Category Archives: Banking & Credit Unions

The Quiet Collapse of HBCU-Based Credit Unions — and What Michigan State’s $8.26 Billion Juggernaut Reveals About the Cost

We went from bartering to dollars. We can go from capitalism to whatever may come next. But without institutional ownership of the institutions that control the circulation of the medium, without the institutional ownership that protects our economic interest, and without the institutional ownership that reduces financial risk in our community, then power and empowerment will always be reduced to the fantasy of freedom we tell ourselves with raised fists. – William A. Foster, IV

There is a financial story unfolding across the historically Black college and university landscape that is not receiving nearly enough attention. It is not a story about endowments, donor campaigns, or legislative funding fights — though it touches all of those. It is a story about credit unions: small, member-owned financial institutions that were once tethered to HBCUs as a gateway to financial inclusion for Black students, faculty, and alumni. One by one, they are disappearing. And the speed with which they have vanished over the past five years should alarm anyone who has spent even a passing moment thinking about African American wealth-building.

In 2020, HBCU Money published a comprehensive directory of all eleven HBCU-based credit unions in the country. The list was not long to begin with. Eleven institutions, spread across the nation, collectively holding $88.7 million in total assets and serving roughly 14,953 members. Those numbers were already modest bordering on fragile but they represented something tangible: a constellation of Black-controlled financial institutions with deep roots in the communities they served.

Today, that number has dropped to six.

Five HBCU-based credit unions have either closed or been acquired since that 2020 snapshot. Howard University Employees Federal Credit Union in Washington, D.C., which held $10.1 million in assets making it the fourth-largest in the group is no longer operational as an independent institution. Savannah State Teachers Federal Credit Union in Georgia, Tennessee State University’s credit union, and Shaw University’s federal credit union in Raleigh, North Carolina, the smallest of the group at just $400,000 in assets, have all ceased to exist as independent entities.

And then there is Prairie View A&M University Federal Credit Union, a case study in how these institutions disappear not with a clean closure, but with an acquisition that raises questions nobody seems willing to ask out loud. Prairie View FCU, which held $3.7 million in assets as of 2020, was absorbed by Cy-Fair Federal Credit Union, the credit union tied to Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District in the Houston suburbs. Prairie View FCU now operates as a division of Cy-Fair FCU, retaining its name and its single location at the foot of the PVAMU campus but operating entirely under Cy-Fair’s infrastructure, branding, and control. The Cy-Fair FCU website frames the arrangement in the warmest possible terms celebrating PVFCU’s “remarkable 85-year history” and its founding in 1937 by sixteen pioneers who created a financial institution to serve employees of what was then Texas’s first state-supported college for African Americans. The language is reverent. The reality is that an 85-year-old Black institution, one built by and for a Black community, is now a subsidiary of a school district credit union. This in and of itself should be acutely embarrassing to the HBCU community. A school district lording over a higher education institution community’s financial interest.

The choice of Cy-Fair FCU as the acquiring institution deserves scrutiny. Cypress-Fairbanks ISD is the third-largest school district in Texas, but its relationship with its Black community has been, to put it charitably, troubled. In 2020, the district was forced to confront documented racial disparities in its own student discipline where African American students made up 18.5 percent of enrollment but accounted for 38.7 percent of suspensions in the 2018-19 school year. The district commissioned an equity audit, and the results confirmed what critics had long alleged: districtwide discrepancies in academics, discipline, and staff representation along racial lines. White students consistently outperformed Black peers on standardized tests and graduated at higher rates, while the teaching staff remained overwhelmingly white — 66 percent white in 2019-20, even as the student body had become far more diverse.

The situation reached a national flashpoint in January 2022 when Cy-Fair ISD trustee Scott Henry, who had won his seat on a platform centered on opposing critical race theory, made remarks at a board work session that were widely condemned as racist. Henry openly questioned the value of hiring more Black teachers, pointing to Houston ISD’s higher percentage of Black educators and linking it to that district’s dropout rate — a claim that multiple studies and education researchers have thoroughly debunked. Harris County Judge Lina Hidalgo, then Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner, the NAACP, and the ACLU of Texas all called for his resignation. Henry was fired from his position at software company Splunk but, because he was elected, could not be removed from the board by his colleagues. His remarks, and the social media trail of racially charged posts that preceded them, painted a portrait of the ideological environment within Cy-Fair ISD’s governance.

It is into this environment that Prairie View FCU, an institution founded specifically to serve a historically Black university community was folded. The Cy-Fair FCU website does not dwell on any of this context. It offers a “Panther Card” debit card that channels a portion of spending back to PVAMU athletics, and it lists enhanced services like video banking and remote deposit. These are not trivial upgrades for an institution that previously lacked basic digital banking capabilities. But the upgrades come at a cost: Prairie View FCU’s independence, its board, and its autonomy as a Black-controlled financial institution are gone. What remains is a branding exercise — a name on a building, a division page on someone else’s website.

Five institutions, gone in roughly four years. What remains is a smaller, more concentrated group of survivors. According to 2025 data from the National Credit Union Administration, the six remaining HBCU-based credit unions now hold a combined $76.8 million in total assets and serve 11,588 members. Southern Teachers & Parents Federal Credit Union in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, leads the group at $28.9 million in assets. Florida A&M University Federal Credit Union in Tallahassee follows closely at $28.5 million. Virginia State University Federal Credit Union in South Chesterfield, Virginia, has seen meaningful growth, reaching $13.3 million in assets, a 54.4 percent increase since 2016. Councill Credit Union at Alabama A&M in Normal, Alabama, clocks in at $2.5 million, though it has lost roughly 28 percent of its assets over the same period. Arkansas A&M College Federal Credit Union in Pine Bluff holds $1.9 million, and Xavier University’s Credit Union in New Orleans, one of the smallest surviving institutions, manages $1.7 million.

The trajectory is not encouraging. Even among the survivors, total membership has declined by more than seven percent since 2016, dropping from 12,467 members to 11,588. The average assets per member across the group have risen — from $5,189 to $5,611 — but that figure is almost entirely a function of assets outpacing a shrinking membership base, not a sign of organic financial health or deepening engagement. These are institutions hemorrhaging members even as they struggle to grow. And that hemorrhaging did not catch everyone off guard. Back in February 2012, HBCU Money published a detailed proposal outlining a path forward for these credit unions — not as isolated, single-branch institutions stumbling through each academic year, but as a unified financial force. The concept was straightforward in theory: consolidate the eleven HBCU-based credit unions into a single national institution, or at the very least forge a formal alliance that would pool resources, share technology infrastructure, and create economies of scale.

The 2012 proposal painted a picture of what that consolidated institution could look like. With access to the combined workforce of HBCUs — roughly 180,000 full and part-time employees — along with approximately 400,000 students, over a million alumni, the endowments of more than a hundred institutions, and the financial ecosystems of the communities surrounding each campus, a unified HBCU credit union would have been one of the most significant African American-controlled financial institutions in the country. It would have had the scale to offer affordable mortgages, student loans, small business financing, and a suite of services that, individually, none of these credit unions could ever dream of providing.

That merger never materialized. The alliance was never formed. And the consequences of that inaction are now playing out in real time as institutions that might have been strengthened by consolidation instead fold into obscurity. The reasons for the failure are familiar and deeply structural. HBCU administrations have historically been risk-averse when it comes to financial innovation, partly because of the precarious funding environments many of these schools operate in, and partly because of a broader cultural reluctance to prioritize financial infrastructure as a strategic institutional asset. The credit unions themselves lacked the technological sophistication and institutional support needed to compete in a rapidly evolving financial services landscape. Many of them did not have functional websites, mobile apps, or even basic debit card programs, amenities that any modern financial institution would consider non-negotiable. As the 2020 directory noted, the most glaring deficiency was a lack of FinTech investment. Without it, these credit unions were structurally incapable of retaining members whose financial needs matured beyond what a single-branch, limited-service institution could offer.

