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HBCU B-Schools’ Leadership Still Embarrassingly Lacking In HBCU Alumni

The most difficult thing in life is to know yourself. — Thales

The Graham Principle: Why HBCU Business Schools Must Lead From Within

Warren Buffett’s rejection by Benjamin Graham is more than a quaint footnote in the history of American finance. It is a parable about institutional loyalty, strategic insulation, and the deliberate construction of parallel economic power. Graham, the architect of value investing, declined to hire the future Oracle of Omaha not for lack of qualification but for reasons of principle. At a moment when Wall Street’s doors remained firmly closed to European American Jews, Graham made a conscious decision to build from within his own community. His hiring practices were not sentimental. They were strategic—an act of institutional self-preservation in a market structured against him. He understood that talent required more than identification; it required cultivation, protection, and deliberate positioning within institutions the community itself controlled.

A decade has passed since anyone undertook a comprehensive examination of leadership trends within HBCU business schools. The intervening years might reasonably have produced a renaissance of internal cultivation—an era defined by deliberate succession planning, alumni-led governance, and a clear institutional commitment to developing leadership from within. That hope has gone largely unrealized. Across the landscape of HBCU business education, the preference for external hires persists, the pipeline for internal leadership development remains thin, and the governing logic of these schools continues to defer, implicitly or explicitly, to standards of excellence defined by the very institutions that historically excluded Black scholars from full participation.

The appointment of deans and senior faculty from predominantly white institutions is routinely framed as a commitment to excellence—the familiar rhetoric of meritocracy dressed in the language of best practices. What this framing systematically obscures is the structural disadvantage HBCU graduates face in academic and professional labor markets, disadvantages produced not by deficiency but by decades of underfunding, network exclusion, and credential discrimination. When HBCU business schools accept this framing uncritically, they do not rise above structural inequality; they reproduce it within their own walls. The result is a business education ecosystem that remains institutionally disconnected from the communities it is chartered to serve.

Of the 85 accredited HBCU business schools and departments operating under the latest available data, fewer than 20 percent are led by HBCU alumni. Of that minority, fewer than half hold both undergraduate and graduate degrees from HBCUs, further attenuating the institutional knowledge that might otherwise be reinvested across the ecosystem. The contrast with elite PWI practice is clarifying. Approximately 75 percent of business school deans at Ivy League institutions hold at least one degree from an Ivy League school. This is not coincidence. It reflects a deliberate institutional philosophy that prizes continuity, internal network loyalty, and cultural capital accumulated within the institution itself. These schools understand that leadership is not merely a management function. It is an expression of institutional identity and a mechanism for transmitting values across generations of students and faculty.

HBCU business schools have not absorbed that lesson with equivalent seriousness. The absence of a deliberate succession strategy—one that identifies, mentors, and elevates internal talent over sustained periods—constitutes a structural failure that compounds over time. When young Black scholars do not see themselves reflected in the senior leadership of their own institutions, the implicit signal is that the path to authority runs elsewhere. And so it does. Promising scholars educated at HBCUs routinely migrate to PWIs for higher compensation, greater prestige, or more robust professional infrastructure. When those scholars eventually ascend to positions of institutional leadership, their loyalty and networks do not reliably return. The brain drain becomes self-reinforcing, and the institutions that initially formed these scholars see little of the compounded return on that investment.

This pattern might be called institutional amnesia—a collective failure to study, internalize, and replicate the strategies through which other minority communities have built durable institutional ecosystems. Jewish, Catholic, and Mormon institutions have each constructed powerful networks by systematically aligning leadership selection with community identity, concentrating institutional resources within their own structures, and maintaining cultural continuity across leadership transitions. They benchmark their performance against their own historical trajectories and communal objectives, not against the preferences of institutions oriented toward different communities and different purposes. HBCU business schools, by contrast, frequently evaluate themselves against ranking systems and accreditation frameworks built around metrics that reflect neither their mission nor the specific market failures their students are positioned to address.

