballpark experience in ownership and identity.

Complementing this vision is the role of HBCU-owned service enterprises like Perkins Management Services Company, founded by Nicholas Perkins, a Fayetteville State University alumnus and owner of Fuddruckers. Perkins Management operates food services across HBCUs and federal institutions, combining operational scale with cultural competence. Partnering with Perkins Management to run stadium concessions or hospitality would ensure that the team’s operations mirror the ownership group’s values efficiency, reinvestment, and excellence.

Such an approach would transform the stadium into an economic hub for HBCU enterprise. Food vendors would come from HBCU alumni-owned companies. Uniform suppliers could source from HBCU textile programs. Merchandise stands could feature HBCU student designs. Hospitality contracts would prioritize HBCU-affiliated culinary programs. The music during games could feature HBCU marching bands or alumni artists. Even the stadium’s artwork could highlight HBCU painters and photographers, ensuring every sensory detail honors the ecosystem that made the ownership possible. A fan buying food or merchandise would not just be a consumer they’d be participating in a shared mission to strengthen African American institutions.

This reimagined sports environment would also offer internships, apprenticeships, and consulting opportunities for HBCU students and faculty. Business students could study operations. Communication majors could intern with the PR team. Engineering departments could advise on stadium energy efficiency. Each partnership would turn the franchise into a living classroom of applied HBCU excellence.

At a time when major leagues outsource globally, a women’s baseball franchise owned by HBCU women could reimagine localization and reinvestment as competitive advantage. Every game day would circulate dollars through a self-sustaining ecosystem that feeds back into HBCU entrepreneurship. Because when the ballpark itself is powered by HBCU women’s enterprise from boardroom to concession stand it ceases to be a venue. It becomes a living institution.

If the Women’s Pro Baseball League truly takes off, early ownership will be the golden ticket. African American investors have often entered markets too late once valuations skyrocket and access narrows. Now, before the WPBL matures, is the time for HBCU institutions and their entrepreneurial alumnae to act collectively. The call is not for charity but for strategy. Pooling even a fraction of the capital that circulates annually among HBCU alumni could change the power dynamic in sports forever. Endowments could stake equity. Alumni could invest through private funds. Students could study the economics of their own institution’s franchise. The result would be a feedback loop of wealth, wisdom, and visibility.

The first women’s professional baseball league in seventy years deserves first-of-its-kind ownership and no community is more qualified to deliver it than HBCU women. Because when HBCU women own the field, the entire game changes.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.

Leave The Bands At Home: HBCU Football Should Leave Their Bands Behind For Road Games

“Pragmatism is good prevention for problems.” – Amit Kalantri

The unspeakable may be the fiscally responsible

It seems almost unthinkable. An HBCU football game without BOTH bands at halftime. It has happened before, though only in exceptional cases: an emergency back home, a suspended band, or budgetary chaos. But to purposely and preemptively not take one’s band on the road? In HBCU culture, it feels akin to breaking the thirteenth commandment—Thou Shall Not Not Make ‘Em Dance—or committing some kind of cultural apostasy. Yet, for all its sacredness, perhaps it is time to break the spell.

At the core of this radical idea lies a rather mundane but pressing question: money. Football remains a major cost centre for most HBCUs. Marching bands, while sources of school pride and cultural magnetism, are not cheap to move. Between buses, meals, lodging, uniforms, and instrument logistics, taking a full band of 150+ members on the road can easily cost upwards of $50,000 per trip—especially if the destination is cross-country or involves air travel. Multiply that over several away games and a program could be looking at a mid-six-figure expenditure for the season. For many financially struggling HBCUs, this is no longer tenable.

The Holy Trifecta: Football, Bands, and Black Culture

At HBCUs, the band is often a co-headliner alongside the football team. In fact, at many institutions, the halftime show garners more social media views than the football game itself. The human formations, the drumline cadences, the high-stepping majorettes—it is part performance art, part cultural ritual. This makes the suggestion to leave bands behind feel almost blasphemous. It would strip the game of a vital sensory component, some argue, and deflate the inter-institutional competition that thrives on the duality of football and music.

Yet, it is precisely because of the power and prestige of the band that its role should be more strategically deployed. Bands are brand equity, not just background music. And that equity can be preserved—even enhanced—by rationing its presence and reallocating its costs.