To understand just how far behind HBCU-based credit unions have fallen, it helps to look at what a university-based credit union can become when it is given the institutional support, technological investment, and long-term strategic commitment to grow. Michigan State University Federal Credit Union — MSUFCU — is that example. And the comparison is, frankly, staggering. MSUFCU, headquartered in East Lansing, Michigan, is the largest university-based credit union in the world. Founded in 1937 by eight faculty and staff members — its earliest records were kept in a desk drawer, it has grown into a financial powerhouse that, as of 2025, serves over 367,000 members and holds $8.26 billion in assets. It operates out of more than 30 branches across Michigan, has expanded into the Chicago metropolitan area, and employs over 1,300 people. It is not just a credit union; it is a regional financial institution by any standard measure.

Put that number next to the combined assets of every African American credit union in the country including the six remaining HBCU-based credit unions and the disparity becomes almost difficult to articulate. The six surviving HBCU-based credit unions hold, collectively, $76.8 million in assets. MSUFCU holds $8.26 billion. That means a single predominantly white university credit union holds more than 107 times the combined assets of every HBCU-based credit union still in existence. MSUFCU’s assets are not just larger than the combined total of HBCU credit unions they exceed the total assets of virtually all African American credit unions in the country. The gap is not a crack. It is a canyon.

MSUFCU did not arrive at this scale through magic or accident. It grew because Michigan State University invested in it. It grew because the institution was given the runway to expand its membership base from employees to students to alumni and to build out the technological and physical infrastructure that a modern credit union requires. It grew because it had the institutional backing to pursue mergers and acquisitions, absorbing smaller credit unions and even banks as it expanded its geographic footprint. Every strategic move MSUFCU has made over the past several decades — the branch expansions, the technology partnerships, the acquisition of McHenry Savings Bank and Algonquin State Bank in the Chicago area — reflects a long-term institutional vision that HBCU-based credit unions have never had the support or the organizational will to pursue. The contrast is not merely about money. It is about institutional commitment. It is about whether a university sees its credit union as a strategic asset, a vehicle for building generational wealth among its community or as an afterthought, a small office on the edge of campus that serves a fraction of the student body and operates with minimal oversight and fewer resources.

The 2025 NCUA data on the six surviving HBCU-based credit unions tells a story of incremental progress layered on top of structural decline. Virginia State University Federal Credit Union is the clearest success story in the group, growing its assets by 54.4 percent since 2016 from $8.6 million to $13.3 million and increasing its assets per member by 87.1 percent, from $3,742 to $7,001. Florida A&M University Federal Credit Union has also seen solid growth, with total assets rising 41.3 percent to $28.5 million, and membership expanding by 16.5 percent to 3,918 members. But these gains are exceptions, not the rule. Southern Teachers & Parents Federal Credit Union in Baton Rouge, the largest in the group, has grown its assets by only 2 percent since 2016, and its membership has fallen by 15.6 percent, dropping from 5,124 members to 4,326. It is holding steady on assets while quietly bleeding its membership base. Councill Credit Union at Alabama A&M has seen its assets shrink by nearly 28 percent since 2016, and its membership has fallen by over 30 percent. Arkansas A&M College Federal Credit Union has lost 22.7 percent of its assets. Xavier University’s credit union has contracted by 36.3 percent in assets and lost 5 percent of its membership. Across the group, the median asset change since 2016 is negative 10.3 percent. The median membership change is negative 10.3 percent as well. For every Virginia State that is growing, there are two or three institutions quietly shrinking toward irrelevance.

The average assets per member across all six institutions now stands at $5,611, up from $5,189 in 2016. That is a 12.5 percent increase — a number that sounds encouraging until you consider that MSUFCU’s assets per member, calculated from its $8.26 billion in assets and 367,000 members, comes to approximately $22,500. HBCU credit union members hold, on average, roughly one-quarter of the per-member asset value that an MSU credit union member does. The wealth-building capacity of these institutions is simply not comparable.

The collapse of five HBCU-based credit unions between 2020 and 2025 is not an isolated event. It is a symptom of a larger pattern in African American financial infrastructure one in which institutions that could, in theory, serve as engines of wealth circulation and community investment instead wither from neglect, underfunding, and a failure of institutional imagination. The 2012 proposal for a consolidated HBCU credit union was not a radical idea. It was a practical one. Credit union mergers are common across the industry. MSUFCU itself has pursued multiple mergers and acquisitions as a core part of its growth strategy. The tools, the regulatory framework, and the precedent all exist. What has been missing is the will on the part of HBCU administrations, alumni networks, and the broader African American institutional ecosystem to treat financial infrastructure with the same urgency that is applied to endowment campaigns or facility renovations.

The #BankBlack movement that surged during the social justice awakening of 2020 brought renewed attention to African American financial institutions, including credit unions. But attention without structural investment is temporary. The members who were inspired to open accounts at HBCU credit unions during that period appear, in many cases, to have drifted away once the cultural moment passed, a pattern visible in the continued membership declines across the group.

If the remaining six HBCU-based credit unions are to survive and if the broader ecosystem of African American credit unions is to grow rather than contract the conversation must shift from nostalgia to strategy. That means revisiting the merger and alliance models that were proposed over a decade ago. It means demanding that HBCUs treat their credit unions as institutional priorities, not afterthoughts. It means investing in the technological infrastructure that members now expect as a baseline. And it means reckoning honestly with the fact that, while MSUFCU serves as an aspirational model, it did not build $8.26 billion in assets overnight. It built them over nearly ninety years of sustained, intentional institutional support.

The clock is not on HBCU credit unions’ side. The five that have already closed will not reopen. But the six that remain still hold something valuable: a foothold. The question is whether the institutions and communities they serve will invest in preserving it or whether the quiet collapse will simply continue, one credit union at a time, until there are none left to save.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

Credit Card Rate Caps Could Deepen Financial Inequality for African American Households

Our credit system, like almost institutional reality we have is very much dependent on Others. Until we realize and work towards infrastructure of our own institutional ownership within the credit landscape, then we will continue to be prey for predators and subsidizers that enriches others and their institutions. – William A. Foster, IV

When President Donald Trump announced a proposed 10% cap on credit card interest rates in January 2026, most Americans greeted the news with skeptical hope. The move seemed like a potential lifeline for families struggling with debt burdens and interest rates that often exceed 20%, even as many questioned whether it could actually happen. But for African American households, this well-intentioned policy could become another barrier in a financial system that has historically excluded and disadvantaged them.

The challenge lies not in the intention behind rate caps, but in their likely consequences. While lower interest rates sound beneficial on the surface, the economic reality of credit markets means that banks facing reduced profitability will respond by restricting who can access credit in the first place. For African American families already fighting against systemic barriers to financial services, this could close doors that were only partially open to begin with.

African American households face dramatically different credit market realities than their white counterparts. According to the FDIC’s 2023 survey, more than 10% of Black Americans lack access to basic checking or savings accounts, compared to just 2% of white Americans. This banking gap represents more than inconvenience it fundamentally limits the ability to build the credit history that determines access to affordable loans, mortgages, and yes, credit cards.