The strategic costs of this posture are substantial and compounding. Recruitment searches for business school deans, when conducted through executive search firms, routinely exceed $250,000 in direct expense. When that investment produces a dean with limited institutional loyalty and no deep roots in the community the school serves, the organization is exposed to the further costs of short tenures, strategic discontinuity, and misaligned fundraising. Business schools function as economic engines—engines that generate networks, direct student talent toward particular career paths, shape research agendas, and produce or fail to produce the intellectual infrastructure that sustains community-level economic development. Leadership that lacks genuine cultural and strategic commitment to the HBCU mission cannot be expected to operate that engine in the community’s interest.

The curriculum consequences are equally significant. HBCU business schools exist in a moment when the structural dimensions of Black economic life—persistent wealth gaps, discriminatory access to capital, the collapse of Black-owned financial institutions, the chronic underdevelopment of Black neighborhoods—constitute some of the most pressing and tractable problems in American political economy. Addressing those problems requires not merely academic competence but institutional orientation. Who is designing curricula around cooperative economics and community wealth retention? Who is building research programs on Black entrepreneurship, the historical function of Black banking, and the mechanics of financial exclusion? Who is developing partnerships with Black-owned financial institutions, investment funds, and real estate developers that would allow students to graduate with network capital as well as intellectual credentials? These priorities require leadership that has been formed within the ecosystem, that understands its history, and that has a personal stake in its long-term trajectory.

The Graham analogy holds at precisely this level of analysis. Graham’s decision to hire from within his community was not a concession to sentiment. It was a calculated judgment that institutional effectiveness depended on leadership whose values, networks, and long-term interests were structurally aligned with the institution’s mission. He was not interested in demonstrating that his firm could attract talent validated by mainstream institutions. He was interested in building something that would compound over time within his own community’s orbit. The question for HBCU business school leadership is whether a comparable institutional logic is possible—and whether the will exists to pursue it.

The remedies are neither mysterious nor beyond reach, but they require deliberate institutional action sustained over years rather than episodic declarations of intent. HBCU business schools must establish formal succession pipelines that identify promising alumni early, support their doctoral training and early-career development, and create structured pathways back into institutional leadership. Mentorship programs, leadership fellowships, and transparent internal promotion tracks are the instruments through which this pipeline is built and maintained. Without them, talented HBCU alumni will continue to be absorbed by institutions with superior infrastructure, and the cycle of external dependence will continue.

Boards of trustees and presidential leadership must also reckon honestly with the hiring criteria that have produced current outcomes. Cultural alignment, mission literacy, and demonstrated investment in HBCU communities should carry weight commensurate with academic credentials in dean and faculty searches. These are not competing values. They are complementary ones, and institutions that treat them as such will find that the pool of qualified, mission-aligned candidates is larger than conventional search processes have suggested.

The benchmarks against which HBCU business schools measure their progress require reconstruction as well. Chasing rankings defined by and for PWIs produces strategic mimicry rather than institutional distinctiveness. The appropriate comparators are institutions that have used internal leadership and community alignment to produce durable economic outcomes for the communities they serve. The relevant question is not whether an HBCU business school resembles Wharton. It is whether that school is building the human capital, research infrastructure, and network density that the African American institutional ecosystem requires to become economically self-reinforcing.

Alumni hold a particular form of leverage in this process that has been insufficiently exercised. Philanthropic capital directed toward HBCU business schools carries with it the legitimate expectation of institutional integrity. Alumni who fund these schools are entitled to ask whether the institutions are investing in their own—whether succession planning exists, whether internal candidates are being developed and promoted, whether the school’s research and curricular agenda reflects the community’s strategic needs. These are not hostile demands. They are the expressions of institutional ownership that any serious donor community directs toward the organizations it sustains.

The broader HBCU ecosystem has long understood, at least in principle, that institutional density is the precondition for community resilience. Strong communities are not produced by exceptional individuals operating in isolation. They are produced by networks of reinforcing institutions—universities, banks, hospitals, media organizations, research centers—that retain capital, concentrate talent, and coordinate strategically across organizational boundaries. Business schools are a critical node in that network. They are the institutions most directly positioned to translate academic investment into economic infrastructure, to convert tuition into entrepreneurial capacity, and to channel philanthropic capital into research that serves the community’s long-term interests. Their leadership must reflect that position.