Opportunity Cost and the Marching Million

Take the example of a mid-tier HBCU football program with four away games and a 160-member band. Transporting that band to all four games (via coach buses and lodging in modest hotels) might cost around $45,000 per game, or $180,000 total. Now imagine what else $180,000 could fund:

  • A student internship fund supporting 60 summer internships with $3,000 stipends;
  • A marketing campaign aimed at boosting out-of-state recruitment;
  • Repairs to the music department’s aging instruments and facilities;
  • A reserve fund for the band itself, to increase scholarships or buy newer uniforms.

The fact that this trade-off rarely enters the conversation reflects how entrenched the band has become as a required amenity for HBCU athletics. But institutions facing increasing competition for enrollment, state budget cuts, and inflationary pressure must start examining what truly maximizes impact—and what has become tradition for tradition’s sake.

Enter the Bandlight Policy

A “Bandlight” policy—where the band does not travel to away games unless deemed a high-profile or high-impact matchup (such as classics or homecoming of an opposing school)—could preserve institutional pride while enabling budget reprioritization. To soften the cultural blow, this policy could be paired with livestreamed pregame performances from home, aired during halftime of away games, or partnerships with local high schools or community colleges to fill the halftime slot. In effect, HBCUs would still “show up” culturally—just not logistically.

Moreover, rival institutions could enter into alternating-year agreements where only one band travels per year to the same matchup, thereby cutting costs in half while preserving some tradition. Or the entire conference could collectively implement policies to standardize expectations.

Revenue Substitutes: Making Absence Profitable

There is also the question of replacement: if the band is not traveling, what can be put in its place—socially and economically?

  1. High School Recruitment Fairs: Away games, especially those in recruiting hotbeds like Atlanta, Dallas, or Memphis, could feature pre-game recruitment fairs or pop-up university expos that target prospective students. Hosted in the parking lots or auxiliary spaces near stadiums, these expos would draw interest beyond the usual alumni tailgating crowds and create a broader community impact.
  2. Alumni Investment Summits: Rather than just tailgates and chants, HBCUs could host micro-investment forums or alumni networking mixers tied to away games. These could feature information on planned giving, institutional capital needs, and legacy endowments. Such events reinforce the university’s brand as an enduring institution—not just a weekend pastime.
  3. Cultural Diplomacy Exchange: At many PWIs (Predominantly White Institutions), the visiting HBCU band often provides the primary Black cultural presence on campus. By not sending the band, HBCUs could instead host curated cultural experiences: pop-up film screenings of Black directors, panel discussions on African American history, or mini art exhibitions. These events would still showcase the university’s heritage—just in a different form.
  4. Digital Monetization: Finally, there is room for digital alternatives. Bands could record exclusive halftime content back on campus for broadcast during away game livestreams. With the right sponsorship and media packaging, this could even generate revenue—especially if made accessible to the broader HBCU diaspora via streaming platforms or partnerships with outlets like HBCU Go or KweliTV.

Making Room for Exceptions: The Classics, Championships, and Cultural Diplomacy

No policy should be absolute, and the “Bandlight” approach must leave room for strategic exceptions. Certain games carry weight not just in terms of school pride, but institutional visibility, alumni engagement, and revenue generation. These events—such as the Bayou Classic, Magic City Classic, Florida Classic, or Celebration Bowl—should remain exempt from the policy due to their national reach and cultural cachet.

In these cases, the financial and branding benefits of both bands being present far outweigh the costs. These events are often broadcast on national television, command six- or seven-figure sponsorships, and serve as major alumni gathering points. Not showing up in full force—band and all—would send the wrong message about the value of HBCU pageantry.

Similarly, championship games or playoffs should remain occasions where bands accompany the team, reinforcing institutional pride at the highest level of competition.

Lastly, special exceptions could be granted for “Cultural Diplomacy Games,” where HBCUs play PWIs in regions with limited exposure to African American cultural institutions. These matchups offer an opportunity to expand HBCU brand identity and cultural influence—missions that justify a larger financial investment.

By clearly defining such exceptions, institutions can retain flexibility without undermining the integrity of a more fiscally responsible standard for regular-season games.