The wealth disparity tells an even starker story. The median net worth of white households stands at approximately $188,200, nearly eight times the $24,100 median for Black households. This gap isn’t accidental it’s the product of generations of discriminatory policies from redlining to predatory lending, compounded by the deterioration of African American-owned banks and credit unions. As Black ownership of financial institutions has declined, the community has become more reliant on external institutions for credit, creating conditions that invited more predatory lending into African American neighborhoods. When African Americans do access credit, they consistently face higher interest rates than white borrowers with similar incomes. High-income Black homeowners, for instance, receive mortgage rates comparable to low-income white homeowners.

The dependence on consumer credit has reached critical levels in African American households. Recent analysis from HBCU Money’s 2024 African America Annual Wealth Report reveals that consumer credit has surged to $740 billion, now representing nearly half of all African American household debt and approaching parity with home mortgage obligations of $780 billion. This near 1:1 ratio between consumer credit and mortgage debt represents a fundamental inversion of healthy household finance. For white households, the ratio stands at approximately 3:1 in favor of mortgage debt over consumer credit. The African American community stands alone in this precarious position, where high-interest, unsecured borrowing rivals the debt secured by appreciating assets.

These disparities matter enormously when considering how banks will respond to rate caps. Credit card companies operate on risk-based pricing models, charging higher rates to borrowers they perceive as riskier based on credit scores, income stability, and banking relationships. African American borrowers, because of structural disadvantages in each of these areas, already cluster in categories that receive higher interest rates. When banks can no longer charge those rates, they will simply stop offering credit to these borrowers entirely.

The banking industry’s response to Trump’s proposal has been swift and unequivocal: a 10% interest rate cap would force them to dramatically restrict credit availability. Analysis from the American Bankers Association suggests that nearly 95% of subprime borrowers, those with credit scores below 680 would lose access to credit cards under even a 15% cap. With rates currently averaging around 20%, a 10% ceiling would affect even more borrowers. Industry analysts estimate that between 82% and 88% of credit cardholders could see their cards eliminated or their credit limits drastically reduced. The Electronic Payments Coalition warns that low to moderate income consumers would be hit hardest, precisely the demographic where African American households are disproportionately represented.

This isn’t just industry fearmongering. Historical evidence supports these concerns. When Illinois implemented a 36% APR cap on all borrowing, lending to subprime borrowers plummeted. Similar patterns emerged from 19th-century usury laws and research on payday loan restrictions. The consistent pattern is clear: when rate caps make lending unprofitable, lenders exit the market or tighten requirements. For African American households, this creates a devastating catch-22. They’re more likely to need credit due to lower wealth levels and less access to family financial support. Yet they’re also more likely to be denied that credit or pushed into predatory alternatives when traditional sources dry up.

The credit card industry categorizes borrowers by risk, with subprime borrowers facing the highest rates but also the greatest need for access to credit. African American consumers are overrepresented in subprime categories, not because of personal failing but because of systemic factors that suppress credit scores. Historical discrimination in housing, employment, and lending created wealth gaps that persist through generations. Lower wealth means less ability to weather financial shocks, leading to missed payments that damage credit scores.

When major banks stop serving subprime borrowers, those families don’t suddenly stop needing credit. They turn to alternative sources and here’s where the rate cap could cause real harm. Payday lenders, pawn shops, auto title loans, and other fringe financial services often charge effective annual percentage rates far exceeding credit card rates, sometimes reaching 300% to 400% or higher. These services operate in a less regulated space where consumer protections are weaker and predatory practices more common.

African American neighborhoods already contain disproportionately high concentrations of these alternative lenders, a modern echo of historical redlining patterns. Bank branches are scarce in many predominantly Black communities, while check-cashing outlets and payday loan storefronts proliferate. A rate cap that drives more families into this unregulated market would exacerbate existing inequities. The irony is profound. A policy designed to protect consumers from high interest rates could push vulnerable families toward even higher costs and fewer protections. JPMorgan analysts warned that the rate cap could redirect borrowing away from regulated banks toward pawn shops and non-bank consumer lenders, increasing risks for consumers already under financial strain.

The consequences of restricted credit access extend far beyond the immediate inability to make purchases. Credit cards serve as emergency funds for families without substantial savings, a category that includes a disproportionate number of African American households. For many Black families facing persistent income gaps, credit cards function not just as a convenience but as an income supplemental tool, helping to bridge the gap between earnings and the actual cost of living. When a car breaks down, a medical bill arrives, or a job loss creates temporary income disruption, credit cards can mean the difference between weathering the storm and falling into a debt spiral that damages credit for years.

The reality is that consumer credit has become essential infrastructure for African American household finance. With consumer credit growing by 10.4% in 2024, more than double the 4.0% growth in mortgage debt, Black families are increasingly dependent on expensive borrowing to maintain living standards. This isn’t a choice so much as a structural reality of trying to survive on incomes that remain roughly 60% of median white household income while facing higher costs for everything from insurance to groceries in predominantly Black neighborhoods.

Small business ownership represents another critical pathway to wealth building where African Americans face systemic barriers. Black entrepreneurs already struggle to access business loans, with approval rates significantly lower than for white business owners with similar qualifications, another systemic issue from African American banks and credit unions having limited deposits and being unable to extend loans and credit. Many small business owners use personal credit cards to fund startup costs, inventory purchases, and cash flow gaps. Restricting credit card access would eliminate this crucial financing option for aspiring Black entrepreneurs.

The rewards and benefits ecosystem could also shift dramatically. Banks have indicated they would likely reduce or eliminate rewards programs to offset lost interest income from rate caps. While this might seem minor compared to interest savings, rewards programs have become an important tool for building value, particularly for higher-credit consumers who pay balances in full monthly. The Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator research found that borrowers with credit scores of 760 or lower would see reductions in credit card rewards under a rate cap. Perhaps most concerning is the potential for credit scoring and financial history deterioration. When credit lines are closed or limits reduced, credit utilization ratios increase, which damages credit scores. This creates a downward spiral where reduced access leads to worse credit, which leads to further reduced access. For African American families working to build credit and financial stability, this could set progress back by years.

The genuine problem of high credit card interest rates and mounting consumer debt deserves serious policy attention. But effective solutions must account for how credit markets actually function and who would be most affected by reduced access. Rather than interest rate caps, policymakers should consider approaches that expand access while addressing affordability. Strengthening African American-owned banks, credit unions, and community development financial institutions would restore economic self-determination to communities that once had thriving financial ecosystems. These institutions don’t just serve African American communities they’re owned by them, led by them, and invested in their long-term prosperity. Historically, Black-owned banks have proven they can maintain sound lending practices while understanding the full context of their customers’ financial lives in ways that large, distant institutions simply cannot.

Currently, there are only 18 Black or African American owned banks with combined assets of just $6.4 billion, a tiny fraction of the industry. The absence of robust Black-owned financial institutions means that virtually all of the $740 billion in consumer credit carried by African American households flows to institutions outside the community. With African American-owned banks holding assets equivalent to less than 1% of Black household debt, the overwhelming majority of interest payments—potentially $120 billion annually—enriches predominantly white-owned institutions with no vested interest in Black wealth creation or community reinvestment. This extraction mechanism operates continuously, draining capital that could otherwise be intermediated through Black-owned institutions to support local lending and community development.

Strengthening requirements for transparent pricing, fee limitations, and responsible lending standards could protect consumers without eliminating credit availability. Regulators could mandate clearer disclosure of total costs, limit penalty fees that disproportionately burden those already struggling, and establish guardrails against predatory terms while preserving access to credit itself. Yet even these modest reforms face an uphill battle in the current political climate. The reality is that meaningful policy solutions require political will that simply doesn’t exist right now for addressing racial economic disparities directly. This makes the unintended consequences of blunt instruments like interest rate caps even more dangerous—they can restrict credit access under the banner of consumer protection while offering no viable alternatives.