The failure to develop and elevate HBCU alumni into business school leadership is not simply an administrative oversight. It is a strategic error with consequences that extend well beyond the schools themselves. Every dean recruited from outside the ecosystem without a plan to develop internal successors is a missed compounding opportunity. Every promising scholar who departs for a PWI without a pathway back represents a loss of accumulated institutional knowledge that will not return on its own. Every curriculum designed to satisfy external accreditation standards at the expense of community-relevant content is a semester in which the institution’s potential as an engine of economic development goes partially unrealized.

Graham built his firm on the premise that talent required institutional protection to reach its full potential—that external markets, structured against your community, could not be trusted to recognize or reward what you were building. That premise has lost none of its force. HBCU business schools that internalize it, and act on it with the rigor and consistency it demands, will be better positioned to fulfill the extraordinary institutional promise that their founding represented. Those that continue to defer to external validation and outsourced leadership will find that the promise remains exactly that—unrealized, and over time, increasingly difficult to recover.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ClaudeAI.

From Classrooms to Cleanrooms: What HBCUs Must Do to Compete with PWIs in Deep Tech and Semiconductor Innovation

“A lot of kids growing up today aren’t told that you can be whatever you want to be. I am living proof you can do that. If you have the talent and the passion, you can build the future.” – Mark Dean, Black IBM engineer and inventor who co-created the personal computer and holds three of IBM’s original nine PC patents

In late June 2025, HEXAspec—a Rice University spinout—captured a $500,000 National Science Foundation (NSF) Partnership for Innovation grant for its breakthrough work in thermal management for GPUs. In a tech world grappling with the environmental and efficiency challenges of artificial intelligence (AI) and high-performance computing, the achievement turned heads across academic, investment, and scientific communities alike. Yet amid the applause lies a hard truth: not one HBCU was remotely close to competing for that same prize. Not because HBCUs lack talent, but because they lack the systemic infrastructure to harvest, incubate, and capitalize on that talent.

The chasm between HBCUs and predominantly white institutions (PWIs) in deep tech commercialization is as wide as it is worrisome. Deep tech—defined by transformative innovation in areas like semiconductors, quantum computing, and climate technology—requires long-term capital, robust research infrastructure, and high-trust, high-dollar partnerships with government and industry. These are precisely the things HBCUs have historically been denied or underinvested in. The question now is not whether HBCUs can catch up—but whether they will prioritize institutional shifts necessary to stop losing by default.

The Innovation Economy: The New Gateway to Power

Today’s innovation economy is no longer driven by consumer startups hawking mobile apps. Instead, it is being shaped by semiconductors, AI infrastructure, clean energy technologies, and advanced materials. These domains form the core of what the Department of Commerce calls “national critical capabilities”—a short list of sectors that will dictate U.S. competitiveness in the coming century.

The federal government, through the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and NSF initiatives like the Engines program, has made clear where it will direct its attention—and money. However, most of that funding has flowed to elite PWIs like MIT, Stanford, and Rice. Why? Because those institutions have built systems that convert faculty research into startups, license technologies to Fortune 500 companies, and aggressively pursue government grants through dedicated offices with seasoned staff and alumni connections.

HBCUs, by contrast, often find themselves trapped in subsistence mode—juggling shrinking state funding, donor droughts, and outdated infrastructure. Even when they do produce brilliant scientists and engineers, they are often siphoned off by PWIs, venture capital firms, or federal labs where their IP contributions enrich other institutions.

The goal for HBCUs is not just to get a slice of the pie—it is to own the bakery.

Why HBCUs Are Losing in Deep Tech (And How To Fix It)

1. No Institutionalized Commercialization Pathways

Rice University’s HEXAspec didn’t win a grant because of luck. It emerged from the university’s Liu Idea Lab for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Lilie), which exists solely to help faculty and students translate research into viable companies. Most HBCUs do not have such a lab—or even a dedicated Office of Technology Transfer.

To compete, HBCUs must institutionalize commercialization in their mission. This means establishing:

  • Internal seed funding mechanisms for promising research
  • Technology transfer offices with experienced patent lawyers and startup advisors
  • Accelerator programs targeting deep tech verticals
  • Alumni angel networks to fund spinouts

Without these, ideas will remain trapped in the lab—and the economic fruits will go elsewhere.