From Brass to Bank: Strengthening Endowments Through Smart Savings

Perhaps the most compelling reason to consider limiting band travel is the long-term impact it could have on strengthening HBCU endowments—a chronic weakness in the financial armor of most historically Black colleges and universities. Endowments are not merely rainy-day funds; they are the bedrock of institutional independence, providing reliable income streams for scholarships, faculty retention, infrastructure improvements, and strategic initiatives. Yet, the vast majority of HBCUs remain dangerously undercapitalized.

As of 2024, only one HBCU—Howard University—has an endowment exceeding $1 billion. By comparison, over 50 predominantly white institutions boast endowments larger than $1 billion, and the average Ivy League endowment surpasses $10 billion. The gap in financial flexibility means that most HBCUs remain reliant on tuition, federal grants, and unpredictable philanthropic cycles. Closing this endowment divide must be a generational project—and rethinking every cost center, including football and band logistics, is a prudent step.

Let us revisit the travel cost scenario: an HBCU saves $180,000 annually by not sending its marching band to four away games. If that amount were instead directed into an endowment or investment fund yielding a 10% annual return, compounded over 30 years, the return on the first year’s investment alone would grow to approximately $3.1 million. But in practice, this contribution would not be a one-time deposit—it would be made every year for 30 years.

Each $180,000 annual deposit would compound over a different span of time—from 30 years down to 1 year for the final contribution. When we sum the compounded growth of all 30 annual contributions, the total value by year 30 is not merely $3.1 million, but a remarkable $32.6 million.

This is the true power of consistent, disciplined investing. What might seem like a relatively small annual sacrifice—foregoing band travel to four away games—can, when reinvested wisely, build a financial pillar for an HBCU that could support hundreds of scholarships, faculty lines, or capital improvements. Across multiple institutions, such strategy would not just close the endowment gap—it could transform it into a long-term competitive advantage. Using the future value formula:

FV = P × [(1 + r)^t – 1] / r
FV = $180,000 × [(1.10)^30 – 1] / 0.10
FV ≈ $3.1 million

Now imagine 40 HBCUs adopting this policy. If each institution redirected $180,000 annually into an endowment with a 10% annual return, the combined value of those contributions over 30 years would grow to an extraordinary $1.3 billion.

This isn’t speculative—it is mathematical certainty backed by compounding returns. What begins as a quiet cost-saving measure becomes a billion-dollar transformation of Black institutional capital. It is the kind of long-term vision HBCUs need to build financial independence and power. Leaving the bands at home, selectively and strategically, could finance a future where they never again play second fiddle to structural underfunding.

Such funds could be reserved for band scholarships, new instruments, music department endowments, or general institutional advancement. Equally important, this shift demonstrates fiscal maturity to large philanthropic donors who seek assurance of sustainability and capital stewardship. In this light, the silence of a band on one Saturday becomes a long crescendo toward institutional resilience.

Band Camp Economics and Reallocation Potential

Consider also the economic pressures on the bands themselves. Marching bands at HBCUs are often underfunded even as they serve as ambassadors and talent pipelines. Travel budgets could be redirected internally:

  • Higher stipends for band scholarships, which could attract more top talent;
  • Expanded outreach to middle and high school band programs to sustain the pipeline;
  • Better faculty-to-student ratios for music education;
  • New instrument purchases, particularly for percussion and brass sections, which endure high wear and tear.

An internal reallocation of $150,000–$250,000 annually per school could mean the difference between merely surviving and thriving for a band program.

The Cultural Blowback—and Counterarguments

Naturally, such a policy will meet resistance—not only from fans but from within. Band members may feel shortchanged on travel experiences. Alumni may bristle at what they see as a cultural dilution. Game promoters may worry about reduced ticket sales if the bands are not both present.

But it is precisely because bands matter so much that they should be protected from burnout and underinvestment. If leaving them home three or four times per year increases their overall budget, performance level, and recruitment reach, is that not a worthy trade?

Besides, culture evolves. Just as HBCUs have moved from AM radio to YouTube, from pamphlets to TikTok, so too can band culture adapt to a new hybrid reality—where physical presence is not the only measure of visibility or power.

A Conference-Wide Model: The SWAC and MEAC Could Lead

If this is to be implemented, it would ideally not be school by school, but as a conference-wide reform. Both the Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC) and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) could establish guidelines that limit band travel to key games while preserving equity among member institutions.