The fundamental reality is clear: waiting for federal policy to solve credit access problems is a losing strategy. African American households face a specific set of economic challenges rooted in a specific history, and the solutions must be equally specific not generic approaches that treat all groups the same. The path forward requires African American communities to build their own financial infrastructure. This means capitalizing and expanding Black-owned banks and credit unions that can offer credit products designed for the actual economic realities of their customers, not risk models built on white wealth patterns. It means creating community-based lending circles and cooperative credit arrangements that leverage collective resources. It means developing alternative credit scoring systems that account for rent payments, utility bills, and other financial behaviors that traditional models ignore.

Rebuilding this sector isn’t about charity or inclusion; it’s about economic self-determination. Black-owned financial institutions have historically understood that a credit score doesn’t tell the whole story of a person’s creditworthiness, and they’ve made sound lending decisions based on relationship banking and community knowledge that large institutions can’t replicate. The challenge isn’t convincing European American owned banks to be fairer, it’s building the capacity to not need them as much. When African American communities had stronger networks of Black-owned banks, insurance companies, and credit unions, they had more options and more power. Rebuilding that infrastructure, combined with individual financial strategies that emphasize building assets and reducing dependence on consumer credit, offers a more sustainable path than hoping for beneficial federal intervention.

A 10% interest rate cap might sound appealing in the abstract, but for African American households, it likely means one thing: less access to the credit system entirely. The question then becomes not whether mainstream banks will treat Black borrowers fairly, but how communities can create their own credit access systems that serve their actual needs. That’s not a policy problem it’s a community capacity problem, and it requires community-driven solutions.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

Institutional Agriculture: How HBCUs and Black Banks Can Build a Farm Credit System of Our Own

It’s tough for all farmers, but when you throw in discrimination and racism and unfair lending practices, it’s really hard for you to make it. – John Boyd, Jr., Founder of the National Black Farmers Association

America’s oldest financial divide is agricultural. Once, the majority of African Americans lived and labored on land; now, less than 1.4% of the nation’s 3.4 million farmers are African American. The disappearance of Black farmers is not only a human story—it is a story of capital deprivation, institutional neglect, and the collapse of an ecosystem that once linked land, education, and community credit. To reverse this, imagine if each of the 19 land-grant institutions in the 1890 HBCU system committed $1 million from their endowments and alumni associations to create a unified private lending fund. This $19 million “1890 Fund” would not sit passively in treasuries or bond portfolios but circulate directly through African American banks and credit unions, financing African American farmers and food producers across the country. Such a fund would be modest in scale but revolutionary in concept, a self-directed act of institutional cooperation that reconnects three critical arteries of African American economic life: land-grant HBCUs, African American financial institutions, and Black agricultural producers.

The 1890 HBCUs, institutions such as Tuskegee University, Prairie View A&M, North Carolina A&T, and Florida A&M were established as part of the Second Morrill Act of 1890 to serve African Americans excluded from the original land-grant colleges. Their purpose was not abstract scholarship but applied science: to teach, research, and extend knowledge about agriculture, engineering, and the mechanical arts. Over time, many of these schools evolved into comprehensive universities. Yet the decline of Black farmers and the consolidation of farmland under non-Black ownership represent a direct erosion of the very population these universities were created to serve. Between 1910 and 2020, African American land ownership fell by roughly 90%, from an estimated 15–16 million acres to less than 2 million today. The structural dispossession through discriminatory lending, heirs’ property laws, and USDA bias has left African American farmers with less access to credit and fewer pathways to generational land retention. HBCUs were founded to be a shield against such vulnerability. The 1890 Fund would revive that founding spirit, transforming their agricultural programs and extension centers into engines of financial empowerment rather than merely research hubs dependent on federal grants.

Each 1890 HBCU would allocate $1 million from a combination of its endowment and alumni association reserves, with matching commitments encouraged through philanthropic donors or corporate partners. The pooled fund $19 million at launch would be professionally managed under a cooperative structure, similar to a community development financial institution or business development company. The fund would not make direct loans itself but would place its capital into African American-owned banks and credit unions identified in HBCU Money’s 2024 African American-Owned Bank Directory. Institutions such as OneUnited Bank, Industrial Bank, Citizens Trust Bank, and smaller but vital credit unions like FAMU Federal Credit Union or Hope Credit Union would serve as the lending conduits. In effect, the 1890 Fund would function as the “wholesale” capital pool of low-interest (but profitable), long-duration deposits or certificates placed with African American banks that, in turn, originate and service loans to qualified African American farmers, cooperatives, and agri-businesses. Loans would range from $25,000 micro-lines for new producers to $500,000 or more for established operations seeking equipment, irrigation, or land expansion. Priority would be given to farmers with relationships to HBCU agricultural programs such as those who have completed workshops, extension training, or student partnerships. Each bank or credit union participating would commit to transparent reporting, with loan performance and demographic data shared annually with the 1890 Foundation. The revolving structure of repayments would ensure that as farmers succeed, their payments replenish the pool for new borrowers creating a regenerative loop of institutional and community wealth.

Routing the fund through African American financial institutions is not symbolic it is structural. Historically, Black farmers were denied access to credit through traditional banks and faced redlining by federal programs. Even today, USDA lending disproportionately benefits white farmers. African American banks and credit unions remain among the few institutions with both the cultural understanding and community trust necessary to underwrite these borrowers responsibly. Moreover, these banks themselves are chronically undercapitalized. With combined assets of roughly $7.5 billion across the sector, African American banks represent barely 0.001% of total U.S. banking assets, insufficient to exert meaningful influence in national credit markets. By placing deposits into these banks, HBCUs would strengthen their liquidity ratios, reduce dependence on volatile retail deposits, and expand lending capacity far beyond the fund’s nominal amount through fractional reserve leverage. In short, every dollar committed by an HBCU could translate into $7–$10 in agricultural lending capacity once multiplied through the banking system.

HBCU alumni associations hold untapped potential as financial intermediaries. While endowments must operate under fiduciary and investment constraints, alumni associations often have greater flexibility. They can act as private limited partners in the 1890 Fund, contributing capital from dues, life membership funds, or targeted campaigns such as “Adopt-a-Farmer.” Imagine an alumni chapter of Florida A&M underwriting 10 acres of hydroponic greens for a local farmer who agrees to hire FAMU agriculture graduates. Or Prairie View alumni pooling funds to purchase cold-chain trucks for dairy producers across Texas. These actions extend the HBCU brand into the real economy transforming loyalty into tangible economic development. Each alumni association could also create its own micro-fund linked to the central 1890 Fund, mirroring the “chapter endowment” concept used by major universities. This networked structure would democratize investment and bring the broader African American middle class into the process of agricultural renaissance.

Lending alone does not sustain farmers; ecosystems do. The 1890 Fund would operate most effectively if it integrated with the broader HBCU agricultural and business infrastructure. HBCU agricultural economists could conduct continuous impact analysis tracking how capital access affects yields, profitability, and land retention. Their findings would strengthen advocacy for increased African American private capital. Extension programs could pair loan recipients with agronomists and soil scientists to ensure that capital is used productively and sustainably. HBCU-affiliated food labs, hospitality programs, and dining services could prioritize procurement from funded farmers, creating closed-loop demand. Business schools could develop crop insurance products and risk models tailored to small producers, mitigating the vulnerability that has historically devastated African American farms. Student internships in finance, agriculture, and data science could be embedded in the fund’s operations training the next generation of agricultural financiers and analysts. This approach transforms the 1890 Fund from a mere loan pool into a comprehensive agricultural development platform.