2. Lack of Research Infrastructure in Key Industries

Semiconductors, materials science, and energy storage require state-of-the-art labs, cleanrooms, and expensive machinery. These are multi-million-dollar commitments most HBCUs currently lack. But waiting for philanthropy or state generosity to fund them is a losing strategy.

Instead, HBCUs should pursue regional consortia to co-own such infrastructure. For example, a Deep South Semiconductor Consortium could bring together Jackson State, Tuskegee, Southern University, and Prairie View A&M to jointly invest in fabrication labs, wafer testing facilities, and AI research clusters. Land-grant HBCUs have both the land and the federal designation to attract such funding—if they are organized and bold.

3. Underleveraged Alumni Networks

MIT alumni fund startups before most even have a name. At HBCUs, alumni often wait for a call to contribute to scholarships or athletic departments. There is little systemic cultivation of alumni as early-stage investors, strategic partners, or board members in research spinouts.

This must change. Institutions like Howard, Morehouse, and NC A&T should be grooming alumni with industry experience to invest in campus spinouts. HBCU endowments should allocate a small percentage to internal venture capital—seeding their own companies instead of investing in white-led VC funds that ignore Black founders.

4. Faculty Incentives and Sabbaticals

Many HBCU faculty juggle overwhelming teaching loads, with little time or incentive for research commercialization. Unlike PWIs, where professors routinely take sabbaticals to commercialize research or sit on startup boards, HBCUs rarely support such flexibility.

Presidents and provosts must restructure faculty contracts to reward commercialization, encourage patent filings, and support teaching reductions for faculty leading deep tech ventures. Faculty must become institutional entrepreneurs, not just employees.

Federal Funding Alone Won’t Save Us

Yes, HBCUs have been historically underfunded. Yes, they face structural racism. But federal funding, when it comes, should meet us halfway—not pull us from the basement. Competing for NSF grants requires grant writers, internal review committees, and aggressive outreach. When Rice University wins NSF money, it’s because the institution has a playbook.

HBCUs need a playbook. The White House’s Initiative on HBCUs can fund technical assistance centers focused on grant acquisition, proposal design, and intellectual property strategy. These centers should live at HBCUs, not just be managed by consulting firms and retired PWI administrators with no stake in HBCU sovereignty.

Deep Tech is a Strategic Asset. HBCUs Must Treat it as Such.

In 2025, global supply chains are being rewritten. Semiconductor control is no longer just an industry issue—it is national security. Nations are forming tech alliances. Cities are building innovation districts. And investors are backing companies with decade-long R&D timelines because the rewards are generational.

HBCUs must enter this arena with the same clarity and urgency as any geopolitical actor. The institutions that helped engineer Black America’s ascent during segregation must now help engineer Black America’s role in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. That means going far beyond DEI rhetoric and focusing on institutional capital, not just human capital.

What a Competitive HBCU Ecosystem Could Look Like

Imagine this:

  • Howard University launches a Deep Tech Lab with funding from Black-led venture capital firms.
  • NC A&T, already a top producer of Black engineers, builds a quantum computing facility co-owned with MIT Lincoln Lab, with graduates flowing into DARPA-backed projects.
  • Fisk University, with its elite physics tradition, leads a semiconductor materials initiative funded through an HBCU Engines grant from NSF.
  • HBCU United, a new consortium of 30 HBCUs, pools $100M in alumni capital to invest in research commercialization, faculty sabbaticals, and patent acquisition.

This is not fantasy. It is simply the result of what happens when HBCUs start behaving like institutions of power—not institutions asking for inclusion.

Compete or Be Colonized (Again)

The innovation economy is not just about startups and science. It is about who will own the 21st century. If HBCUs do not build internal capacity to compete in the deep tech space, they will become labor farms—training brilliant Black minds who will go on to build white wealth.

Rice University’s HEXAspec is a signal — and a threat. It tells us what’s possible. The question is whether HBCUs will treat it as a wake-up call or another missed opportunity.

In the words of Frederick Douglass, “Power concedes nothing without a demand.” It’s time HBCUs demand more—of themselves and of the systems they are meant to challenge. The lab coats may be new, but the game remains the same: compete, or be colonized.

Disclaimer: This article was assisted by ChatGPT.