Such a policy might include:

  • A rotating system where each team brings its band to only half of its away games;
  • Revenue-sharing from livestreamed halftime performances;
  • Incentives for home teams to offer cultural hospitality to offset the absence of the visiting band.

It would also open new possibilities for sponsorship. Corporate partners who understand the influence of HBCU bands could be enlisted to underwrite digital halftime content or band scholarships—an easier pitch if funds are not being spent on transport and logistics.

March Differently, Spend Smarter

Culture is not weakened by strategy. In fact, when deployed wisely, it is made more resilient. Leaving the bands at home for select away games is not a betrayal of HBCU tradition—it is a restructuring of it to survive and thrive in a new era.

In a time when HBCUs are asked to do more with less, the question is not whether the bands should still matter. Of course they do. The question is whether they should have to march themselves into financial depletion to prove it.

Better to let them rest, regroup—and when they do appear, make it unforgettable.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.

The Gridiron Mirage: Debunking the NFL as the Engine of African American Wealth

“A lot of enslaved people actually made money, but they had no power.” – William Rhoden

In the annals of American mythology, few institutions occupy as outsized a symbolic role in African American economic advancement as the National Football League. It is a league awash in spectacle and saturated with the rhetoric of opportunity. “The NFL has made more African American millionaires than any other institution,” say its defenders. This refrain—recited with patriotic pride or cynical resignation—has come to function as a social truism, a talisman held up to justify the nation’s meager investments in structural equity. But like most myths, its repetition does not make it true.

This article contends that this notion is not only false but insidious. It misrepresents the scale and structure of wealth in the African American community, diverts attention from more potent engines of generational prosperity, and masks the extractive and precarious nature of professional sports as a vehicle for wealth creation. The NFL is not a wealth escalator; it is, at best, a short-lived income spurt machine for a statistical elite, and at worst, a cultural and physical treadmill leading back to zero.

Gridiron Arithmetic: The Numbers Game

The first fallacy is numerical. As of the 2023 season, there were approximately 1,696 active NFL players spread across 32 teams. Around 58% of these players identified as African American, or roughly 984 athletes. Even when one accounts for the extended rosters, practice squads, and recent retirees still living off their earnings, the figure remains marginal—perhaps a few thousand men across multiple generations.

Contrast this with sectors such as healthcare, education, government, and business. The National Black MBA Association alone counts tens of thousands of members, many of whom have built sustainable wealth through entrepreneurship, investment, or corporate ascendancy. African American doctors number over 50,000. Black-owned businesses, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, exceed 140,000 with paid employees, and millions more operate as sole proprietorships.

The American Bar Association reports over 50,000 African American attorneys. Even the public sector, often decried as slow or bureaucratic, employs hundreds of thousands of Black professionals across local, state, and federal levels. These occupations, while lacking the glamour of a touchdown, generate far more stable, scalable, and generationally transferrable wealth.

Income vs. Wealth: The Shaky Foundations of NFL Riches

To understand the illusion, one must disentangle income from wealth. Wealth is not what one earns; it is what one owns. It is the portfolio, the property, the equity stake, the passive income stream, and, perhaps most critically, the ability to transfer resources across generations. NFL players earn substantial salaries during their brief careers—an average of $2.7 million per year, though the median is closer to $860,000. But careers are short, averaging just 3.3 years.

This creates what economists call a “high burn rate, low accumulation” profile. Studies have found that 15% of NFL players file for bankruptcy within 12 years of retirement, despite millions in earnings. Others do not go bankrupt but live in quiet precarity, reduced to local celebrity gigs and motivational speaking to sustain a post-football identity. The 2022 National Bureau of Economic Research paper “Bankruptcy Rates among NFL Players with Short-Lived Income” confirms this vulnerability, showing how the lack of financial literacy, support systems, and institutional guidance leads to dissipation rather than accumulation.

Meanwhile, wealth in America is driven by ownership: of businesses, real estate, stocks, and institutions. The NFL offers none of these to the vast majority of its Black athletes. Ownership, it must be said, remains the exclusive domain of white billionaires. As of 2025, there are zero majority African American owners of NFL franchises. While the NBA has made token strides—see Michael Jordan’s brief tenure as majority owner of the Charlotte Hornets—the NFL remains rigid in its old-world capital structure.