The greatest strength of the 1890 Fund lies in its multiplier effect. Consider: $19 million revolving annually at a conservative 6% loan rate generates roughly $1.1 million in annual interest income—income that can be reinvested or partially distributed back to participating universities to grow the fund. If repayments are recycled annually, the fund could underwrite over $100 million in cumulative loans within its first decade. The macroeconomic ripple is job creation, land retention, and input purchases that would expand rural GDP in African American counties and increase deposit growth for the participating banks. Contrast this with the status quo: endowment funds largely held in Wall Street instruments that yield moderate returns but generate no localized impact. By re-directing even a fraction of assets into mission-aligned community lending, HBCUs align their investments with their historic purpose of educating and empowering the descendants of those who built the land.

The global contest for food security is intensifying. Nations that control food production, water, and soil fertility will control the future. For African America, regaining agricultural capacity is not nostalgic it is strategic. Every acre restored to productive use by African American farmers increases food sovereignty and reduces dependence on foreign or corporate supply chains. If HBCUs act collectively through the 1890 Fund, they position themselves as key players in regional and national food policy. They could partner with African universities for climate-resilient crop research, link with Caribbean agricultural cooperatives for trade, and develop transatlantic agribusiness ventures under the banner of Black institutional power. Such cooperation would redefine “land-grant” for the 21st century not as a relic of American expansion but as a global model of Pan-African capital deployment.

The road to building the 1890 Fund will not be smoothed by political cooperation. The federal and state governments that oversee the 1890 land-grant system are, in many cases, openly hostile toward African American advancement. Most of the 1890 HBCUs operate in states where racial resentment, austerity politics, and legislative interference remain the norm. These are states that have withheld or delayed millions in matching funds, imposed discriminatory audits, and used political appointments to keep HBCUs subordinate to their predominantly white peers. Under such conditions, the 1890 Fund is not merely an investment vehicle it is a form of institutional defense. Federal and state policy cannot be relied upon to sustain African American agriculture or financial independence. The only realistic path forward is one where HBCUs, alumni associations, and African American banks coordinate their own internal economy of capital, shielded from political manipulation.

This is where the 1890 Foundation becomes indispensable. Established to support the collective mission of the 1890 universities, the Foundation already exists as a neutral, centralized, and professionally managed entity capable of administering joint initiatives on behalf of all 19 institutions. Tasking it with managing the 1890 Fund would provide immediate credibility, legal infrastructure, and continuity. The Foundation could structure the fund as a private, revolving loan pool, capitalized through contributions from university endowments, alumni associations, and strategic partners, while remaining beyond the reach of hostile state legislatures. Governance through the 1890 Foundation would also protect participating universities from political retaliation. Rather than each HBCU appearing to act independently potentially inviting scrutiny from governors or state boards the fund’s activities could be coordinated under the Foundation’s national charter. This collective structure would allow for scale, professional risk management, and a unified investment policy aligned with the long-term interests of African American farmers and institutions.

Nevertheless, challenges remain. Some university boards, especially those with state-appointed trustees, may hesitate to commit endowment dollars to what they perceive as politically sensitive or unconventional investments. The uneven size of endowments ranging from under $50 million at smaller 1890s to more than $200 million at the largest could create tensions over proportional contributions. And while the 1890 Foundation provides an ideal governance structure, it would still need to secure regulatory clarity and investment expertise to manage a multi-million-dollar lending operation through external financial institutions. These risks, however, are outweighed by the opportunity to build economic sovereignty in an era of state hostility. The very conditions meant to weaken HBCUs like political obstruction, financial starvation, and bureaucratic oversight can become the catalysts for collective independence. If the 1890 Fund channels its capital through African American banks and credit unions, it strengthens two institutional pillars simultaneously: HBCUs regain control over how their endowments circulate, and Black-owned financial institutions gain the liquidity and leverage they need to expand.

The political hostility surrounding 1890 HBCUs should not be seen as a deterrent, but as confirmation of why this fund must exist. It demonstrates that African American progress, even in the 21st century, cannot depend on state benevolence. By empowering the 1890 Foundation to manage a private, self-sustaining fund, HBCUs would be acting in the same spirit of independence that defined their creation in 1890 when the federal government forced states to either open their existing land-grant colleges to Black students or create new ones for them. The 1890 Fund would be the modern continuation of that act of defiance transforming exclusion into enterprise. Through the 1890 Foundation’s leadership, African American endowments, farmers, and banks could finally operate in unison, beyond the grasp of state control. In doing so, they would build not just a lending mechanism, but a shield—a financial structure capable of outlasting political hostility and securing the long-term survival of Black agricultural and institutional power.

If the 1890 Fund fulfills its purpose, its long-term success should evolve into something even greater, a joint venture between the 1890 Foundation, African American banks, and African American credit unions that establishes a new national financial institution: one modeled on the Farm Credit System but existing independently from it to preserve full financial sovereignty. The Farm Credit System is a government-sponsored network of cooperative lenders that provides over $400 billion in loans and financial services to farmers, ranchers, and agricultural businesses across the United States. Its reach is vast and influential, covering roughly 40% of all agricultural debt in the country. Yet African American farmers have historically been excluded from its benefits. The FCS, like much of American agricultural policy, was built in an era when Black ownership was being systematically dismantled. It became a backbone for white rural wealth while African American farmers were left to navigate a labyrinth of local banks, discriminatory USDA programs, and predatory lending.

A successful 1890 Fund would prove that African American institutions: universities, banks, and credit unions can design a credit network capable of rivaling the FCS’s effectiveness, without its dependencies or racial exclusions. Over time, this collaboration could be formalized into a joint enterprise: the African American Agricultural Credit Alliance: a cooperative, member-driven, nationwide system built to finance not just farms but the entire food and fiber value chain. Like the FCS, it could be composed of multiple regional lending cooperatives, each capitalized by a blend of HBCU endowment investments, bank deposits, and credit union member capital. At its center would sit a national coordinating body responsible for liquidity management, risk pooling, and bond issuance. But unlike the FCS, this alliance would be entirely private and its governance drawn from the 1890 Foundation, the African American Credit Union Coalition, and the National Black Farmers Association. The goal would not be to replicate the FCS’s structure exactly but to rival its scale, providing affordable credit, insurance, equipment financing, and agri-business investment under the umbrella of Black-owned control.

Refusing to integrate into the existing Farm Credit System is not a rejection of efficiency it is a declaration of sovereignty. The FCS, though cooperative in name, ultimately answers to federal regulators, congressional committees, and a system of oversight that has never prioritized Black agricultural survival. Independence ensures that capital allocation decisions remain rooted in African American priorities—restoring land, building ownership, and sustaining communities rather than maximizing short-term returns. Financial sovereignty also allows for creative lending models that the FCS cannot adopt under federal restrictions, such as cooperative land trusts, heirs’ property buyouts, carbon-credit-backed collateral, or blockchain-based agricultural exchanges.

The evolution from the 1890 Fund to a fully realized agricultural credit system would expand capital from millions into billions. Once the fund demonstrates consistent performance, its track record could attract institutional investors like African American foundations, pension funds, and even sovereign funds from the African diaspora seeking mission-aligned, asset-backed investments. Through securitization and bond issuance, the alliance could channel long-term capital into rural Black communities, funding everything from precision agriculture and agroforestry to food processing and logistics. This would make agriculture once again an attractive sector for young entrepreneurs and HBCU graduates. Over time, the 1890 Fund could thus mature into an ecosystem capable of reindustrializing Black rural America through ownership and control of capital.

The creation of such a system would carry global implications. It could link with agricultural cooperatives in Africa and the Caribbean, forming a transatlantic agricultural finance corridor and positioning African American institutions as both lenders and investors in global food systems. The founding of the 1890 Fund, therefore, would not be an endpoint but the beginning of a long journey toward financial nationhood. The eventual establishment of an independent agricultural credit alliance would mark the institutionalization of economic sovereignty—a transformation from temporary coordination to permanent capacity.

The 1890 Fund embodies the principle that power comes from ownership, not participation. For too long, African American institutions have waited for external validation or federal rescue. The tools for rebuilding agricultural sovereignty already exist: universities with land and research infrastructure, banks with local lending channels, and farmers with generational knowledge. When linked together, these elements form a complete ecosystem capable of restoring both land and leverage. The $1 million commitment from each 1890 HBCU would not be a gift it would be a strategic investment in self-determination. If executed, within a generation the 1890 Fund could help reclaim millions of acres, incubate thousands of Black-owned farms, and expand the asset base of African American financial institutions. It would also serve as a model for other sectors like manufacturing, housing, and technology demonstrating how collective capital deployment transforms a marginalized community into a nation within a nation.

As Dr. Booker T. Washington once observed, “No race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem.” The modern corollary is that no people can be free until they can finance their own fields. The 1890 Fund is not only a mechanism for loans it is a blueprint for liberation through institutional coordination. Its success could lay the groundwork for a sovereign financial architecture that, like the land it seeks to reclaim, will belong entirely to the people who cultivate it.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.

The Debt That Could Bind Us: Why African American Banks Must Engage African Debt Markets to Strengthen Diaspora Sovereignty

“Control of credit is control of destiny. Until Our institutions decide where Our capital sleeps and wakes, Our freedom will remain on loan.” – William A. Foster, IV

The African diaspora’s greatest unrealized financial potential may lie not in Wall Street, but in the vast and growing debt markets of Africa. Across the continent, nations are negotiating, restructuring, and reimagining how they fund development. At the same time, African American banks and financial institutions, small but strategically positioned in the global Black economic architecture, stand largely on the sidelines. This disconnection is more than a missed investment opportunity; it is a failure of transnational financial imagination. If the descendants of Africa in America wish to secure true sovereignty, interconnectivity, and global influence, engaging African debt markets is not optional it is imperative.

Africa’s debt profile is as complex as it is misunderstood. Many Western narratives frame African debt in crisis terms, yet that view ignores the sophistication of African capital markets and the diversity of creditors. The continent’s public debt stood around $1.8 trillion by 2025, but much of this borrowing has gone toward infrastructure and industrial expansion. The key shift in recent years has been away from traditional multilateral lenders toward bilateral and market-based finance particularly through Chinese, Gulf, and private bond markets. Countries like Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia have issued Eurobonds in recent years, often at higher interest rates due to perceptions of risk rather than fundamental insolvency. Others, such as Zambia, have undergone restructuring efforts designed to rebalance repayment with growth. In each case, Africa’s economic story remains one of ambition constrained by external debt conditions, a pattern reminiscent of the post-Reconstruction era Black South, when capital starvation and dependency on non-Black lenders limited autonomy and intergenerational power. That parallel matters deeply for African Americans. The same global financial order that restricts African nations’ fiscal independence also limits the growth of African American financial institutions. The tools that could change both realities already exist within the diaspora: capital pools, credit analysis expertise, and shared strategic interest in sovereignty.

African American banks—roughly 18 federally insured institutions as of 2025—control an estimated $6.4 billion in combined assets. While that is a fraction of what one mid-sized regional white-owned bank manages, these institutions hold a symbolic and strategic power far greater than their balance sheets suggest. They remain the custodians of community trust, the anchors of small-business lending in historically neglected markets, and potential conduits for international financial collaboration. Historically, African American banks were created to fill a void left by exclusionary financial systems. But in the 21st century, their mission can evolve beyond domestic community lending toward global financial participation. The African debt market, currently dominated by Western institutions that extract value through high interest and credit rating manipulation, offers a natural arena for African American engagement. If Black banks can collectively participate through bond purchases, underwriting partnerships, or diaspora-focused sovereign funds they could help shift Africa’s dependence from Western and Asian creditors toward diaspora-based capital flows. This would not only stabilize African economies, but also create transnational linkages that reinforce both African and African American economic self-determination.

Consider the power of mutual indebtedness as a political tool. When nations or institutions lend to each other, they form durable relationships governed by trust, negotiation, and shared interest. For too long, the African diaspora’s relationship with Africa has been philanthropic or cultural rather than financial. That model, however well-intentioned, is structurally disempowering and it reinforces dependency rather than partnership. Debt, properly structured, reverses that dynamic. If African American financial institutions were to purchase or underwrite African sovereign and municipal debt, they would create financial obligations that tether African states to diaspora capital, not to exploit but to interdepend. This is the foundation of modern sovereignty: the ability to borrow and invest within your own cultural and political network rather than through intermediaries who extract value and dictate terms. Imagine, for instance, a syndicated loan or bond issuance where a consortium of African American banks, credit unions, and philanthropic financial arms partner with African development banks or ministries of finance. The terms could prioritize developmental outcomes like affordable housing, small business lending, renewable energy while generating steady returns. The instruments could even be marketed domestically as “Diaspora Sovereign Bonds,” accessible through digital platforms. The impact would be twofold: African American banks would diversify their portfolios and tap into emerging market yields, while African governments would gain access to capital free from neocolonial conditions.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) stand at the crossroads of intellect, finance, and heritage. Their institutional capacity, academic talent, and alumni networks make them natural architects for a new financial relationship between the African diaspora and the African continent. Yet this potential comes with risk, particularly for public HBCUs, whose visibility and state dependency could make them targets of political and financial backlash. If a public HBCU were to openly participate in or advocate for engagement with African debt markets, it would likely face scrutiny from state legislatures, regulatory bodies, and entrenched financial interests. Such activity would be perceived by non–African American–owned banks and state-level policymakers as a challenge to existing capital hierarchies. The idea of Black public institutions developing transnational financial alliances outside traditional Western frameworks threatens not only market control but ideological narratives about where and how Black institutions should operate. To navigate this terrain, public HBCUs must be strategic, creative, and stealth in execution. Their participation in African financial engagement cannot be loud; it must be layered. They can do so through consortia, research collaborations, and investment partnerships that quietly build expertise and influence without triggering overt resistance. For example, an HBCU economics department could conduct African sovereign credit research under a global development initiative, while a business school could host “emerging market” investment programs that include African debt instruments without explicitly branding them as Pan-African.

Private HBCUs, freer from state oversight, can play a more overt role forming partnerships with African banks, hosting diaspora finance summits, and seeding funds dedicated to Africa-centered investments. But public institutions must operate with a subtler hand, leveraging think tanks, foundations, and alumni networks to pursue the same ends through indirect channels. Creativity will be their shield. Collaboration with African American–owned banks, credit unions, or diaspora investment funds can serve as intermediary structures allowing HBCUs to channel research, expertise, and even capital participation without placing the institutions themselves in direct political crossfire.

Both public and private HBCUs must also activate and empower their alumni associations as extensions of institutional sovereignty. Alumni associations exist in a different legal and political space and they are often registered as independent nonprofits, free from the direct control of state governments or university boards. This autonomy allows them to operate where the universities cannot. Through alumni associations, HBCUs can channel capital, intelligence, and partnerships in ways that stay outside the reach of regulators or political gatekeepers. Alumni bodies can create joint funds, invest in African debt instruments, or collaborate with African banks and diaspora enterprises. The understanding between HBCUs and their alumni networks must be clear and disciplined: the institution provides intellectual and structural guidance; the alumni associations execute the capital movement. This relationship becomes a discreet circulatory system of sovereignty with universities generating the vision and expertise, alumni executing the financial maneuvers that advance that vision.