The Plantation Paradigm: Extraction, Not Empowerment

It is hard to avoid the uncomfortable metaphor that the NFL structurally resembles a modern-day plantation. African American bodies fuel the labor force, endure the risks, suffer the injuries, and entertain the masses. White ownership, white commissioners, and white-centered media conglomerates reap the institutional profits. The league generates $18 billion in annual revenue. The average team is valued at $5 billion. And yet, the athletes, even at the apex of their earning power, remain labor, not capital.

This is not a critique of sports per se. Athletics can inspire and galvanize. But the mythologizing of football as a viable strategy for racial uplift is akin to mistaking a single rainstorm for an irrigation system. The commodification of Black excellence in a space so structurally white in ownership and control cannot plausibly be the foundation for true economic emancipation.

This is made all the more clear by examining the fates of even the most successful. Players like Vince Young, who signed a $26 million contract and ended up broke, or Warren Sapp, who earned $82 million only to file for bankruptcy, are cautionary tales. Exceptions like LeBron James, who has parlayed his brand into equity ownerships and venture capital, are held up as archetypes. But these are aberrations, not templates. And they are not NFL stories.

The Opportunity Cost of Myth-Making

Perhaps the greatest harm of the “NFL creates millionaires” myth is opportunity cost. It distorts the allocation of attention, aspiration, and investment within the African American community. While youth in other demographics are taught to pursue STEM, financial literacy, or entrepreneurship, too many African American boys are sold a lottery ticket disguised as a profession. A 2021 study by the Journal of Black Studies found that African American adolescent males are 40 times more likely to aspire to a professional sports career than to become an engineer or entrepreneur.

This has ramifications far beyond the individual. It weakens pipelines to industries that are scalable, recession-resistant, and foundational to intergenerational wealth. No serious community-wide wealth can be built on the shoulders of 53-man rosters. Nor can economic independence arise from dependency on one of the most exploitative and physically damaging professions in modern labor.

There are also societal consequences. The overrepresentation of African Americans in professional sports distorts public perception. It fosters the narrative that “Black people are doing fine” because a few are seen in Super Bowl commercials or luxury car ads. It becomes a justification for denying systemic reform, funding cutbacks to HBCUs, or underinvestment in majority-Black schools. “Why do they need help?” ask the indifferent. “They have the NFL.”

Institutional Power vs Individual Stardom

In the game of wealth, institutions win. The NFL is an institution—one whose structure benefits its owners and media affiliates. The real wealth in sports lies not in being a player but in being an owner, a broadcaster, a media rights holder, or a licensed merchandiser. It lies in being Robert Kraft, not the running back who suffers a concussion under his ownership.

African American wealth building must shift its focus toward institutions that compound, aggregate, and replicate power. HBCUs, Black-owned banks, cooperative land trusts, investment syndicates, media companies, and technology accelerators are more viable pathways to collective advancement than any draft pick. Consider that a single Black-owned private equity fund managing $500 million will produce more Black millionaires than five decades of NFL careers.

In fact, historical analogues suggest that professional exclusion led to the construction of powerful Black institutions. During segregation, African Americans built hospitals, universities, bus lines, and newspapers. These were incubators of both economic and cultural power. In today’s integrationist fantasy, too many of these have been sacrificed in favor of proximity to elite white institutions—like the NFL—that will never relinquish true control.

The Global Lens: Transnational Wealth Thinking

Moreover, the fixation on domestic sports ignores the global economic realignment. The world’s fastest-growing wealth markets are in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Forward-thinking African Americans should be exporting services, partnering with Pan-African institutions, and investing in sovereign wealth opportunities. Yet, the “NFL as savior” narrative keeps too many tethered to a narrow, provincial idea of success.

The NFL does not build factories. It does not fund innovation. It does not seed capital. It does not provide passive income. It does not own land, develop cities, or engage in infrastructure. It sells tickets. It sells ads. It breaks bodies. It builds billion-dollar stadiums on taxpayer subsidies and pays its workers less than hedge fund interns.

Real wealth is built through scale and succession. The Black farmer who owns 1,000 acres and passes it down is more transformative than the Pro Bowler whose children inherit post-career medical bills and reality show royalties.

Toward a New Narrative: Wealth Without Injury

African American communities need new wealth myths—ones grounded in fact, finance, and future orientation. The idea that the NFL is a pinnacle of Black achievement should be retired. In its place must come narratives about investment clubs, fintech startups, regenerative agriculture, urban development, and cooperative real estate ventures.