HBCUs can further support this ecosystem by funneling institutional capital and intellectual property toward their alumni associations in strategic, deniable ways. Research centers can license data or consulting services to alumni-managed firms. Endowments can allocate small funds to “external collaborations” that, in practice, seed diaspora initiatives. Career and alumni offices can quietly match graduates in finance and development with African institutions seeking diaspora partners. These are small, legal, but potent acts of quiet nation-building. The success of this strategy depends on discipline, secrecy, and shared purpose. HBCUs, particularly the public ones, must move as institutions that understand the historical realities of Black advancement: every act of power must be both visionary and shielded. Alumni associations, meanwhile, must operate as the agile extensions of these universities, taking calculated risks on behalf of the larger mission. If executed carefully, this dual structure of HBCUs as the intellectual architects and alumni associations as the financial executors creates a protected channel for diaspora wealth creation. It allows public institutions to avoid political exposure while still advancing the collective objective: redirecting Black capital toward Africa and reestablishing a financial circuit of trust, obligation, and empowerment across the diaspora. In this model, the public HBCU becomes the hidden engineer, the private HBCU the visible vanguard, and the alumni network the financial hand. Together, they form an ecosystem of quiet innovation and a movement that builds transnational Black sovereignty not through protest or proclamation, but through precise and deliberate financial design.

Skeptics might argue that African American banks lack the scale or technical capacity to engage in sovereign lending. This concern, while not unfounded, can be addressed through collaboration. No single Black institution must go it alone. The path forward lies in consortium models of pooling resources, sharing risk, and leveraging collective bargaining power. Diaspora bond funds could be structured as partnerships between African American banks, HBCU endowments, and African development finance institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) or Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). These organizations already have experience managing sovereign risk and would benefit from diaspora participation, which strengthens their political legitimacy. Furthermore, technology has lowered the cost of entry into complex financial markets. Digital banking, blockchain-based identity verification, and fintech partnerships can allow diaspora institutions to participate in cross-border finance with greater transparency and speed. The real obstacle, therefore, is not capacity it is vision. The diaspora’s capital remains trapped within Western financial systems that reward liquidity but punish sovereignty. Redirecting even a fraction of that capital toward Africa would shift the balance of global economic power in subtle but profound ways.

Sovereignty in the modern world is measured as much in capital access as in military or political power. Nations that cannot borrow on fair terms cannot build on fair terms. The same is true for communities. African Americans, long denied fair access to capital, should understand this truth intimately. The African debt question, then, is not a distant geopolitical matter it is a mirror. If African American banks and financial institutions continue to operate solely within the parameters of domestic credit markets, their growth will remain capped by a system designed to contain them. But if they extend their vision outward to the African continent, to Caribbean nations, to the global diaspora then they create new asset classes, new partnerships, and new pathways to power. Moreover, engagement with African debt markets enhances geopolitical influence. It positions African American institutions as interlocutors between Africa and global finance, enabling a collective voice on credit ratings, debt restructuring, and investment policy. That is the kind of influence that cannot be achieved through philanthropy or symbolism it is built through transactions, treaties, and trust.

Other diasporas have already proven this model works. Jewish, Indian, and Chinese global networks have long used financial interconnectivity as a tool of sovereignty. Israel’s government issues bonds directly to diaspora investors through the Development Corporation for Israel—a program that has raised over $46 billion since 1951. The Indian diaspora contributes billions annually in remittances and investments that underpin India’s foreign reserves. The African diaspora, by contrast, remains financially fragmented despite its vast size and income. With over 140 million people of African descent living outside Africa, the potential for coordinated capital deployment is immense. Even modest participation of say, $10 billion annually in diaspora-held African bonds would change the global conversation around African finance and diaspora economics. This scale of engagement requires trust, transparency, and accountability. African nations must commit to governance reforms and anti-corruption measures that assure diaspora investors of integrity. Likewise, African American institutions must build financial literacy and confidence around African markets, overcoming decades of Western media narratives portraying the continent as unstable or uninvestable.

The long-term vision is a self-sustaining ecosystem of diaspora credit: African American and Caribbean banks pool capital to buy or underwrite African debt; HBCUs model sovereign risk, publish credit analyses, and design diaspora finance curricula; African governments and regional banks issue diaspora-oriented financial instruments; fintech platforms connect diaspora investors directly to African projects; and cultural finance diplomacy transforms diaspora engagement into official national strategy. The ecosystem would allow wealth to circulate within the global African community rather than being siphoned outward through exploitative intermediaries. Over time, such networks could support not only debt financing but also equity investment, venture capital, and trade finance all under the umbrella of Black sovereignty economics.

At its core, this initiative is not merely about money. It is about the reconfiguration of power. The African diaspora cannot achieve full sovereignty while its economic lifeblood flows through institutions indifferent or hostile to its future. Engaging African debt markets transforms the diaspora from spectators of African development into its co-architects. It also transforms Africa from a borrower of last resort to a partner of first resort within its global family. For African American banks, this is the logical next chapter. The institutions that once shielded Black wealth from domestic exclusion now have the opportunity to project that wealth into international inclusion. It is a matter of strategic foresight aligning moral mission with financial opportunity. As the world edges toward a multipolar order where the U.S., China, and regional blocs vie for influence, the African diaspora must define its own sphere of power not through slogans but through balance sheets. A sovereign people must have sovereign finance.

Toward a Diaspora Credit Ecosystem

The long-term vision is a self-sustaining ecosystem of diaspora credit:

  1. Diaspora Banks & Funds: African American and Caribbean banks pool capital to buy or underwrite African debt.
  2. HBCU Research Hubs: HBCUs model sovereign risk, publish credit analyses, and design diaspora finance curricula.
  3. African Institutions: African governments and regional banks issue diaspora-oriented financial instruments.
  4. Fintech Platforms: Secure, regulated digital systems connect diaspora investors directly to African projects.
  5. Cultural Finance Diplomacy: Diaspora engagement becomes part of national policy—similar to how nations court foreign direct investment today.

The ecosystem would allow wealth to circulate within the global African community rather than being siphoned outward through exploitative intermediaries. Over time, such networks could support not only debt financing but also equity investment, venture capital, and trade finance all under the umbrella of Black sovereignty economics.

In 1900, at the First Pan-African Conference in London, W.E.B. Du Bois declared, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” A century later, that color line has become a credit line. It is drawn not only across borders but across ledgers between who lends and who borrows, who owns and who owes. The African American bank and the African treasury are not distant cousins; they are parts of one economic body severed by history and waiting to be reconnected by will. Engaging African debt markets is not charity it is strategy. It is the financial expression of unity long preached but rarely practiced. The next stage of the African world’s freedom struggle will not be won merely in the streets or in the schools. It will be won in the boardrooms where capital chooses its direction. If African American finance chooses Africa, both sides of the Atlantic will rise together not as debtors and creditors, but as partners in sovereignty.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.

More Than A Decade Later: New York’s Carver Bank Has Not Returned To African American Ownership

At close of market May 16th, 2025 Carver Federal Savings Bank (Ticker: CARV) stock price was $1.37 and had a market capitalization of $7 million.

In the heart of Harlem, a modest stone building bears a powerful legacy. Carver Federal Savings Bank, founded in 1948 to serve African Americans shut out of the financial system, once stood as a proud monument of Black economic independence. But more than a decade after a series of financial interventions shifted its ownership structure, Carver remains out of African American hands—raising questions about the future of Black-owned banking in America’s largest city.

For much of the 20th century, Carver Federal Savings Bank wasn’t just a bank—it was a symbol. Born in the crucible of racial segregation, the bank was named after George Washington Carver, a gesture toward economic empowerment and self-reliance in an era when African Americans couldn’t freely access mortgages, capital, or commercial loans. Carver stood apart as one of the few banks chartered to serve underserved Black communities with full-service financial products, not just basic deposit services. By the 2000s, Carver had grown into the largest Black-operated bank in the United States, holding nearly $800 million in assets and a footprint that extended across New York City. But the financial crisis of 2008 brought a devastating blow to community banks nationwide. Carver was no exception.

In 2011, to prevent collapse, Carver accepted a $55 million recapitalization led by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Prudential Financial. The deal saved the institution from immediate failure but came with a price: Black ownership was diluted, and eventually disappeared altogether. “It was like watching a cultural landmark sold off piece by piece,” says Alfred Edmond Jr., senior vice president at Black Enterprise. The investors involved in the bailout argued that their capital preserved an essential community institution. Without it, Carver may have followed the path of other Black banks that shuttered in the wake of the crisis. Yet critics argue that Wall Street’s “rescue” functioned more as a quiet takeover.

As of 2024, Carver is publicly traded under the ticker symbol CARV on the NASDAQ. But its board of directors and major shareholders no longer reflect the community it was founded to serve. African American representation remains, but it is symbolic at best—not controlling. This is not merely symbolic loss. According to a 2023 Federal Reserve report, only 16 Black-owned banks remain in the United States—down from more than 50 in the 1990s. Black-owned banks hold less than 0.01% of America’s banking assets, despite African Americans comprising over 13% of the population. These institutions face outsized scrutiny, undercapitalization, and, more recently, cultural erasure. “Carver’s transformation reflects a broader systemic problem,” says Mehrsa Baradaran, professor of law and author of The Color of Money: Black Banks and the Racial Wealth Gap. “These banks are often asked to solve problems created by centuries of exclusion without the capital or autonomy to do so.”

In the wake of the George Floyd protests in 2020, corporate America made a wave of public commitments to racial equity. JPMorgan Chase pledged $30 billion. Bank of America committed $1 billion. A smaller yet symbolically important gesture came in the form of investments into Black-owned banks, often through special deposit programs or equity infusions. Carver, still labeled as a Minority Depository Institution (MDI), became the recipient of some of this renewed attention. Goldman Sachs’s One Million Black Women initiative included community bank support. JPMorgan made technical assistance available. But none of these efforts changed the fact that the bank was no longer under Black control. “The irony is that companies are promoting racial equity while owning and profiting from a once-Black institution,” says Nicole C. Elam, president and CEO of the National Bankers Association. “There’s no accountability mechanism to ensure community control is returned.” Despite all the attention, Carver’s stock remains volatile, trading below $4 per share for much of 2024. Its market capitalization hovers under $20 million—hardly a prize for large investors. And yet, efforts to return control to Black investors or the community have stalled.

At first glance, the logic is simple. If Black community leaders or financial institutions want Carver back, why not just buy it? The answer, as usual, lies in a thicket of regulatory burdens, capital constraints, and systemic inequities. First, buying back a publicly traded bank is not cheap. Not only must investors pay for the shares, they must also meet stringent capital adequacy standards, undergo intense scrutiny from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the FDIC, and develop a viable turnaround plan. That requires not only money, but financial expertise and a willing group of institutional backers. Second, Black institutional capital remains relatively shallow. The combined assets of all Black banks in America are less than those of a mid-sized regional bank. Few HBCU endowments top $1 billion. Black venture capital and private equity firms are growing but still under-resourced. “If you don’t control the capital, you don’t control the bank,” says John Rogers Jr., founder of Ariel Investments. “And Black America still doesn’t have control of the capital.”

Some believe that the pandemic-era racial reckoning presented a missed opportunity. Corporate America was writing big checks. Foundations were searching for credible ways to support Black wealth-building. Influential Black philanthropists like Robert F. Smith and Mellody Hobson were encouraging long-term investments. With the right coordination, a capital stack combining philanthropy, mission-oriented investment, and community contributions could have reestablished Black control of Carver. But that coordination never materialized. “Institution building takes vision and orchestration. We had the moment. What we didn’t have was the mechanism,” says William Michael Cunningham, an economist and banking analyst. “Everyone wanted to help, but no one wanted to lead.”

New York’s political leadership has been largely silent on the issue. Harlem’s representation in the city council and state legislature rarely mentions Carver publicly. Even as the Adams administration touts equity initiatives and minority small business support, it has not made a coordinated effort to support community banking or institutional ownership transfer. Compare this to other minority community examples. In Chicago, the city has created a $100 million Community Wealth Fund to help finance minority entrepreneurs and institutions. In Atlanta, the Russell Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship works closely with regional banks and city government to support Black business ecosystems. “New York talks a good game,” says Inez Barron, a former city councilmember. “But when it comes to economic infrastructure, the silence is deafening.”

The erosion of Black control of Carver has not gone unnoticed by its depositors. Harlem residents and small business owners say they still bank with Carver out of loyalty—but many no longer see it as their bank. “The staff are still great. The service is personal. But it doesn’t feel like we own it anymore,” says Celeste Washington, who owns a beauty salon two blocks from the 125th Street branch. “It feels like a museum of what Black finance used to be.” Others are more cynical. “It’s the same bank name, same building, but a different master,” says a former Carver employee who requested anonymity. “The soul’s been sold.”

Despite the challenges, some financial architects are working to engineer a return to community control. One idea gaining traction is a cooperative buyback. Using a vehicle similar to a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), a collective of Black investors, philanthropists, and mission-driven capitalists could pool resources to buy out majority shareholders. A parallel idea involves transferring shares to a nonprofit trust governed by Harlem residents and business leaders. Others are pushing for a broader transformation of Black institutional capital. “We need to stop thinking of banks as only banks,” says economist Darrick Hamilton. “Think of them as economic platforms—distribution points for housing finance, entrepreneurship, education loans, and job creation. That’s what Carver could be again.” A Black-owned financial institution, particularly in a city as rich and diverse as New York, could be pivotal in building a community-centered economic ecosystem—from affordable housing cooperatives to small business lending networks to cultural real estate ownership.

Observers say that Black colleges and universities, especially those in the northeast like Howard University, Lincoln University (PA), and Morgan State, could play a strategic role. These institutions, along with Black philanthropic funds and pension boards, could pool endowment dollars to create an acquisition consortium. Even a modest $50 million fund could provide enough leverage to reclaim majority control and reorient Carver toward mission-driven service. “Imagine if Carver became the lead underwriter of mortgages for Black college alumni in major cities,” says Anthony Jackson, a Black banking consultant. “Or the back-end servicer of student loan refinancing for HBCU graduates. That kind of synergy could multiply.” The projected ROI on such a move isn’t trivial. Assuming a 10% annual return over 30 years, a $50 million investment grows to more than $872 million—more than the combined assets of most Black-owned banks today. It’s a long-term play—but one that offers strategic cultural, economic, and financial returns.

Carver’s story is still being written. It could continue as a bank preserved in name only, a hollowed-out shell of its former self. Or, with vision, coordination, and capital, it could return to its original purpose: not merely to serve Black communities, but to be owned by them. What’s at stake is more than a bank. It’s about ownership, power, and whether the symbols of Black advancement can be reclaimed—or will remain curated artifacts of a more ambitious past.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.