Educational institutions and cultural gatekeepers have a responsibility here. Public school counselors, pastors, and media platforms should deglamorize the sports-to-riches narrative and illuminate more durable paths. Foundations and philanthropies should invest not in football camps, but in coding bootcamps, maker spaces, and entrepreneurship labs.

Policy must evolve, too. Tax incentives should reward community ownership and capital retention. States should support Black-owned banks the way they support stadium construction. Reparations conversations should be about equity stakes, not honorary jerseys.

The NFL is not evil. It is, however, a business. And like all businesses, it is designed to maximize returns for its investors—not to solve racial inequality. The sooner we disabuse ourselves of the myth that it is a wealth escalator, the sooner we can begin the real work of building wealth—wealth that endures beyond the roar of the crowd, the flicker of the lights, or the brevity of a three-season career.

Trading Helmets for Holdings

In conclusion, the NFL is a distraction, not a development strategy. It is a parade, not a pipeline. It is a pageant of athletic excellence exploited for institutional enrichment. And it is a cultural sedative—one that soothes legitimate anger over systemic inequality with the spectacle of a few lucky gladiators.

The real revolution will not be televised on Monday Night Football. It will be written in balance sheets, ownership ledgers, and multi-generational trusts. African Americans must trade the helmet for holdings, the franchise tag for franchise ownership, and the myth of athletic salvation for the measured, compound reality of institutional power.

That is not as thrilling as a fourth-quarter comeback. But it is the only way to win the long game.

From Showtime to Shutout: What the Lakers Sale Says About Black Ownership in Sports

“Wealth is created in ownership. If you don’t own, you’re always at someone else’s mercy.” – Robert F. Smith

June 2025’s record-shattering $10 billion sale of the Los Angeles Lakers to Guggenheim Partners chief Mark Walter confirmed what many already suspected: franchise values are rocketing into the financial stratosphere. Yet the deal also spotlighted a harsher truth. After nearly a half-century of hard-court brilliance and gridiron dominance, African Americans are still largely locked out of true ownership power. This article examines why—tracing the structural barriers that keep Black wealth on the playing field instead of in the owner’s suite, and outlining the institutional reforms needed to change the score.

From the Field to the Boardroom: Still a One-Way Street

African Americans make up roughly 70–75 percent of NBA players and about 60–65 percent of NFL rosters. In the WNBA, the share is even higher. Yet across 154 combined franchises in the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL:

  • Zero teams are majority-owned by African Americans in the NFL, MLB, or NHL.
  • Only one historic example (Robert L. Johnson’s Charlotte Bobcats/Hornets) and one recent example (Michael Jordan, 2010–2023) exist in the NBA.

Three forces keep that door shut:

  1. Intergenerational-Wealth Deficit – Most Black athletes are first-generation millionaires, while many current owners are third- or fourth-generation billionaires.
  2. Limited Collective Capital Vehicles – Black-controlled banks and investment firms are few and undercapitalized relative to mainstream counterparts.
  3. Opaque League Gatekeeping – Franchise valuations above $4 billion and insider-driven vetting processes deter new entrants without deep networks.

The Robert L. Johnson Breakthrough—And the Mirage of Progress

On December 18, 2002, BET founder Robert L. Johnson secured the NBA’s Charlotte expansion franchise for $300 million, becoming the first African American majority owner of a modern U.S. pro team. The milestone was historic, but it proved fragile. Lacking a pipeline of Black institutional capital—no HBCU endowment co-investors, no African American businesses or firms operating as minority owners—Johnson operated alone. By 2010 he sold controlling interest to Michael Jordan, whose own 2023 exit returned the league to its status quo: African American talent on the court, minimal African American equity off it. Symbolic breakthroughs absent institutional follow-through do not create sustainable inclusion.

The LeBron Conundrum: Cultural Power Without Governance Leverage

Billion-dollar athlete-entrepreneur LeBron James epitomizes the new Black business titan—owning film studios, apparel lines, and minority stakes in Fenway Sports Group. Yet even LeBron, arguably the most financially astute athlete of his generation, cannot write a solo check for a majority share of an NBA or NFL team. Average franchise prices now exceed $4 billion in the NBA and $6.5 billion in the NFL.

LeBron’s estimated net worth, while staggering at $1.2 billion, pales in comparison to the financial firepower wielded by new Lakers controlling owner Mark Walter, who is worth an estimated $5.5 to $6 billion personally—and controls access to far greater institutional capital. As CEO of Guggenheim Partners, Walter leads a global financial firm with over $345 billion in assets under management (AUM), according to the firm’s own reporting.

That institutional reach gives Walter an unparalleled advantage: the ability to deploy capital at scale, with leverage, and over long time horizons. His 2012 acquisition of the Los Angeles Dodgers for $2 billion was just the beginning. Now, his control over the Lakers reflects how ownership is secured not by personal wealth alone—but by deep institutional infrastructure.

The gap is not merely one of celebrity or business acumen—it is one of capital architecture. LeBron’s wealth is largely rooted in earned income and venture-backed enterprises, while Walter’s access to Guggenheim’s multi-hundred-billion-dollar asset base enables him to execute major acquisitions swiftly and without co-investors.

Until African Americans gain collective control of similar institutional investment vehicles—through private equity firms, pension-managed funds, or bank-led syndicates—Black excellence in sports will continue to be celebrated on the court, but denied authority in the boardroom.

Building a Syndicate That Can Actually Write a Check

If African Americans are to move from the highlight reel to the cap table, the capital stack must shift from aspirational community pooling to institutional syndication—driven by organizations already designed to deploy large checks and assume complex risk. Pragmatism, not idealism, is the order of the day.

Capital SourceAsset BaseRealistic Deployment Rationale
Black-Owned Banks (18 nationwide)$6.4 billion in assetsFDIC-insured balance sheets, access to low-cost deposits—including the growing wave of Fortune 500 “diversity deposits”—can underwrite debt facilities or pledge Tier 1 capital to a buyout fund.
Black Investment & Private-Equity Firms (e.g., Ariel, Vista, Fairview, RLJ)$70–90 billion AUM (collectively)Deep GP/LP relationships with public pensions and foundations; experienced at assembling $100–$500 million special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) around a single asset.
HBCU Endowments (102 institutions)≈ $5 billion totalAsk for 0.5–1 percent commitments per school—$25–50 million system-wide—providing research access, internships, and brand equity rather than acting as anchors.
Athlete Sidecar FundVariableStructure a managed feeder that lets players co-invest passively (no tithes or self-directing). Capital is professionally deployed—removing behavioral risk.
Corporate & Public PensionsTrillionsMany plans reserve 5–10 percent for “emerging managers.” A Black-led sports-ownership PE fund fits this mandate.

1. Banks as Capital Bridges
Black-owned banks can’t buy teams outright, but they can warehouse capital and extend critical financial infrastructure. By leveraging corporate “diversity deposits” and issuing credit facilities, they can become crucial intermediaries that keep transaction fees and governance influence in Black hands.

2. Investment Firms as Syndicate Architects
Black-led PE firms already understand the terrain. By structuring a flagship $400–$600 million sports-focused fund, they can attract institutional LPs and scale their acquisitions from minority WNBA stakes to majority control in emerging or undervalued leagues.

3. HBCUs as Modest Strategic LPs
HBCUs should not be burdened with anchoring such funds. Instead, they can contribute symbolic capital, student talent pipelines, and academic value. For example, a 1 percent commitment from Howard or Spelman tied to naming rights or internship guarantees would align mission with opportunity.

4. Athletes & African American Families as Co-Investors, Not Donors
A feeder fund with low buy-ins and lock-up periods allows them to invest with institutional support. This protects them from high-risk self-management and ensures alignment with professional fund managers.

5. Execution Timeline

  • 2026–2028: Assemble GP team, secure $150 million from banks and PE partners, with layered support from HBCUs and athlete and African American businesses co-investors.
  • 2028–2032: Close a $500 million Fund I and acquire equity in two WNBA teams and a controlling NWSL stake bundled with real estate.
  • 2032–2037: Launch Fund II at $1 billion, targeting a controlling interest in an MLS or NBA franchise.
  • 2040: Own a major-league asset with governance representation from African American banks, investment firms, and HBCU partners—creating long-term cash flows and intergenerational wealth held by Black institutions.

Media Rights and the Power Gap

Owning teams is only half the battle. The NBA’s next domestic media deal could top $75 billion, and yet no Black-owned network will participate directly in those revenues. Streaming platforms, RSNs, data-analytics firms, and betting partnerships—all profit off Black athletic performance. Until African American institutions enter the media-rights supply chain, the revenue fountainhead remains out of reach.

Cultural Iconography, Financial Dispossession

Hip-hop tracks blare in arenas, sneaker culture drives merchandise sales, and social-media highlights fuel league engagement—but licensing profits flow to predominantly white ownership groups. Careers end; ownership dynasties do not. The average NFL tenure is 3.3 years; Robert Kraft has owned the Patriots for 31 years. Equity compounds; salaries evaporate.

From the Boardroom, Not the Ball Court: Where Owners Really Make Their Money

A glaring misconception is that sports fortunes begin with sports talent. In practice, franchise control stems from non-sports industries:

OwnerTeam(s)Primary Wealth Source
Steve BallmerLA ClippersMicrosoft stock
Stan KroenkeRams, Nuggets, ArsenalReal estate / Walmart marital fortune
Robert KraftPatriotsPaper & packaging
Mark CubanMavericksBroadcast.com tech exit
Joe TsaiNets, LibertyAlibaba IPO
Josh HarrisCommanders, 76ersApollo Global Mgmt. (private equity)

None earned money playing pro sports; all deployed patient, appreciating, often tax-advantaged capital to buy franchises. In contrast, athlete income is earned, highly taxed, and front-loaded. A $200 million NBA contract, after taxes, agents, and lifestyle inflation, seldom equals the liquidity needed for a $6 billion NFL acquisition.

African Americans dominate labor yet rely on labor income to pursue ownership—an uphill climb when the ownership class uses diversified portfolios, inheritance, and leverage. The gap is not just financial; it’s structural.

A Blueprint Forward

African American banks, PE firms, and institutional investors must build syndicates that mirror the strategies of the existing ownership class—while rooting the returns inside Black institutions.

  • 2026–2030 – Launch a $500 million Fund I with contributions from banks, investment firms, HBCUs, and athletes.
  • 2030–2035 – Acquire multiple minority and controlling stakes in undervalued leagues.
  • 2035–2045 – Expand into media-rights, merchandising, and facilities ownership.
  • 2045–2050 – Control a major-league asset and use it to empower future generations via scholarships, pensions, research grants, and equity reinvestment.

Owning the Game—or Owning What Funds the Game?

The persistent call for African American ownership in major league sports raises a deeper question: Should African Americans even prioritize owning sports franchises, when we remain almost entirely absent from the very industries—technology, finance, energy, real estate—that generate the wealth used to buy these teams in the first place?

Mark Walter didn’t become the Lakers’ majority owner through basketball. He did it through Guggenheim Partners—a financial firm managing $345 billion in assets. Steve Ballmer bought the Clippers not from years of courtside ambition, but from cashing out Microsoft stock. Owners dominate sports not because of athletic brilliance, but because they own pipelines, patents, trading desks, and land—the assets that make sports ownership a byproduct, not a goal.

For African Americans, the concern isn’t just that they don’t own the team. It’s that they don’t own the banks that financed the team, the media companies that broadcast the games, or the tech platforms monetizing fan engagement. It is a misallocation of focus to aim for the outcome—sports ownership—without first entering the industries that produce ownership-level capital.

There’s no harm in wanting a seat in the owner’s box. But the more strategic question is: why not aim to own the entire ecosystem? The scoreboard. The stadium real estate. The ticketing software. The AI that tracks player stats. The advertising networks.

Athletes made sports cool. Billionaires made sports profitable. African America must ask whether it wants symbolic entry into an elite club—or whether it wants to control the industries that fund the club.

The real power isn’t just in the arena. It’s in what surrounds it. And until African Americans own those arenas—of finance, data, infrastructure, and media—they will always be positioned to play the game, but not define it.

Final Whistle

The scoreboard of ownership still reads 0-154 against African Americans in most major leagues. Talent fills highlight reels; equity fills trust funds. The route to flipping that score will not be paved by bigger contracts or more MVP trophies. It will be built through African American banks mobilizing capital, investment firms leading syndicates, and HBCU institutions gaining board seats—not just honorary jerseys.

Athletes have inspired generations. Now, institutions must finance generations.

The next dynasty to celebrate should not just hoist a trophy—it should hold a deed.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.